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1. The ‘please-do-not-write-by-pen’-sign
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                           : 
Introduction 
On some computer screens, particularly large projection screens used for class-
room presentations, you may find a peculiar pictogram, showing a right hand 
holding a pen, crossed out by a bold red diagonal line – not unlike a non-smoking 
sign – conveying the warning ‘do not write here’.1 Against a backdrop of an old-
fashioned blackboard in the seminar room, the sign takes on a historical meaning. 
Indeed, we only rarely write with chalk or pen these days, as our private desktops 
and public classrooms are inundated with computers and media equipment, and 
our writing tools mostly consist of keyboards, screens, and projectors. Handwrit-
ing, in the age of the Internet and digital media, is considered by many to be a back-
ward technique, a slowly deteriorating and gradually vanishing tradition, and the 
myth of its decline is as widespread as the pictogram. After all, the sign addresses 
only those rare specimens of the human race who are, as of yet, unfamiliar with the 
very basic principles of multimedia. Like the non-smoking sign, ‘writing without a 
pen’ is now supposed to become the default mode in our contemporary class-
room.
Ever since the invention and spread of moveable type in modern times and of 
the typewriter in the late-19th century, the idiosyncrasy of manual writing has giv-
en way to standardized, replicable, power-driven letters produced by machines. 
With the advent of word processors, the significance of ‘hand’ in conjunction with 
‘writing’ is expected to diminish even further, as the cultural emphasis on digital 
flexibility and infinite manipulation is displacing values traditionally attached to 
handwriting, such as authenticity, uniqueness, and personality. But despite the 
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widespread and invasive mechanization of writing, the power and meaning of 
handwriting goes way beyond its standardizing instruments of inscription. Hand-
writing has given rise to a number of cultural practices, such as letter writing, and 
cultural forms, such as diaries or Post-it notes. Moreover, handwriting is also an 
aesthetic category that we still uniquely associate with a manual craft: from callig-
raphy to urban graffiti, from tattooing to signing, the physical, the human hand is 
pivotal in the production of letters and texts. 
Will handwriting actually disappear in the age of new (digital) media? In fact, 
we argue in this volume that this question is philosophically and historically incor-
rect. It is philosophically erroneous because it presumes a teleological relationship 
between media and their ensuing practices and forms. Technologies, cultural prac-
tices and forms, however, always change in conjunction with each other, and al-
though specific apparatuses may be displaced in the course of time, related forms 
and practices hardly ever vanish. If we look at the history of handwriting, we may 
notice that in spite of the emergence of generations of ‘writing machines’, manual 
script has never disappeared; on the contrary, as it evolved, handwriting adjusted 
its practical functions, social meanings and cultural aesthetics. The introduction of 
the typewriter, for instance, shifted the emphasis to the standardization of script, 
but it may even have increased the notion of authenticity associated with hand-
writing. The invention of machines like the Xerox copier or the digital scanner 
once again shifted the use and meaning of handwriting by enabling the reproduc-
tion of individual handwriting, and, in the case of Optical Character Reading 
(ocr) as it is also used in the latest invention of the tablet PC, the automatic tran-
scription of manual script into typeface. In addition, technologies that are not im-
mediately script-related, such as photography and film, also affected the cultural 
meaning of handwriting, if only because these technologies allowed for an exact 
‘recording’ of the manual act or its product. Handwriting, in other words, has nev-
er disappeared in the wake of new technologies, but has always adjusted its use 
and meaning in the face of larger technological, social, and cultural transforma-
tions. It is therefore hard to believe that handwriting will vanish, as long as its tech-
nologies are intimately tied to particular cultural practices and forms that are con-
tinued in the present. 
Technologies, forms, and practices are inscribed with cultural values that 
change along with larger social and cultural transformations. Important cultural 
concepts, such as original and copy, authenticity, reproducibility, uniqueness, or it-
erability, are never anchored once and for all because the cultural value of these 
concepts shifts with every innovation or transformation. For instance, in the 19th 
century, the meaning of ‘uniqueness’ metamorphosed in the wake of apparatuses 
enabling mechanical reproduction. By the same token, the concept of ‘authentici-
ty’ is currently undergoing a substantial overhaul now that computers are becom-
ing the preferred tools for (written) communication. Signatures, for instance, were 
supposed to be authentic, idiosyncratic signs of selves, intimately tied to the hand 
that produced them; now that they are gradually replaced by memorized codes 
and biometrical scans, the former handwritten sign of identification is no longer 
considered foolproof. The exchangeability of original and copy prompts us to re-
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consider conventional notions of manuscripts: what counts as an original ‘docu-
ment’ in the current digitized office environment? And why do we value handwrit-
ten manuscripts as ‘authentic’ proofs of historical persons or events? Every new 
technology not only affects our everyday habits and practices in using them, but 
also situates handwriting in a new perspective, thus requiring a reinterpretation of 
its meaning. 
This collection of essays will address three aspects of handwriting in the age of 
new media: authenticity, remediation, and (dis)embodiment. Each of these aspects 
will be further elucidated in the paragraphs below. 
The articles collected in the first section of this volume focus on an aspect of hand-
writing that is dramatically challenged by mechanical and electronic reproduction 
practices: its claim to authenticity. Handwriting is traditionally regarded as an 
autography, as an un-exchangeable, unique and authentic ‘signature’ that claims 
to guarantee the presence of an individual writer during a historically unique mo-
ment of writing.2 This claim for authenticity distinguishes handwriting from its 
cultural opposite, mechanical writing, in the sense of print or typed writing. After 
all, the cultural significance of mechanical writing resides in its capacity to be iter-
able and reproducible. The reproduction of authentic handwriting, on the other 
hand, risks being considered a forgery. This view on handwriting has a long tradi-
tion in different disciplines, most importantly in jurisprudence, but also in histori-
cal studies of original sources, and in art theory, where it delineates the status of 
the artist/author. In connection with the 20th-century’s technological develop-
ments, the idea of the uniqueness of the signature has been challenged philosophi-
cally, most profoundly by Derrida in his famous essay ‘Signature, Event, Context’. 
Derrida claims that the signature is a performative sign; its validity – or as Austin 
would say, its ‘felicity’ – is grounded in the fact that the signature is a singular 
event, and that it repeats or quotes a set of norms constituting a cultural or juridi-
cal context.
This section explores how the double structure of a signature as both singular 
and iterable needs to be redressed in the wake of technological reproduction. How 
do the concepts of uniqueness and iteration, of authenticity and counterfeit in rela-
tion to handwriting, change when the binary opposition ‘authentic’ vis-à-vis ‘copy’ 
no longer appears to be anchored in the distinctive materiality of the sign? And 
what are the consequences for both historical and contemporary cultural forms 
and practices still hinging on modernist notions of authenticity?
As a common starting point for the articles collected in this section, we chose 
Walter Benjamin’s famous article ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Re-
production’. His article is still challenging, not only because it touches on the com-
plexity of the problem of authenticity and its interrelations with notions of unique-
ness and originality, but also because it anticipates many of the more recent theo-
retical debates about cultural objects in the age of new media, including digital me-
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dia. In addition to putting contemporary debates in a historical perspective, it also 
renders the concept of authenticity relevant if not center stage for the disciplines 
represented in this volume.
In his renowned piece, Benjamin investigates the art status of reproduced art-
works. Original artworks, such as paintings, are singular and durable, and they 
therefore have an ‘aura’ connecting them to a certain tradition. For Benjamin, au-
thenticity relates to the here and now of the original artwork, ‘its presence in time 
and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be’ (220). Repro-
duced artworks, on the other hand, are regarded as iterable and transient, they 
lack this ‘aura’, as they primarily serve ‘the desire of contemporary masses to bring 
things “closer” spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward 
overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction’ (223). 
Unfortunately, Benjamin does not elaborate on the ‘auratic’ status of writing in his 
essay. The aim of this section, in a way, is to fill that gap. For now, we will tenta-
tively argue that, according to Benjamin’s classification of cultural objects, writing 
should be considered non-auratic. The basic principle of writing, after all, is repeti-
tion. The alphabet, a discrete number of distinct letters, is standardized for the 
sake of iteration and of mechanical reproduction – first by Gutenberg’s movable 
type, later by the typewriter, and, most recently, by electronic media. It was for 
good reasons that Friedrich Kittler, in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, categorized 
the typewriter as referring to Lacan’s symbolic system:
Only the typewriter provides writing as a selection from the finite and ar-
ranged stock of its keyboard. It literally embodies what Lacan illustrated 
using the antiquated letter box. In contrast to the flow of handwriting, we 
now have discrete elements separated by spaces. Thus, the symbolic has the 
status of block letters. (28-29)3 
We will argue in response to Kittler that handwriting, in spite of its fluidity, is still 
bound up with the symbolic system of language – in the sense of a system of differ-
ences – and as such, it is spellable and repeatable. Still, it does make sense to con-
trast, as Kittler does, handwriting with its cultural opposite, typed writing, to ex-
plore the ‘auratic’ dimension of handwriting that resides in its authenticity. Let us 
tentatively describe the authenticity of handwriting by means of three criteria 
marking the boundaries between handwriting and typed writing, that is, singular-
ity, individuality, and materiality.
Singularity. A typed text may be printed in an unlimited number of ways and 
in an infinite variety of materials without it directly influencing its authenticity. 
Written text is reproducible, printable, and, as Nelson Goodman states in his Lan-
guages of Art, ‘allographic’, or ‘spellable’.4 The reproduction of handwriting, 
however, requires reproduction technologies that are closer to those of images 
than to those of writing. Handwriting, therefore, functions like painting or draw-
ing, which are categorized by Goodman as ‘autography’ because their central qual-
ity resides in their uniqueness. Even though the basic principle of all writing is it-
eration, for handwriting there is no such thing as two manuscripts that look exact-
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ly the same – except if one is a perfect Xerox copy of the other. But then, it can be 
expected that one will wish to distinguish between the original, ‘auratic’ version 
and the copy.
Individuality. The authenticity of handwriting, as opposed to typed writing, 
resides also in its potential to refer to an un-exchangeable individual. Handwriting 
is regarded as auratic because of its capacity to function as a signature that claims 
to guarantee the presence of an individual writer during a historically unique mo-
ment of writing. Whereas in typed writing, as Martin Heidegger (119) has argued, 
‘every person looks the same’, for handwriting, there is no such thing as two indi-
viduals writing identically.5 Except, of course, in Goethe’s novel Wahlverwandt-
schaften, in which the lovers Eduard and Ottilie, miraculously enough, used the 
same handwriting (cf. Hörisch, chapter I/2).
Materiality. This subjectivity, then, is physically inscribed in the movement and 
the pressure of the pen led across the paper, leaving there an un-exchangeable, per-
sonal trace. If handwritten manuscripts are regarded as ‘auratic’, their ‘aura’ re-
sides precisely in their material authenticity incorporating the undividable ‘here 
and now’ of the manuscript’s historical origin. 
The problem central to this first section of the book can be grasped by the ex-
ample of the pentagraph, a multiple writing machine that made its appearance at 
the end of the 18th century (Illustration 2). James O’Toole describes the function-
ing of this machine as follows: ‘The pentagraph was constructed so that, as the 
writer moved one pen along a sheet of paper, another pen, attached to it by wood-
en arms, wrote the identical words on a second sheet’ (643). This writing practice 
exemplarily raises the questions central to this first section: who is writing here? 
Which one of these handwritings is the original? And which one is the duplicate 
copy? Can they both be unique? And authentic? 
2. Jefferson’s writing machine 
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Contributors to this section of the volume will both accentuate and question the 
distinction between handwriting and typed writing, autography and allography, 
original and copy, in relation to various types of handwriting. Sonja Neef address-
es the problem of cultural memory of an ‘authentic’ past by discussing the contest-
ed ‘authenticity’ of the historical, handwritten diaries of Anne Frank and the al-
leged diaries of Adolf Hitler. Michael Wetzel discusses the concept of the hand by 
bringing it in dialogue with the ideas of authenticity and artistic authority as per-
formed in the work of Marcel Duchamp; in his work, handwriting is distinctly 
linked to the logic of the ‘trait’. The end of ‘originality’ is also proclaimed by John 
Mackenzie Owen, who relocates the issue of ‘authorship’ to a space where the 
‘aura’ of authentic handwriting is literally volatilized in electronic impulses: the 
digital world. Within this digital space, and finally, Hannelore Dekeyser attempts 
to save what seems to have vanished in the process of digitization: the signature’s 
authenticity that, even though it is deprived of its auratic dimension, can function 
perfectly as a legal instrument.
For handwriting, seen as a Western cultural practice emerging from an age-long 
tradition, the primal writing implement has been the stylus, a tool that started as a 
wedge to incise traces in sand, in clay, or in wax. Over time, the stylus took on dif-
ferent shapes: as a brush which, once turned around, became a quill, then a pencil, 
a pen, and a ballpoint pen. In all these forms, the stylus was led by the hand, par-
ticularly by the right hand, and its basic product was a line or a ‘trait’. In our con-
temporary communication society, the archaic stylus is to a large degree replaced 
by the typesetting tool of the keyboard. Paradoxically, the most threatening and
– literally – most stirring threat to handwriting, electricity, turned out to be the ve-
hicle that initiated a renaissance in handwriting. Technical print media and visual 
media enable the reproduction of images and thus of handwriting: photography, 
film, microfiche, Xerox, fax, scanner, and computer. On the one hand, these media 
supplant handwriting, on the other hand, they bring handwriting back to us, but 
in a different – what Bolter and Grusin call – a ‘remediated’ form. The central 
question of this section is to discuss handwriting in its relation to a second medium 
in which it is depicted, reproduced, or remediated. Hence, this section has a double 
focus: it is devoted both to the ‘mediation’ and to the ‘re-mediation’ of handwrit-
ing.
Mediation. In the history of writing theory, from Plato’s Kratylos to Saussure’s 
Cours linguistique générale, writing has been regarded as derivative of speech. Un-
til this very day, writing is defined as a sign system with a referential structure con-
necting writing to language and speech, and the relationship between sign and ref-
erence is described as arbitrary. Writing is specified as a system of difference, and 
this system is said to be productive, meaning that a finite stock of signs can pro-
duce infinite varieties of articulations. These philosophical and linguistic epistemes 
define writing’s essential characteristics – its referential structure, its arbitrariness, 
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its functioning as a system of difference, and its productivity – without taking its 
medial or material mode into consideration. 
Writing is indeed closely related to language and speech, but not exclusively. 
Writing is also and primarily a visual medium, rendering it complex as a system 
based both on the articulation strategies of alphanumeric text and of visual im-
ages. This visual dimension distinguishes standardized mechanical writing from 
handwriting, which is idiosyncratic and often risks being illegible. This specific 
materiality qualifies the handwritten text as allographic and autographic at once; 
its semiotics unfolds in this in-between-media, as ‘text-image’ or as ‘image-text’. 
Moreover, handwriting as a specific form of writing emphasizing the individual 
dimension of it, finds an audible pendant in the voice, which is as un-exchangea-
ble as handwriting. Because of this audible dimension, handwriting may also ap-
pear as a ‘sound-image’. In conclusion, handwriting is ‘mediated’ because it is a 
hybrid medium composed of visual (writing), audible (speech), and verbal (lan-
guage) media. Handwriting’s hybrid structure becomes particularly visible when 
it is incorporated in another medium – when it is thus literally re-mediated. 
ReMediation. In their now classic book on new media and digital culture, Jay 
Bolter and Richard Grusin (1999) have developed the concept of ‘remediation’ to 
trace how new types of media re-interpret and concurrently re-form other tech-
nologies and their uses. In this section, we deploy the concept of ‘remediation’ to 
examine the transformation of cultural practices and forms conventionally asso-
ciated with manual writing, in order to explore what happens when ‘script’ is per-
formed in a second medium. Bolter and Grusin’s concept of ‘Remediation’ will be 
reformulated as ‘ReMediation’; the capital ‘M’ producing two interrelated con-
cepts of ‘mediation’ and ‘remediation’ is introduced to indicate that handwriting 
is a double-edged practice. Handwriting is itself mediated because it is grounded 
in the inscription technologies of other media, and, in turn, it remediates other 
media when it becomes a model for ‘newer’ media effectively intervening in the 
old ones, for example when the archaic stylus is resurrected as an electronic tool 
of the tablet PC. 
Our current media culture is full of ‘ReMediated’ handwriting. We find it 
etched, photographed, Xeroxed, and digitally scanned. Intelligent Fond Analysis 
(ifa) allows us to write our own handwriting via a keyboard, to perform hand-
written e-mail correspondence, indeed, even to write someone else’s ‘hand’. For 
example, Leonardo da Vinci’s left-handed mirror writing, today still regarded an 
attribute of the genius, can be performed on a keyboard by using a free online 
transmitter (Illustration 3).6 The focus of this section is the examination of hand-
writing at those loci where it is least expected: in digital environments. We will 
analyze how it gets ‘incorporated’ by a digital apparatus that privileges multime-
dia expression while erasing material signs of historicity and personality, but also 
in other environments where handwriting’s inscription technologies are remedi-
ated: film and literature.
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3. The Leonardo-Right to Left website, March 2005 
The contributions in this section map out some implications for the ReMediation of 
traditional uses of handwriting. Richard Grusin reconsiders the status and meaning 
of the signature as a legal and cultural means to proving someone’s individuality, at 
a time when audio-visual ‘mediations of self’ are taking center stage. José van Dijck 
discusses the cultural meaning of weblogs in relation to the former practice of diary 
writing. How do former notions of intimacy and personality change when the diary 
is transformed into a multi-medial form characterized by immediacy and public ex-
posure? Arnold Dreyblatt and Jeffrey Wallen, then, focus on the effects that the spe-
cific materiality of handwriting has on the archive by analyzing the ReMediation 
of personal documents of a historical figure – a suspected Eastern European spy – 
found in archives around the world. Dreyblatt’s art installation The T Project chal-
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lenges us with poignant questions concerning the migration of lives and (hand-
written) texts across different media. Mieke Bal takes us to literary studies, where 
she investigates the logic of handwriting in Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu 
in a double sense; the material reality of Proust’s idiosyncratic handwriting func-
tions as a medium that produces the diegetic reality of the second medium of liter-
ature, which, in itself ponders the status of handwriting: its aesthetics, its readabil-
ity, its delayed arrival. Finally, Rembert Huser discusses the status of the signature 
and of filmic authorship in the film credits of Martin Scorsese. 
In the Bible, the prophet Daniel recounts a miraculous act of writing that functions 
as a divine warning signal on a wall in the palace of King Belshazzar. The passage 
from the Bible reads: ‘There appeared the fingers of a human hand writing on the 
plaster of the palace wall’ (Daniel 5, verses 5-6). The sign is magically written in 
indecipherable script, and the absence of a physical piece of writing comes to stand 
for the presence of God.7 This dialectical structure of absence and presence pre-
cisely pinpoints the great mystery of handwriting: that handwriting always gets its 
cultural authority from its claim of springing from a physical and living hand – a 
claim that Benjamin would call the undividable ‘here and now’ of presence. This 
corporeal dimension makes handwriting an absolutely individual and non-ex-
changeable sign, almost as unique as fingerprints or other biometrical data. And 
this holds even if the subject of writing is no longer there, as Derrida emphasizes, 
‘even after death’ (1988, 5). 
The concept of the hand and its role in the process of writing have been dis-
cussed in various academic disciplines. Pedagogy formulates rules to discipline the 
child’s (right!) hand; philosophy connects the activity of the mind to the movement 
of the hand; and grapho-psychology uses the expression of the hand’s movement 
to trace the writing subject’s character.8 Technical writing tools, in these discours-
es, are often regarded as detaching script from hand, as ‘disembodiment’ of what 
has traditionally been seen as a highly corporeal act, implying a ‘loss of self’. The 
assumptions made in these discourses come to stand in another light however, if 
handwriting is not redeemed by technical writing methods but, instead, itself ap-
pears in a second medium. How do such writing methods affect our understanding 
of an authentic physical body? This problem can be described by the example of 
Microsoft screensaver Sports, published in Windows 98. This screensaver produc-
es white stripes that emerge from a dark, marbled background, forming zeros, 
crosses, and other symbols, written in real time by a hand writing with chalk on a 
blackboard or tablet. This screensaver generates handwriting, but just like the di-
vine writing on the wall, the screensaver’s writing is written as if by magic, urging 
us to ask who is writing here? Is there some artificial intelligence with a virtual 
body inside the computer? Post-post-modern paranoiacs may suspect some lonely 
cyborg sending cryptic messages. Or perhaps it concerns one of those creatures 
N. Katherine Hayles describes as those who ‘reconcile themselves to living inside 
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the computer’, and who ‘often create interfaces that allow them to preserve the 
illusion of ordinary human existence’ (22). But how, then, are these interfaces to be 
conceived of? How can we as users with an ‘ordinary human existence’ interact 
with this bodiless subject of writing inside the screensaver, as if any intervention, 
any manipulation of the machine, might immediately erase the script from the 
screen, thus making the writer even more absent?9 By simulating the physical in-
scription technologies of handwriting, the screensaver Sports emphatically claims 
the physical presence of an individual writing hand. Yet this presence then appears 
to be an effect of the user’s absence. Conversely, one could say that the bodiless 
writer inside the screen produces this user only as an effect of its absence, reducing 
it so to speak to a physical leftover showing up only when the screensaver is put to 
rest (cf. Neef, 2004).
 4. A screen capture from Microsoft screensaver Sports
The screensaver enacts handwriting both as the archi-writing of a hand that claims 
physical presence, authenticity, and uniqueness, and concurrently signifies the 
place of handwriting’s disembodiment. As screen writing it does, indeed ‘save’ a 
hand, but not quite, because it simultaneously inscribes and suppresses the prolif-
eration of manual writing; it embodies and disembodies at the same time. 
The focus of this third section is to ask where the writing hand is to be located 
in a dialectics of presence and absence, man and machine, medium and hand, and 
how this dialectics is to be conceived of if handwriting is not immediately per-
formed ‘by hand’ but in a second medium. Eric Ketelaar turns again to the archive 
when he asks for the ways in which writing on, in or with new archiving machines 
impresses the work of the archive, when the hand of handwriting has been trans-
formed into a part of the machine. Thomas Fechner-Smarsly, then, concentrates on 
a form of handwriting in which the claim of corporeality takes shape most radi-
cally: the fingerprint. Fechner-Smarsly in his article relates the concept of hand-
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writing to two concepts closely related to it and yet distinctly different from it: 
those of ‘trace’ and ‘imprint’. When remediated in contemporary art, the finger-
prints produced in both ink and blood can only be read through the grammar im-
posed by genetic codes. Begüm Firat concentrates on medial enactments of Arabic 
writing, which – due to its flowing movement – strikingly resembles handwriting, 
even if typed on a keyboard or visualized on a computer screen. Firat discusses Shi-
rin Neshat’s famous photographic work in which Arabic handwriting is dominant. 
Finally, Sonja Neef investigates the cultural practice of tattooing as a writing prac-
tice that takes the living body for its medium, a body that appears absolutely in-ex-
changeable and singular. And yet, Neef argues that a tattoo can only become mean-
ingful as writing when it takes a repeatable, or citational form, when its presence 
will function as a sign and do this also in a past and in a future present. The com-
bination of hand and writing, thus considered, can no longer be considered a sta-
ble and unitary source of authenticity, singularity and originality, since it is driven 
by difference.
This book was funded by the Dutch Research Organization (nwo). A warm thanks 
is directed at Saskia Lourens and Bart Plantenga for their professional and friendly 
support in copy-editing this book.
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Notes
1. Thanks to Jan Simons, for having point-
ed out this particular symbol at the two-
day conference ReMediating Handwriting, 
Weimar, June 18, 2004.
2. For a seminal study of the history of the 
signature see Fraenkel, La signature, 
1992.
3. Arguing within a Lacanian frame, for 
Kittler, film refers to the realm of the imagi-
nable, the gramophone with its emphasis 
on the presence of the voice refers to the 
realistic, and the typewriter is bound up 
with the symbolic system of language.
4. Goodman elaborates on the difference 
between allographie and autography in 
chapter 3 ‘Art and Authenticity’.
5. The topos of the hand in the work of 
Heidegger is studied in detail by Jacques 
Derrida in La main de Heidegger.
6. For detailed discussions of digital en-
actments of the handwriting of Leonardo 
as screensaver and as digital codex on 
CD-ROM, we refer to Neef ‘The 
W/Ri(gh)ting Hand. Leonardo da Vinci as 
Screensaver’, respectively ‘Die (rechte) 
Schrift und die (linke) Hand’.
7. For a detailed analysis of this magic act 
of writing, we refer to Neef 2000,  
64-68.
8. For a history of handwriting education 
from Victorian writing culture until auto-
matic writing in the 20th century, see 
Plakins Thornton. An overview of the philo-
sophical question of mind and hand from 
Quintilianus until Renaissance is given in 
Zwijnenberg, 65-82. For graphology as a 
modern science in the humanities we refer 
to the work of Ludwig Klages (1905-1927).
9. This is what Hayler would call a ‘techno-
text’, texts which ‘interrogate the inscrip-
tion technology that produces it, it mobi-
lizes reflexive loops between its imagina-
tive world and the material apparatus 
embodying that creation as a physical 
presence’ (25).
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The Diaries of 
                    and the 
Alleged Diaries of 
                         
1
This article approaches the concepts of authenticity and copy by focusing on two 
autographs whose authenticity is at the core of a longstanding and culturally ur-
gent debate: Anne Frank’s diaries and the alleged diaries of Adolf Hitler. Combin-
ing these cases by discussing them in one and the same paper may, at first sight, 
seem odd, or even blasphemous. By taking a closer look at these diaries, however, 
I will concentrate on a rhetoric of authenticity that they share and that, at the same 
time, distinguishes them radically. The aim, then, is to arrive at a differentiated 
view of the concept of the authenticity of handwriting and of the cultural signifi-
cance of the idea of the original. Both diaries were subject to a series of investiga-
tions into their authenticity. For Frank, several attempts were made to prove that 
the diaries were false and – along with this – that the Holocaust was a lie. For Hit-
ler, in contrast, the aim was to prove that the diaries were authentic, and – along 
with this – to fill in the flatness of der Führer’s public persona with the private depth 
of an original, personal character. Both diaries had a serious impact on how we 
deal with the past and on how we locate this past in our present culture between 
memory and amnesia.
Both for the diaries of Frank and for the alleged diaries of Hitler, the discourse 
of authenticity is to a large extent based on archival work. The primary scene for 
studying the authenticity or falseness of these manuscripts, then, is the archive, un-
derstood as a location where authenticity is generated by means of certification 
and custody.2 However, ‘exposing authenticity’ does not only mean exposing a 
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document as true or false, one of the basic operations of the archive, but it can also 
refer to the act of exposing objects in a museum, literally understood as placing the 
object in a showcase, lighting it, and equipping it with an explanatory sign. The 
goal of this paper is to explore both ‘loci’ of authenticity: firstly, the archeı~on as an 
official hall that guarantees authenticity through the very architecture of an insti-
tutionalized authority, and secondly, the mu-se-um – as a location where objects are 
displayed or ‘exposed’ in such a way that authorizes their function as authentic 
witnesses to the past, as semiophores in the sense of Krystzof Pomian (1990, 30): 
visible objects that gain their meaning by referring to the hidden, the invisible.
The diary of Anne Frank was first published in 1947 by Anne’s father, Otto Frank, 
and was titled Het Achterhuis (The Secret Annex). Since then, it has been translat-
ed and published in more than 60 languages, and has become one of the most 
widely read books in the world. However, from the 1950s on, the authenticity of 
the diary was repeatedly questioned by several ex-Nazis and neo-Nazis in a variety 
of pamphlets, brochures, and other publications that received extensive media 
coverage. Their accusations were all aimed in the same direction, claiming – to 
quote from a pamphlet distributed by Schönborn – the diary of Anne Frank to be 
a ‘forgery and the product of Jewish anti-German atrocity propaganda to support 
the lie of six million gassed Jews’ (quoted from Da Silva). Between 1960 and 1993, 
these allegations became the subject of five lawsuits in Germany, mostly filed by 
Otto Frank, sometimes with the Anne Frank House as co-plaintiff.3 In all these 
cases, the verdict that the accused were guilty of slander and publicly inciting racial 
hatred was grounded in evidence that the diary was authentic.
Like the diary of Anne Frank, the alleged diaries of Adolf Hitler and the debate 
of their authenticity received extensive media coverage. Their discovery created a 
major stir in the media. On May 5, 1983, Germany’s best-selling weekly magazine 
Stern headlined the sensational find of secret diaries written by Adolf Hitler.4 The 
discovery of these documents was presented as an adventurous story about an he-
roic pilot named Friedrich Gundlfinger who escaped Berlin at the moment of Rus-
sian liberation in May 1945, carrying with him a safe containing secret documents 
of der Führer, among which were his personal notebooks. Almost forty years later, 
Gerd Heidemann, a Stern reporter, claimed that these diaries had shown up again. 
He explained that he had received the notebooks from an intermediary who had 
smuggled them into the country from East Germany by intervention of the Institut 
für Staatssicherheit (East German Secret Service) and some dubious generals in the 
Nationale Volksarmee (East German Army) (Heidemann in Stern, April 28, 1983). 
In fact, Hitler’s notebooks, along with other Nazi memorabilia, were manufac-
tured by Heidemann’s mysterious intermediary – Konrad Kujau, alias Dr. Fischer, 
a forger and dealer in Nazi relics who found his business partners in collectors ob-
sessed with the Third Reich. He had also faked, for example, handwritten manu-
scripts of Mein Kampf and paintings ‘by Hitler’. Almost a quarter of the more than 
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700 artworks represented in Billy Price’s Adolf Hitler: The Unknown Artist (1983) 
were actually forgeries by Kujau.5
Both the diaries of Anne Frank and the alleged diaries of Adolf Hitler have 
been investigated by a battery of internationally acknowledged handwriting ex-
perts. In what follows, I will not provide a complete overview of the jumble of cer-
tifications and reports. Rather, I will ask how authenticity and falseness are con-
ceived of in these assessments by analyzing some snapshots, each showing a frag-
mented episode from a long and arduous quest for truth. These snapshots are tak-
en at the two locations central to this article: first, the archive, and later in this ar-
ticle, the museum. 
The archival investigation of a document’s authenticity can roughly be divided 
into three types of approaches. First, from an historical point of view, a text-criti-
cal analysis questions the text’s content for grammatical, logical, and historical 
consistency and places it in a context. Second, the material authenticity of a docu-
ment is investigated on the grounds of chemical tests. And third, handwriting ex-
perts analyze the visual performance of the actual writing. 
Initially, it was the first procedure – the historical approach – that, for Hitler’s 
notebooks, led to a certification of authenticity.6 Since Kujau had collected and 
read an extensive personal library about Hitler, historians specialized in the histo-
ry of the Third Reich could not immediately expose the manuscripts as forgeries. 
Only upon a second viewing did a team of archivists from the German Bundes-
archiv locate Kujau’s sources: Max Domarus’ well-known publication of Hitler’s 
speeches and proclamations, Gerd Rühle’s Das Dritte Reich, as well as the Nazi 
daily Der Völkische Beobachter. They identified a series of identical mistakes con-
cerning dates, names of institutions, and historical facts made both by Kujau and 
one of his sources (Henke, 310-314). 
The initial certification of authenticity was also based on the immense amount 
of autographical material, which included a collection of 62 volumes of diaries, ac-
companied by a massive archive of 300 watercolor paintings, drafts for speeches 
and letters – all ‘by Der Führer’, and, last but not least, his World War I uniform 
and helmet (Hamilton, 1). Hugh Trevor-Roper evaluated the find in the London 
Times as follows: ‘whereas signatures, single documents, or even groups of docu-
ments can be skillfully forged, a whole coherent archive covering 35 years is far 
less easily manufactured… The archive coheres as a whole and the diaries are an 
integral part of it’.7 
But there were also skeptical voices, among which the famous historian David 
Irving and the German Bundeskriminalamt. Their critique introduced a second 
phase in which the Bundesanstalt für Materialforschung und -prüfung (German 
Criminal Court Laboratory), by chemical analyses, identified synthetic fibers in 
the binding as well as paper-bleaching agents in the paper of some volumes, neither 
of which were used before 1945.8 Whereas the historical investigation of the al-
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1. Extract from Hardy’s summary of the report of the Gerechtelijk Laboratorium in Rijkswijk/
Netherlands (150-151) showing ‘micro-characteristics’ studied as visual ‘points of 
identification’ in the handwriting of Anne Frank. The examples on the left are from 
reference material, those on the right from the first diary.
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leged Hitler diaries had initially failed, this chemical investigation provided posi-
tive evidence that the diaries were fake.
To achieve positive evidence of a document’s falseness, historical and technical 
investigations are undoubtedly effective. To prove the authenticity of an authentic 
manuscript, however, the evidential value of these methods is limited, since they 
can only demonstrate a manuscript’s falseness. This is what happened in the as-
sessments of the diaries of Anne Frank in which no anachronisms could be found 
– neither historical nor chemical.9 To achieve positive evidence of authenticity, the 
Gerechtelijk Laboratorium (Dutch Forensic Laboratory) investigated the specifi-
cities of the handwriting and categorized them in an extensive list of so-called ‘mi-
cro-characteristics’ (microkenmerken) of both the writing movement and the writ-
ing pressure.10 These micro-characteristics were studied as visual ‘points of identi-
fication’ (identificatiepunten) appearing in the extensions of a character (Illustra-
tion 1). If they follow a systematic scheme they can be compared with certified ref-
erence materials, in this case, with Anne Frank’s letters and school albums. This 
comparative method is based on the idea of the mathematical iteration of differ-
ences and resemblances. The result of such an investigation is statistical in nature 
and is, therefore, expressed in terms of a degree of probability. For Anne Frank’s 
diaries, the result was phrased very carefully as ‘probable to a degree bordering on 
certainty that the diary originates from the producer of the reference writing, Anne 
Frank’.11 
These reports offer ample material for a critical discussion of the concepts of au-
thenticity, copy, and their relation to the ideas of originality and uniqueness. First, 
it is striking that the chemical analysis can only be performed on an original docu-
ment, suggesting that a unique ‘original’ cannot be replaced by a copy without 
compromising the manuscript’s authenticity. Unlike chemical analysis, both his-
torical analysis and handwriting assessments can be performed on a high quality 
Xerox copy. These methods rely on the idea of writing as iteration, the idea that a 
written text, like a musical symphony, is repeatable, spellable, or, to echo Nelson 
Goodman, ‘allographic’ (Goodman, chapter 3). Historical assessment, which con-
centrates on a document’s content and on the coherence of an archival collection 
relies precisely on this idea of writing as allography, that is, a writing of which the 
authenticity is not compromised when the text is copied or re-printed. A manu-
script’s physical materiality, in this view, appears as a nearly invisible medium. 
Strictly speaking, the document does not even have to be seen; having the written 
text read aloud is enough. This ‘blindness’, in a way, pertains even more to the 
chemist, who – despite his emphasis on the material original – entirely neglects a 
document’s content. Both the chemist and the text-historical analyst ignore the vis-
ual performance of actual specific handwriting. They are either only interested in a 
manuscript’s material originality and singularity, or, conversely, in the iterability of 
writing as allography.
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Handwriting, I will argue, opens up a third space between originality and copy, be-
tween singularity and iterability. On the one hand, handwriting originates in the 
physical presence of an individual and corporeal writer who, by a movement of the 
hand, generates a line, a ‘trace’, providing it with an un-exchangeable visual qual-
ity. The first test a handwriting expert performs when investigating a piece of hand-
writing is to turn the manuscript upside-down, looking at it as a pure visual ‘im-
age’ without noticing its alphanumeric dimension as ‘writing’. Thus, handwriting, 
like painting, operates as ‘autography’ in Goodman’s sense, since it does not allow 
for repetition without being considered a forgery.
On the other hand, handwriting is still bound up with the symbolic system of 
language; it is still writing and, because the central principle of writing is repeti-
tion, indeed allows for copying. Entire libraries were comprised of handwritten 
transcripts. The archive, however, unlike the library, insists on the originality of a 
document. It preserves unique records that cannot be found anywhere else 
(O’Toole, 633). Archival preservation of a manuscript cannot be achieved by a 
typewriter, but only by those technologies that reproduce its image-quality: Xerox 
copies or microfiches. Thus viewed, handwriting is both allography and autogra-
phy, writing and image, what could be called an ‘ImageText’. Like Derrida’s signa-
ture, handwritten ImageText is both unique and repeatable, singular and iterable. 
Its cultural importance in our contemporary world of print and digital media re-
sides precisely in this paradoxical structure: iterable singularity, singular iterability 
(Derrida 1988). 
The assessments of Anne Frank’s diaries and of the alleged notebooks of Adolf 
Hitler invite yet another discussion about the relationship between authenticity, 
singularity, and originality. These assessments show that authenticity cannot be 
proven on the grounds of a single document because each document is always em-
bedded in an encompassing system of documents constituting the archive. For 
Frank’s diaries, their authenticity was explored by comparing them with docu-
ments of which the authenticity was certified. A document’s authenticity is thus 
not a quality in its own right, but is generated by a system, a body of sources, 
whose authenticity is guaranteed by the archive’s unity, homogeneity, and consist-
ency. This system is simultaneously both certifying and certified. The concept of 
authenticity here takes the shape of a trace, as it cannot be located in a unitary ori-
gin; it is, as Derrida would say, always already deferred.12
For Anne Frank’s diaries, the German Criminal Court Laboratory recognized 
this problem. Hence, for the investigation of the reference material the experts fol-
lowed the same technical procedures they had used for the diary itself, including 
examinations of stamps, postmarks and censure seals on the envelopes of Anne’s 
letters. And yet, the evidence that the reference material was authentic was finally 
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based – as with the diary itself – on the fact that no anachronistic materials or doc-
ument elements could be found (Hardy, 125, 133, 139). For the alleged diaries of 
Hitler, there was only little certified reference material available in the Bunde-
sarchiv. And so it happened – according to Stern reporter Bissinger – that Gerd 
Heidemann compiled the so-called ‘dossier Heidemann’, a file containing samples 
of autographs by Hitler to be given to handwriting experts as reference material. 
‘This… file’, Bissinger writes, ‘had just one minor flaw: big parts of it stemmed 
from the same workshop in which the Hitler diaries were also produced. Thus the 
experts… found that, indeed, these writings stem from the same pen’ (173).13
Comparing counterfeit with counterfeit here turns out to be the equivalent of 
comparing original with original. Kujau’s diaries were indeed authentic, and they 
were originals – authentic and original forgeries. In addition, the documents of-
fered by the ‘dossier Heidemann’ were partly authenticated by certificates, which 
were, in turn, manufactured by Kujau. Whatever we come up with, the idea of au-
thenticity can no longer be rooted in a single and indivisible origin, for any certifi-
cate of authenticity is as much in need of authentication as the doubted document 
itself. For Hitler’s notebooks, it was precisely the denial of this movement of defer-
ral that led to the initial authentication of the notebooks. Authenticity, with re-
spect to handwriting, can neither be definitively cut off from the concepts of origi-
nality and singularity, nor can it be comfortably filed under the idea of an imper-
turbable originality or a handwriting’s singular occurrence in the world. 
And yet we do desire originals. We desire them so profoundly that the Anne Frank 
Stichting had to produce two facsimile replications of all six notebooks of Anne 
Frank. These copies serve to protect the original from damage caused by crowds of 
scholars and film crews, but also to preserve the ‘aura’ of the ‘original’ notebooks 
for future generations. Due to digital technologies of scanning, analyzing, and re-
producing documents, these copies look perfectly authentic.14 Each of them is fit-
ted with the same tiny details that make the original so distinctive: the red-and-
white cloth binding of the famous autograph album; the photographs, picture 
cards, pieces of paper, as well as letters and postmarked stamps on envelopes glued 
inside the book; and the clasp lacking the small metal end that fits into the locking 
mechanism, yes, even the rust spots on that clasp (Tanja).15 The more we desire the 
original, the more counterfeits we get.16
We desire the original so much that Stern at the time was willing to pay the 
princely sum of 18.5 million German marks to gain possession of Hitler’s diaries. 
And the bill got paid, because even though this sensational story turned out to be a 
canard, the magazine’s profits increased to 190 million German marks that year 
(Bissinger, 227). One can hardly avoid the association with the Marxist idea of 
commodity fetishism here, that is, the idea that in capitalist society a commodity is 
alienated from its specific qualities and deprived of its actual value. Instead, a com-
modity is perceived only for its exchange value.17 For the Hitler diaries, their cul-
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tural role as objects of economic exchange cannot be overlooked. The more money 
Stern spent, the more convinced they became of the diaries’ authenticity. The im-
mense money value was justified by Stern claiming that these diaries had a substan-
tial historical value, necessitating a revision of the history of the Nazi era. The ar-
chivists performing the historical authentication were, on the contrary, astonished 
by the banality of the diaries’ historical content, which was reduced to shallow de-
scriptions of public events lacking any private, political, or conceptual reflection 
(Henke, 309-310).
The value of these diaries as objects of economic exchange did not primarily 
result from their historical value but, I will argue, from their autographic dimen-
sion as handwriting, from – to echo Benjamin – their ‘auratic’ character, their 
physical materiality which claims an original and singular ‘here and now’ that can 
be conceived of as an indivisible origin which has the potential to unify past and 
present. This nostalgic desire for auratic handwriting follows the logic of the fetish 
in still other than economic terms. In psychoanalytic discourse, the fetish is under-
stood as an object that one feels strongly attached to. Freud, in his essay on fetish-
ism (1927), describes the fetish as a substitute for the mother’s absent penis. The 
child believes that the mother’s penis was once there but that she was deprived of 
it. The insight that the mother does not in fact possess a penis leads to a metonym-
ic displacement of the absent penis onto some other part of the body or its continu-
ation, such as a piece of velvet, jewelry, or – as in the Kujau-case – a Word War I 
uniform and helmet. This logic of replacing a desired yet unavailable object with 
another object, I will argue, also applies to handwriting. For our cultural desire for 
the ‘auratic’ original derives from a (childish) belief in an original and physical 
presence, embodied in a writing movement conducted by a writing hand which is 
indivisible from the subject of writing and yet has been deprived of it. But not with-
out leaving a trace in the form of a ‘trait’ that becomes a metonymic substitute for 
the writer in a future present. 
It is significant that Hitler’s diaries were part of an encompassing collection of 
Nazi relics circulating among dealers and collectors, including not only documents 
and paintings, but also flags, uniforms and helmets, swords, daggers, and pistols. 
Moreover – and this seems striking for my argument – Kujau had discovered that 
his customers were ‘always impressed by seals, especially wax seals over silk rib-
bons’ (Hamilton, p. 12). The historical value of these objects seems doubtful. In-
stead, they are pure fetish; literally the product of a perversion that can be specified 
as a collecting instinct. This fetishist attitude of collecting is, in psychoanalytical 
terms, predicated on a separation between subject and object which – and I am fol-
lowing Mieke Bal’s theory of collecting here:
makes for an incurable loneliness that, in turn, impels the subject to gather 
things, in order to surround him- or herself with a subject-domain that is not-
other. Small children do this, collecting gravel, sticks, the odd pieces that 
grown-ups call junk but which, for the child, has no quality other than consti-




It is precisely this experience of being separated from a wholeness incorporated by 
the far-away and long-ago homeland of the Third Reich that slips into a present 
here and now, that made Hitler’s alleged diaries so successful. Thus seen, the Hitler 
diaries cannot be understood except as a fetish that is the result of both an econom-
ic and historical desire that finds its specific shapes in Heidemann’s obsession with 
the Third Reich; in Stern’s attachment to a commodity alienated from its empty 
historical value; and in a global public awaiting the resurrection of either a monster 
or a messiah. 
For the Frank diaries, the concept of fetishism raises a few uncomfortable prob-
lems. For one thing, it suggests that one must, paradoxically enough, assume that a 
similar experience of deep and fundamental lack forms the motive for almost one 
million people a year to visit the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam as an authentic 
place where the diaries were written and can now be seen. What, one must ask, dis-
tinguishes the ardent desire of the visitors of the Anne Frank house in their search 
for authenticity from the fetishist desire of the recipients of the alleged Hitler dia-
ries? Is Anne’s diary to be considered a fetish, as the Hitler diary is? There is a subtle 
difference, however – there must be one. But how can we understand this differ-
ence? Can it be attributed to the ultimate distinction that classifies Anne Frank’s 
diaries as true and Adolf Hitler’s diaries as false? Is it enough to point to the fact 
that Frank’s diaries were not written on demand, as Hitler’s diaries were? Rather, 
they were given to us by Otto Frank when he came back from the extermination 
camp in Auschwitz and forced upon us as an inconvenient guest. But if they came 
without invitation, how, then, could they become a monument of shared history, if 
not by inviting a past to speak back to, and intermingle with, our present? How is 
this anachronism to be viewed, this conflation of past and present that is put for-
ward by the principle of iteration, of repeating – in a paradoxical gesture – the sin-
gular original? And how is it related to the nostalgic desire for Nazi relics rooted in 
fetishism?
I have thus far located these questions in terms of the archive, with its practices 
of certifying original and singular records of the past and preserving them for the 
future, but let us now turn to that other locus of cultural memory: the museum. 
Like the archive, the museum’s capacity for ‘exposing’ a document as true or false 
is grounded in the authoritative power of the institution. The archive produces au-
thenticity within the inside of a more or less closed official hall – and this shield 
against the public is an integral part of archival legacy. Archival semiophores do 
not only refer to the invisible, but they are also often stored invisibly in the stacks, 
while the museum’s rhetoric is unbridgeably grounded in this very act of ‘making 
public’.18 In Double Exposures, Mieke Bal understands the main work of the mu-
seum as a posture or gesture of exposition:
Exposing an agent, or subject, puts ‘things’ on display, which creates a sub-
ject/object dichotomy. This dichotomy enables the subject to make a state-
ment about the object. The object is there to substantiate the statement. It is 
put there within a frame that enables the statement to come across. There is 
an addressee for the statement, the visitor, viewer, or reader. The discourse 
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surrounding the exposition, or, more precisely, the discourse that is the ex-
position, is ‘constative’: informative and affirmative.… In expositions, a 
‘first person’, the exposer, tells ‘a second person’, the visitor, about a ‘third 
person’, the object on display, who does not participate in the conversa-
tion. But unlike many other constative speech acts, the object, although 
mute, is present. (Bal 1996, 3-4) 
In what follows, I will explore the expository strategies of the museum within the 
theoretical framework offered by Bal. Concretely, I will continue my examination 
of the concept of authenticity in the Anne Frank Museum in Amsterdam, asking 
how the museum, as a cultural agent and as a first person in the discourse on the 
Holocaust, presents the diary of Anne Frank as an exhibit, a third person to be 
looked at as a public object. I will investigate the discourses proposed by Bal, that 
is, the museum’s statement on the Holocaust as an authentic and representable his-
torical event, and Anne Frank’s voice as the object on display. The aim of my anal-
ysis is to mobilize the fixed positions of authoritative speech, thus allowing Anne 
Frank to ‘speak back’ – both to the museum’s documentary discourse and to us, 
the visitors, the second persons of this speech act.
December 2002, a cold and rainy day in Amsterdam. I join the queue of people 
waiting at the foot of the Westertoren. Freezing and wet, we stand in line for two 
hours to get into the Anne Frank House. Nobody complains or is impatient. What 
does our suffering mean, after all, compared to what she went through? Once in-
side the house on the Prinsengracht, we follow the prescribed route, leading us 
from the front part of the house via a landing with a movable bookcase to the back 
part. There is no escape; we climb the same stairway she once climbed to the secret 
annex to go into, hiding for 25 months until the arrest. 
Once past the bookcase it becomes silent in the canal-side house. This is exact-
ly the situation described by Jessica Durlacher in the opening of her novel The 
Daughter, which tells the story of Max and Suzanne and their second generation 
Holocaust trauma.19 ‘It is almost a funeral’, Durlacher writes. Visitors shuffle 
through the museum silently or quietly whispering, as if they were observing the 
requirements for surviving once observed by the people in hiding. ‘We have to 
whisper, and tread lightly during the day, otherwise the people in the warehouse 
might hear us’, reads a quote from Anne Frank’s diary printed on the museum’s 
wall.
I step into the small room once occupied by Anne Frank and Fritz Pfeffer. It is 
dusky in here because the windows are covered with curtains like they were at that 
time to protect the inhabitants from outside gazes. There are no furnishings here; 
the entire annex was cleared out by order of the Nazi occupiers. Since then – one 
can read in the museum’s pamphlet – it has remained in its authentic state: authen-
tic darkness, authentic silence, authentic emptiness. 
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One of Anne’s handwritten letters is exhibited in a display case in Anne’s room. 
The darkness prevents the viewer from deciphering its contents, but there is a 
transparent accompanying label on the display case. I go nearer and try to read the 
inscription. However, on approaching the case, my own shadow darkens the letter. 
I want to try another angle, but I cannot because I have to share this room with 
others – just as Anne did with Fritz Pfeffer. From my new position, the muted light 
of an exposition spotlight reflects off the glass in a way that blinds me. I finally 
manage to read the sign that describes the manuscript as a ‘farewell letter written 
by Fritz Pfeffer to his fiancée Charlotte Kaletta’. The letter itself remains unreada-
ble, though. The feelings of love expressed in this letter remain undecipherable, 
and its beloved addressee Charlotte Kaletta is ultimately lost.
My tour through the museum leads me to the attic, a large, high and brightly 
illuminated room. Coming out of the dark secret annex, the visitors blink against 
the dazzlingly bright light that shines on glossy images documenting the Holocaust 
and on screens showing videotapes of Westerbork, Bergen-Belsen, and Auschwitz-
Birkenau. Only after the visitors have passed through this room do they arrive in 
the adjacent room where the diaries of Anne Frank are displayed in brightly-lit 
showcases. 
Whereas Pfeffer’s love letter was displayed vertically on the museum wall – like 
an image – Anne’s notebooks are displayed horizontally, requiring the visitor not 
only ‘to look at’, but also ‘read’ them as text. The museum’s topography, moreo-
ver, instructs me how to read them, as it shapes the walk through the museum as a 
narrative with a mono-linear and fixed structure, told by the exhibitor, revealed to 
us, whom Bal calls the museum’s second persons. This story has a preface in the 
warehouse on the ground floor, its beginning is located on a dark platform with a 
movable bookcase, it continues with inescapable linearity up a stairway, and ends 
with the attic documenting the inhabitants’ final destinations after they were be-
trayed. The museum’s topography thus metaphorically instructs us how to read 
Anne Frank’s diary: retrospectively.20 Any event reported in her diaries is supple-
mented by a meaning framed within a second history located outside – or literally: 
on top of – the actual annex: in its attic. We fill in the museum’s empty rooms with 
our knowledge of what is not told in the diary: the arrest, the deportation, the 
camp. We look back at Anne’s 13th birthday party when she was given her first 
notebook, and we frame this moment within the hermeneutic circle by pasting 
Anne’s future into her past, thus creating a unitary history in which Anne threatens 
to become objectified into the always already victim of Nazi murder – which she 
was, indeed. But wasn’t she so much more than that?
Like Anne Frank’s diary, Fritz Pfeffer’s farewell letter is displayed in a showcase, 
but does not seem meant to be read. Its presence there is grounded in a kind of ‘cult 
value’ as Benjamin ascribes to ‘certain Madonnas [that] remain covered nearly all 
year round’ (225). Their value, Benjamin states, resides in their being there, not in 
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their being looked at. The expository gesture of Pfeffer’s showcase in the museum is 
similar to this. As a ‘speaking witness’ to the past, Pfeffer’s handwriting is invisible, 
or mute. Its value as a museum object, as a third person, does not primarily result 
from a readability that would give voice to the past. Rather, the letter only express-
es material authenticity, physical presence, pure ‘cult’. And yet, I would argue, this 
‘cult’ character does not necessarily qualify as fetishism, as the Hitler diaries did in 
their alienation from historical discursivity. Why not?
The point is that Holocaust reports, if authentic, often risk being unreadable. 
Conversely, if they speak out the unspeakable and make their reading too easy, they 
risk being considered inauthentic. They are unreadable to me, a ‘second person’ vis-
iting the Anne Frank House as a tourist in a foreign country where a language is 
spoken that I do not understand. And they were just as much unwritable for the in-
habitants of this long-ago time who were hiding in the dark. Traumatic Holocaust 
experiences are difficult to incorporate into narrative memories, for narratives of 
memory require that the narrator structure events in time in order to become the 
‘master’ of history rather than the object suffering the traumatizing events.21 
Earlier in this essay, I considered handwriting to be an ImageText, and I will 
now focus on another analytic dimension this concept offers. W.J.T. Mitchell, in 
Picture Theory, relates the double structure of his notion of ‘imagetext’ to the con-
cept of memory as both textual and pictorial.22 Text, for Mitchell, has to do with 
storytelling ‘in the sense of a temporal sequence of events’ (194). Image, on the oth-
er hand, has to do with imagery and imagination, which unfolds in space rather 
than in time. Whereas an image contemplates a private memory located in a region 
of the unknown, narrative seems to be a mode of knowing and structuring, of mak-
ing memory writable and readable as public recollection.
For that reason, traumatic experiences often remain within the realm of visual-
ity and cannot become narratives. At best, they become silent testimonies, like this 
drawing by Armando (Illustration 2), that can be understood as an attempt to write. 
Yet, as an ImageText, it is cut off from its alphanumeric dimension. Instead, it spa-
tially fixes the temporal movement of the hand stammering across the paper, blind-
ly groping as if writing in the darkness, leaving an unreadable trace that oscillates 
between the attempt to remember the past and the incapability of mastering it. This 
‘trait’ can decide neither between text and image, nor between past and present. 
Pfeffer’s handwritten letter is different, however. It would be readable if the 
museum’s expository agent, the first person in the narrative of the museum’s visit, 
did not impede our reading of the letter by covering it with a transparent label and 
then casting either too much or too little light on it. Whereas Pfeffer’s letter is not 
allowed to unfold its alphanumeric dimension and thus speak for itself, Anne’s 
diary is made readable without any obstructions. It appears as a tourist attraction 
displayed to re-present a historical past that is literally made tangible in an attic 
with glossy images, showcases, and videotapes. These ‘visuals’ serve to emphasize 
the museum’s documentary reliability. Videotapes here are used as semiophores, 
that is, as documents or objects referring to an invisible, pre-existing meaning which 
they claim to re-present. For Pomian, the logic of the semiophore originates in its 
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religious function of connecting to the realm of the dead and the divine.23 This 
rhetoric of making the invisible visible turns the museum into a temple, an institu-
tion that makes the invisible truth visible, and an apparatus to produce ultimate 
authenticity. Whereas Pfeffer’s letter is underexposed, overwritten by an authorita-
tive act of drowning out his whispered declaration of love, Anne’s diary seems 
overexposed. How much authenticity do we need to rescue us from amnesia? Can 
there be such a thing as too much authenticity?
 
In the attic of the Anne Frank House, the diary lies in a brightly-lit showcase on a 
transparent lectern on top of a mirror. Thus exposed, the visitor is allowed to study 
the notebook from every angle, including its – otherwise hidden – hardcover, 
bound in orange-yellow checked textile, and to examine the notebook in its three-
dimensional compact and material shape. The diary lies open at a page that is com-
posed like a layered paper collage, consisting of two leaves of paper taped to the 
diary’s densely written pages, one of them containing a series of three portrait pho-
tographs of Anne Frank. The various units of text are written in slightly varying 
styles of childish, school-trained script, and is in some places overwritten with pen-
cil corrections in a more mature, individual script, thus mirroring the process of 
writing over time. Each script is meticulous and beautiful.24 
Between the text fragments that remain visible through the overlapping sheets 
of paper, I discover the phrase ‘Beste Kitty’ (‘Dear Kitty’) – a vocative in a diary. 
Here the practice of diary writing intermingles with that of private correspond-
ence. But who is this Kitty? The museum does not mention her as one of the inhab-
itants in the secret annex. And yet she seems to be Anne’s second person, the ‘you’ 
to whom she directs her discourse. The vocative often shows up in Anne’s notes. As 
a pronoun, it is introduced in the very first lines of the diary: ‘I hope I will be able 
to confide in you, as I have been unable to confide in anyone thus far, and I hope 
that you will be of great comfort to me. Anne Frank. 12th June 1942’ (De dag-
boeken, 197; author’s translation).25 Later on in the diary, this invented second 
person is named ‘Kitty’. Kitty becomes an integral part of Anne’s diary, her ideal 
reader and best friend.26 
José van Dijck points out in her article on ‘Diary Writing and Web Logging’ 
elsewhere in this book that such dedication to an absent audience is more a rule 
than an exception in the diary genre, because ‘writing, even as a form of self-ex-
pression, signals the need to connect, either to someone… else, or to oneself later 
in life’. Van Dijck concludes that ‘ [d]iary writing is, to a large extent, a cultural 
form firmly rooted in rhetorical conventions: intimacy and privacy are effects rath-
er then intrinsic features of the genre’. Such public privacy also pertains to Anne 
Frank’s diary. Anne repeatedly expresses her wish to be a journalist and a famous 
writer. An appeal from Dutch Minister Bolkestein on March 28, 1944 via the 
‘Oranje’ radio channel in London to the people of Holland to keep diaries as his-
torical documents for the postwar era inspires Anne to rewrite and edit her diary 
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into a book called Het Achterhuis (Van der Stroom, 69-71).27 ‘Dear Kitty’, writes 
Anne one day after this appeal, ‘Imagine how interesting it would be if I were to 
write a novel about the Secret Annex…’ (De dagboeken, 594; author’s transla-
tion).28 Her notes were meant to be published, at least partly.
The name Kitty is thus indeed readable as allographic text.29 As autographic 
manuscript in the museum’s showcase, however, this vocative is highly ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, the mystery of ‘Kitty’ impels the visitor to delve into the 
book’s depths to learn more about her. But unlike the allographic print versions in 
the museum’s shop, the autographic original manuscript in the showcase is not 
meant to be leafed through. Even though it is exposed on top of a mirror as a three-
Sign Here! / Authentic Events
    3. Anne Frank, diary page 20 October 1942
39
dimensional object, its readability is reduced to this flat double page on display. 
This volume actually has no volume. The proper name of Kitty cannot function 
unproblematically as an index pointing at a person. It has neither a referential 
depth nor a context in which it could become meaningful. The only reduced con-
text it has is the one provided by the institutionalizing frame of the museum: the 
panopticon of the Holocaust. Thus exposed, the second person addressed by the 
diary’s vocative remains flat and unreadable, deprived of other subject possibilities 
except as a witness offering evidence of Nazi crimes. Because ‘Kitty’ is not allowed 
to have alternative narratives, she is as much in danger of becoming a flat fetish, as 
I earlier argued regarding Anne.
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The logic of an imagined addressee put on display in a museum is so vastly com-
plex because the addressee is simultaneously erased and produced by the visual 
rhetoric of the showcase. The more Kitty performs, the more she withdraws. Both 
as text and as image, ‘Kitty’ comes to represent something that is by definition ab-
sent. This empty signifier has no reference but is only deictic because it indicates 
nothing but the vacant place of a desired yet absent addressee who is constitutive 
for the here and now of the speech act. The moment Anne Frank’s private diary be-
comes a public cultural object constituting shared history, we all – as readers and 
as visitors – participate in this second personhood. The reader or the visitor thus 
becomes Anne’s intimate confidant – at least metonymically. 
This metonymic second-person position is not without its problems, however. 
What is on display in the showcase is, after all, a private diary, and diaries, like love 
letters, are neither meant to be read aloud, nor to be displayed in public. They be-
long instead to the intimate private sphere, which deserves protection (see Roessler 
2001). The desire of diary writers for a public audience thus appears somewhat ex-
hibitionist. Analogously, the reader or spectator is in such an expository situation 
is encouraged to slip into the role of a voyeur who, herself invisible, gazes unhin-
dered at an immediately available object. We look at Anne’s private diary as an ob-
ject whose voice is reduced to the notes of a single page. And we look at Anne’s flat 
photo portrait showing her smiling at us from the museum wall with the subtle 
sadness of a saint to whom the visitor can direct her prayers: ‘you who have died 
for us… forgive us the betrayer’s debts...’ Do we, as visitors, or voyeurs, expect her 
to be murdered? Do we thus murder her once more?30
The diary exposed on the mirror, is simultaneously voluminous and flat. Thus 
far, I have argued that this projection of its third dimension onto a two-dimension-
al mirror image silences the speech act of the object on display. When analyzing 
this expository gesture in detail, however, another aspect comes to the fore. Look-
ing at the diary on top of the mirror it is striking to note not only this projection of 
depth, but the fact that, in the same glance, my gaze is caught by my own mirror 
image. This gaze hits me, like Barthes’ punctum, as an unforeseen detail. It disturbs 
the museum’s authoritative first-person speech act, which forces me to gaze unob-
structed at a mute object. Here I am, Anne’s second person, exposed in a showcase 
in her museum. My mono-directional gaze at Anne as the always already victim of 
Nazi murder is – like a dead letter – returned to the sender. Although I can choose 
to leave this showcase at any time, I realize that I have always already been includ-
ed in it. Like Kitty, I come to stand in for a desired friend in a future speech act. For 
it is the basic principle of all writing, including handwriting, to function as a trace 
left to be read. It is only this relation of past and future, only this reciprocal gaze 
that allows for friendship. The speaker, then, can never be that author who is per-
ceived as a pure and indivisible origin in its authentic state. It is only as authentic 
as the projection of my mirror image, exposing myself looking at Anne Frank, only 
as authentic as a projection of depth onto a flat surface. 
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In her novel The Daughter, Jessica Durlacher has her heroine Sabine, an adminis-
trator at the Anne Frank House, comment on the museum: 
It goes on being the secret annex here. It will never end. Ever. The house is eter-
nally empty. This is the cruelty of it, the tragedy.… Actually, it is emptied out 
every day over and over again, this house. Every day, they are arrested once 
again. And every day, every morning when I come here, I find the house empty. 
And they are gone, once again. A horrible repetition, like in hell.31
In this passage, Sabine evokes an iteration of history as the return of a past event 
into her present experience. This miraculous recurrence is based on the logic of the 
memorial, which – unlike most museums and archives – is an authentic place where 
actual events really happened. In Sabine’s words, this event qualifies, in a way, as a 
non-event as it is constituted by absence, by an intervention which does not hap-
pen. However, the ‘cruel’ and ‘tragic’ force of the abandonment of the secret annex 
as a non-event is at the same time grounded in the idea of presence, of a possible 
future that has not come true. The experience of loss of this other future, along 
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with the knowledge about its possibility, turns into an act of mourning constitut-
ing a cultural memory of the Holocaust. The desire to participate in this public 
ceremony is the primary incentive for almost one million people a year to visit the 
authentic location of Anne Frank’s house and to retrace her route, climbing the 
same stairs, peering into the darkness, and shuddering at the thought of betrayal.
And yet, I will argue that the recurrence of authenticity is permeated by a dia-
lectics of counterfeit. For the visitor, the museum functions as a stage, and the di-
ary in this play is a prop, in Latin a requisitus, which literally means a required or 
desired object. Unlike the innumerable print editions of The Secret Annex, the ap-
pearance of this musealized textbook has a sensational value. Its materiality phys-
ically strikes us. It turns the writing from a sober speech act into a tender whisper, 
as if the author speaks to us personally, murmuring her secrets into our ears exclu-
sively. Handwriting, here, makes a difference, because it does not only inform us, 
but affects us. Paradoxically enough, this touch – although sensational and corpo-
real – is not indulged by material authenticity alone, because the diary in the case 
is, strictly speaking, not identical to the one manufactured by Anne Frank. As a 
material object, it is subject to time and to dilapidation; its constitution is differ-
ent than it was 60 years ago. This is precisely why two perfect facsimile copies 
were manufactured. What needs to be preserved is, indeed, material likeness, to 
save the physical touch indulged by the original diary for when it is no longer 
there. It is only the auratic here and now of handwriting’s public performance in 
the museum that allows the viewer to be affected by catharsis. Whoever wants to 
evoke the idea of authenticity can only apply for the authenticity of these affec-
tionate and physical effects – effects that are by definition theatrical. On the one 
hand, these effects result from a putatively inescapable directness and presence 
that distinguishes the medial space of the stage or the museum from that of film or 
photography. On the other hand, this stage, as a theatrical setting, can never be 
the authentic place for a museum visitor as it once was for Anne, because in its re-
currence it can be left whenever one feels like it.
The magical force of the memorial is not grounded in a representational prac-
tice, for the past can never be made present, neither by authentic documents, nor 
by authentic places. Rather, the memorial functions as a performative.32 In his 
study on Holocaust Effects in Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory, Ernst 
Van Alphen argues that:
the Holocaust is not re-presented, but rather presented or enacted. In terms of 
speech-act theory I might explain it differently. The Holocaust is not made 
present by means of a constative speech-act – that is, as a mediated account, as 
the truthful or untruthful content of the speech act; rather, it is made present 
as performative effect. Those performative acts ‘do’ the Holocaust, or rather, 
they ‘do’ a specific aspect of if. (10)
As much as we desire authenticity and however urgent it may be in our culture, 
historical authenticity is always a product of – and I need to use two neologisms 
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here – either ‘archivization’ or ‘musealization’. The term ‘archivization’ is used by 
Derrida in Archive Fever to indicate that the archive ‘produces as much as it records 
the event’ (17). In addition, historical authenticity can also be the result of what 
Eric Ketelaar calls ‘archivalisation’. Ketelaar (1998, 10) points out that the English 
term ‘archivization’ is a translation of the French neologism ‘archivation’ used by 
Derrida in the original version. Following Derrida, Ketelaar (1998, 10) distin-
guishes the term ‘archivalisering’ (in Dutch) from ‘archivization’, adding another 
syllable enclosing the concept of ‘value’ into the concept of the archive, to empha-
size that choices made in archiving are highly dependent upon cultural values. ‘Ar-
chivalization’ is to be seen ‘not only in the technological sense, as Derrida under-
stands it, but especially in the socio-cultural sense, as in the examples by Trouillot 
and Stoler. In one culture they decide that the birth of a baby is an archivable fact 
and record it, in another [i.e., in slavery] they don’t’ (1999, 55). In his article ‘Writ-
ing Archival Machines’ (elsewhere in this volume) Ketelaar specifies that ‘archival-
ization’ means ‘the conscious or unconscious choice (determined by social and cul-
tural factors) to consider something worth archiving’ (emphasis Ketelaar). The ar-
chival adventure, thus considered, commenced at the very moment that Anne 
Frank decided to keep a diary, while in the Hitler case, it was the failure to make 
such a decision, which, in retrospect, set the stage for Kujau’s forgeries.33
The museum, in a way, functions in the same way. I will use the term ‘museali-
zation’ as analogous to ‘archivization’ to indicate that the ‘musealized’ object is 
not an object, but an event. ‘Musealizing’ means ‘to do’ the object. My analysis of 
handwritten objects in this paper gives rise to a conception of handwriting that 
does not ‘mute’ objects in the museum exposed by an authoritative first person, the 
curator, to a second person, a (voyeuristic) visitor – to echo Bal’s theory of exposi-
tion. Archival work – despite its efforts to define the difference between true and 
false – is as performative as the act of musealization. Both institutions aim at dedi-
cating the past to the future; they are – as Derrida has called it – ‘an injunction to 
remember’ (1995, 33). Thus seen, they both imply two temporalities sliding into 
another: a past present that is confirmed by the archive, salvaged like in Noah’s 
Ark, and at the same time relaunched en abyme, for a document in the archive no 
longer fulfils its original function. Cultural or historical memory is an act taking 
place in the theatrical abyss between past and present. 
In the case of the reception of the alleged Adolf Hitler diaries, the anachronistic 
structure of memory was totally denied, disregarding the fact that these diaries 
were false. Handwriting served as a fetish to directly and unreflectingly conflate 
past and present. The situation is more complex in the case of Anne Frank’s diary. 
Not only because her diaries were acknowledged as true, but – I hope to have 
shown here – because it is not enough to ground our recall of the past in a positiv-
istic understanding of authentic origin. Such an understanding risks harming the 
past, like certain chemical methods deployed to prove a document’s authenticity 
threaten to destroy this very document. It is not sufficient to shape the act of mem-
ory as an act of certification and classification by exposing documents as either 
true or false, for this reduces the work of the archive and the museum to an act of 
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re-‘collecting’ the past, the fetishist quality of which I have discussed in this paper. 
Documents can make history present, but never quite so – neither horizontally as 
documentary text, nor vertically as imaginative image. The only effect they can 
achieve is re-iteration, as it is inscribed in all writing, including handwriting – that 
is, iteration with a difference. 




1. This essay has benefited greatly from 
Eric Ketelaar’s stimulating and inspiring 
comments and criticism. I would also like 
to acknowledge José van Dijck and Esther 
Peeren for their many suggestions, as well 
as the support received from the Anne 
Frank House.
2. The immense authority of the archive as 
a host of authenticity can be illustrated by 
the term ‘official custody’, which is defined 
by Sir Hilary Jenkinson in his Manual of 
Archive Administration (1922, 10) as the 
basic condition for public archives. Cus-
tody implies the acceptance of a certified 
copy of a document from the body of the 
Public Record Office in London in any 
court of law. For a document in the British 
Museum to receive this credence, how-
ever, the judge requires the presentation of 
the original document.
3. These involve the Stielau case in Lübeck 
(1960), the Roth case in Frankfurt (1977), 
the Schönborn case in Frankfurt and the 
Kunth case in Stuttgart (both 1979), and 
finally the Römer case in Hamburg (1993). 
A detailed overview of the protracted 
debate on the authenticity of this diary is 
provided by David Barnouw ‘Aanvallen op 
de Echtheid van het Dagboek’ in De dag-
boeken van Anne Frank. 99-119, 1990.
4. The material concerning the scandal of 
the Hitler forgeries is immense. Numerous 
articles were published in newspapers 
worldwide as well as on the Internet (see 
<http://fortunecity.com/dikigoros/schtonk.
htm> and <www.sniggle.net/kujau.php>). 
The film (1992, Dir.: Helmut Dietl) unravels 
the story of the canard in detail, and the 
case has become the subject of informa-
tion and archival studies (for an overview, 
see e.g., Picker and In ‘t Veld).
5. <www.sniggle.net/kujau.php>.
6. For Hitler’s diaries, the process of 
exposing their falseness can be divided 
into two phases. Josef Henke, archivist of 
the Bundesarchiv (German National 
Archive), defines the first phase as running 
from April 5, 1982 – when Thomas Walde 
and Leo Pesch from Stern first contacted 
the Bundesarchiv – until April 22, 1983 – 
when Stern announced the discovery of 
the lost Hitler diaries. The second phase 
runs from April 25, 1983 – when three dia-
ries were given to the Bundesarchiv for 
certification of their authenticity – until 
May 6, 1983, when the German Minister of 
the Interior declared the diaries to be for-
geries (Henke, 289).
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7. Hugh Trevor-Roper, quoted from 
<www sniggle.net/kujau.php>.
8. More precisely, they identified perlon, 
also known as polyamide 6, in the bindings 
of the volumes dating from 1934, 1941, 
and 1943, as well as polyester fibers in the 
1941 volume. Perlon was not produced 
until after 1943, and polyester not before 
1953. Moreover, by means of ultra-violet 
irradiation, they discovered paper-bleach-
ing agents in the paper from the 1941 and 
1943 volumes that were not used prior to 
1945 (Czichos, 78-79; Franke). Another 
flaw was that the diaries had a monogram 
on the front cover that turned out to be 
plastic. Moreover, it was composed of the 
letters ‘FH’ instead of ‘AH’.
9. Several assessments by acknowledged 
handwriting experts were carried out on 
the handwriting of Anne Frank, among 
which one by the Bundeskriminalamt (the 
German Criminal Court Laboratory), and, 
more extensively and authoritatively, by 
the Gerechtelijk Laboratorium (Dutch 
Forensic Laboratory) in Rijswijk, commis-
sioned by the Netherlands Institute for War 
Documentation, or NIOD (Nederlands 
Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, the 
Dutch Institute for War Documentation).
10. In 1986, the complete diaries of Anne 
Frank and the positive results of the labo-
ratory research were published under the 
title De dagboeken van Anne Frank (The 
Diaries of Anne Frank).
11. ‘Met aan zekerheid grenzende 
waarschijnlijkheid afkomstig van de produ-
cente van het vergelijkingsschrift, Anne 
Frank’ (164).
12. This idea comes close to Michel 
Foucault’s conception of the archive as 
epistemological system, as ‘the general 
system of the formation and transforma-
tion of statements’ (146). The archive ‘is 
that which gives to what we can say – and 
to itself, the object of our discourse – its 
mode of appearance, its forms of exist-
ence and coexistence, its system of accu-
mulation, historicity, and disappearance’ 
(145-146).
Wolfgang Ernst summarizes this as fol-
lows: ‘Foucault defines the archive as 
referring to neither the sum of all transmit-
ted documents, nor to the institution of this 
transmission. Rather, it refers to the sys-
tem dominating the appearance and the 
actual functioning of the utterances.’ 
[‘Foucault definiert als Archiv weder die 
Summe aller überlieferten Dokumente 
46
noch die Institution ihrer Überlieferung, 
sondern das System, welches das Auf-
tauchen sowie das weitere aktuelle Funk-
tionieren der Aussagen regiert.’] 
(16; author’s translation).
13. ‘Dieses... Material hatte nur einen 
kleinen Schönheitsfehler: Große Teile 
stammten aus derselben Werkstatt, in der 
auch die Hitler-Tagebücher angefertigt 
worden waren. Die Experten... stellten 
[also] fest, tatsächlich, die stammen aus 
derselben Feder’ (Bissinger, 173).
14. See also José van Dijck, ‘Of Diaries 
and Weblogs’, elsewhere in this book.
15. The reproduction of photographs can 
be seen as symptomatic of the process of 
the facsimilation of the diaries in general. 
In his famous essay, Benjamin regrets the 
loss of aura and relates it to ‘the first truly 
revolutionary means of reproduction, pho-
tography.... To an ever greater degree, the 
work of art reproduced becomes the work 
of art designed for reproducibility. From a 
photographic negative, for example, one 
can make any number of prints; to ask for 
the “authentic” print makes no sense’ 
(224). As opposed to this, Benjamin in his 
‘Small History of Photography’ (‘Kleine 
Geschichte der Photographie’), proposes 
that early photography would be the aura-
tic art par excellence, particularly Atget, 
who would not fake a false aura in his pho-
tographs. Aura, thus considered, does not 
depend on a unique, irreducible print. 
Rather, it can unfold in repetition, as long 
as it remains ‘a peculiar gossamer of 
space and time: a unique phenomenon of 
distance, as close as possible’ (‘ein son-
derbares Gespinst von Raum und Zeit: 
einmalige Erscheinung einer Ferne, so nah 
sie sein mag’) (57; author’s translation).
16. For the wide cultural implications of 
this statement see Hillel Schwartz’s monu-
mental The Culture of the Copy.
17. Marx’s terms commodity and fetish 
form the foundation of a series of critical 
studies. Bal (1994, 107-110) develops her 
concept of collecting by critically discuss-
ing the seminal studies of fetishism – for a 
Freudian approach – by Mitchell (160-208), 
and – for a Lacanian approach – by Žižek 
(32-45). For the idea of fetishism as an 
archival attitude, see Helen Wood, ‘The 
Fetish of the Document: An Exploration of 
Attitudes Towards Archives’.
18. Pomian has made the concept of semi-
ophores travel from the museum to the 
archive. For a reinterpretation of Pomian’s 
dialectics of the visible and the invisible in 
both the museum and the archive, which 
goes beyond the idea of re-presentability 
of history, see Ketelaar (2003).
19. Marianne Hirsch describes the memory 
of the Holocaust by the second generation 
as ‘postmemory’: ‘Postmemory character-
izes the experience of those who grow up 
dominated by narratives that preceded 
their birth, whose own belated stories are 
displaced by the stories of the previous 
generation, shaped by traumatic events 
that they can neither understand nor re-
create’ (8).
20. Or – to echo Freud – ‘belated’.
21. The literature on the problem of trau-
matic recall is immense. Van Alphen (1999) 
explains the difficulties of giving rise to 
subjectivity because this would imply con-
fessing one’s own guilt. See also Mieke 
Bal’s ‘Introduction’ in Acts of Memory 
(1999). 
22. Mitchell’s focus is not on Holocaust 
experiences, but on slavery. When apply-
ing his conceptualization of ‘imagetext’ to 
Holocaust experiences, I do not intend to 
compare these two historical fields be-
cause this would imply a denial of the very 
specific quality of each of them.
23. Particularly in his chapter ‘Collections: 
le visible et l’invisible’ in Pomian, 1987, 
15-58.
24. I have discussed the ‘drama’ of hand-
writing in detail in my book Kalligramme. 
Zur Medialität einer Schrift (Calligrams: 
The Mediality of Writing) by arguing that 
the kalos of handwriting would turn writing 
from an almost invisible medium into a 
vivid, corporeal actor of cultural agency.
25. ‘Ik zal hoop ik aan jou alles kunnen 
toevertrouwen, zoals ik nog aan niemand 
gekund heb, en ik hoop dat je een grote 
steun voor me zult zijn. Anne Frank. 12 juni 
1942’. 
26. For the dialogical relationship between 
Anne and Kitty see Brouwers, 7-8.
27. This doubling of versions and scripts 
added fuel to the fire of the assailants of 
the diary’s authenticity. For this reason, 
the Dutch Rijksinstituut voor oorlogsdocu-
mentatie commissioned the elaboration of 
a historical-critical text edition containing 
Anne’s first version (A), her second ver-
sion (B) as well as the final version that 
Otto Frank edited for publication (De dag-
boeken van Anne Frank. 1990, Harry 
Paape, Gerrold van der Stroom and David 
Barnouw (eds.), Rijksinstituut voor Oor-
logsdocumentatie, 189-736).
28. ‘Stel je eens voor hoe interessant het 
Sign Here! / Authentic Events
47
zou zijn, als ik een roman van het Achter-
huis uit zou geven…’.
29. When pasting the text dimension into 
this image, the name Kitty invites us – for a 
change – to not only focus on what the 
diary does not tell us but on what it does 
tell us. Brouwers (5-7) emphasizes that the 
main topic of the diary is the processual 
formation of identity along with a young 
girl’s awakening sexuality and the awaken-
ing self-consciousness of a beginning 
writer. The diary also contains a multiplic-
ity of literary, picturesque, and ironic short 
stories. Both this intimate and this comical 
dimension of the notebooks redirect our 
view of Anne and protect her from being 
flattened into a two-dimensional image.
30. For the politics of the gaze as an agent 
of power see Norman Bryson, chapter 5, 
‘Gaze and Glance’ in Vision and Painting. 
As for the situation of the logic of the mu-
seum’s gaze, see Bal, Double Exposures, 
especially chapter 8, ‘His Master’s Eye’.
31. ‘Het gaat hier maar door met achter-
huis te zijn. Dat gaat nooit meer weg. Nooit 
meer. Het is voor altijd leeg hier. Dat is zo 
wreed, zo tragisch.… Eigenlijk wordt het 
elke dag opnieuw leeggehaald, dit huis. 
Iedere dag worden ze opnieuw opgepakt. 
En elke dag, elke morgen als ik hier kom, 
tref ik het huis leeg aan. Zijn ze weg, al-
weer. Een gruwelijke herhaling, net als in 
de hel’ (13; author’s translation).
32. The concept of performativity origi-
nates from 19th-century ethnology where 
it describes rites and festivities. In the 20th 
century, it became prominent in theatre 
studies as a concept for describing one-
time events that could not be covered by 
the traditional concept of ‘text’. In philoso-
phy, Austin (1975) applies the concept to 
linguistic utterances as acts that ‘do’ rath-
er than state things. The event-character of 
the concept was profoundly revisited by 
Derrida in Signature Event Context by in-
sisting on the citationality or repeatability 
of the signature as a singularity to be iter-
ated. The idea that repetition involves both 
similarity and difference, and that it there-
fore allows for other possibilities giving 
rise to individual subject interventions, or 
agency, became the founding principle of 
gender studies (Butler 1993), and, again, 
for philosophy (Rössler 2001).
33. Moreover, the archive ‘archivalizates’, 
for example, by exposing events and 
records as either true or false.
Sonja Neef
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The idea of an ‘authentic copy’ that forms the focus of this book’s chapter, is based 
on a contradiction; on what is rhetorically termed a contradictio in adiecto: ‘au-
thenticity’ is generally associated with genuineness, originality, uniqueness. In oth-
er words, with something that cannot or should not be reproduced or that could 
only be ‘copied’ by losing its character, its specificity; in short, its sense. Thus, we 
can refer to cultural theories, for example on the decline of media societies – as rep-
resented, in a first and superficial impression, by someone like Walter Benjamin – 
that are based on the opposition of, on the one hand, a pre-medial world of au-
thenticity and the aura of the original and, on the other, the realm of media-techni-
cal reproduction of what may be called a copy, surrogate, simulacrum, dummy or, 
nowadays, simply fake.
Conversely, we know that if we try to provide a definition of the originality of 
the authentic, we enter into a cycle of reaffirmations of the ‘one’, only now in a 
chain of substitutions or supplements. I remember a paradoxical formulation I 
found in an art advertisement from the 1970s, when very expensive reproductions 
of masterpieces, produced by means of a new printing technique, were offered 
with the slogan: The absolute authentic reproduction.
We may laugh at this absurdity, but even a short look at the etymological con-
text of the word ‘authentic’ teaches us more about both the original relationship of 
the concept and the question of handwriting or, as we say, authentication by palm/
finger: the definition of authentes refers to the concept of a ‘master’, a ‘potentate’, 
someone who makes something with his own hands as originator: an author. This 
is why it is often used as an adjective for the noun ‘auctoritas’ (authority). But all 
this is only representable by repetition, revealed as something identical within dif-
ference. Its authority derives from iteration, domination, and force: as a disposi-
Sign Here! / The Authority of Drawing
51
tion by a strategy of application and appropriation. As, for instance, in Kant’s defi-
nition of authentic theodicy as exegesis, given by the legislator himself, an argument 
that always comes too late and that refers to a founding, establishing moment in the 
sense of donating as giving an origin which eternally lacks. And even though this ori-
gin is absent, it plays a fundamental role in the presence (Kant 1964, 116).
To cut up the complex and over-determined aporia and at the same time to pre-
cipitate forward: we are at once confronted with the abyss of a less mediatic and 
more metaphysical or, even better, theological question of creation: the monopoliz-
ing, monotheistic god who has to split, to differ, to double, or to reproduce himself 
in what we call the creation as revelation for the sole purpose of knowing about 
himself as the one and only god. But let us stop our speculation here, before we get 
sick of Hegelian dialectics.
The passage from the etymological context to the historical development of au-
thenticity is perfectly analyzed in Lionel Trilling’s book Sincerity and Authenticity. 
Trilling argues that in the beginning of the 16th century, the concept of sincerity was 
the first to claim a kind of moral or political correctness against a world of betrayal 
and falsification. A look at the word’s etymological roots may be informative here:
The word... derived from the Latin word sincerus and first meant what the Latin 
word means in its literal use – clean, or sound, or pure. An old and merely fanci-
ful etymology, sine cera, without wax, had in mind an object of virtu which was 
not patched up and passed off as sound, and serves to remind us that the word in 
its early use referred primarily not to persons but things, both material and im-
material.... But it soon came to mean the absence of dissimulation or feigning or 
pretence. (Trilling 1972, 12) 
On the contrary, the word authenticity enlarges the range of legitimacy of pure 
origin:
I can rely on its suggesting a more strenuous moral experience than sincerity 
does, a more exigent conception of the self and what being true to it consists in, 
a wider reference to the universe and man’s place in it, and a less acceptant and 
genial view of the social circumstances of life.... Conversely much that culture 
traditionally condemned and sought to exclude is accorded a considerable mor-
al authority by reason of the authenticity claimed for it, for example disorder, 
violence, unreason. (Trilling 1972, 11)
In this sense, authenticity is attributed more to strategies of transgression and ex-
cess, but also, in an aesthetic sense, of artistic creation by destruction. Trilling recalls 
again the Greek etymology:
Authenteo: to have full power; also, to commit a murder. Authentes: not only a 
master and a doer, but also a perpetrator, a murderer, even a self-murderer, a su-
icide. These ancient and forgotten denotations bear upon the nature and inten-
tion of the artistic culture of the period we call modern. (Trilling 1972, 131)
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I am concerned with these aspects because I would like to concentrate more on the 
aesthetic point of view, especially in the form of a comparison between the artistic 
strategy of producing authenticity within so-called modernity and the juridical 
analysis of the underlying concept of authority.
And, of course, this is an article about the hand, about what is at hand or to 
hand.
But first of all I would like to invoke the basic theory of difference as delay, as 
trace, as developed by Jacques Derrida in his first great book, Of Grammatology. 
The main argument is – and here I have to be unpardonably short – that sense is not 
given as the representation of a former and original truth, but that it is produced by 
a real and material movement in the context of writing as tracing. We quickly see 
how Derrida subscribes to a long anti-Platonic tradition, to the critique of the meta-
physical model of archi-idea and ektypos of sensorial appearance (noumenon and 
phaenomenon). We know the important stages of a kind of pre-histoire, such as 
Kant’s model of schematism, which is also built on the idea of tracing a line to con-
nect concepts to their apperceptions (a move later recycled in the linguistic turn of 
Humboldt’s theory of human language). But what remains a crucial thesis, which 
Derrida never stopped repeating for more than 30 years, is the paradigm of iteration 
as supplement: the so-called archi-trace that is something that reveals itself only in 
the infinite difference (‘differance’) from something else, as an effect of dehiscence 
or, in different but no less confusing words, the trace is testimony only to the absence 
of which it is an index.
Derrida’s writing on art, especially his work on painting and ‘architexture’, also 
claimed the difference between the picture as drawing and the act of drawing as the 
production or path-breaking (as in pushing forth) of visibility as trait. This differ-
ence, I will argue, applies for handwriting as much as for drawing, as both practices 
rely on the activity of a creative hand. The drawn visible mark refers to an invisible 
potency, a potency (as irreducibly unseen, invisible) of the trait, neither as the oppo-
site of vision, nor as reproduction of an original vision, but rather as the invention 
of visibility (invention of the other; Derrida 1987). Thus, as Derrida argued in 
‘Memoirs of the Blind’, painting, like writing, is the result of an unconscious, blind 
process of drawing:
Whether it be improvised or not, the invention of the trait does not follow, it 
does not conform to what is presently visible, to what would be set in front of me 
as a theme. Even if drawing is, as they say, mimetic, that is, reproductive, figura-
tive, representative, even if the model is presently facing the artist, the trait must 
proceed in the night. It escapes the field of vision. Not only because it is not yet 
visible, but because it does not belong to the realm of the spectacle, of spectacu-
lar objectivity – and so that which it makes happen or come about cannot itself 
be mimetic. The heterogeneity between the thing drawn and the drawing trait 
remains abyssal, whether it be between a thing represented and its representa-
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tion or between the model and the image. The night of this abyss can be inter-
preted in two ways, either as the eve or the memory of the day, that is, as a re-
serve of visibility (the draftsman does not presently see but he has seen and will 
see again: the aperspective as the anticipating perspective or the anamnesic 
retrospective), or else as radically and definitively foreign to the phenomenality 
of the day. This heterogeneity of the invisible to the visible can haunt the visible 
as its very possibility. (Derrida 1993, 45) 
The important step of representation, therefore, will be to re-appropriate the re-
vealed form or figure as possibility, an act that constitutes the so-called authorship 
as domination of the work, which is always belated due to the withdrawal and in-
accessibility of the trait. The signature as appropriation does not belong to the 
signing subject: what may be called ‘deconstruction’ in visual arts as a condition of 
construction implies this experience of decentralization, of the dislocation of the 
presence in a work of traces. The signature does not belong to the work, it is some-
thing different, foreign, a name which is part of a discourse on the work and which 
constitutes the relationship between the mere existence of a piece of work and the 
artist as inventor or producer not by the mere act of signing, but by referring to the 
whole sociological context of reception, publication, attribution, acceptance, rec-
ognition, etc. There is no signature without countersignature, as Derrida explained 
in an interview: 
The origin of the work ultimately resides with the addressee, who doesn’t yet 
exist, but that is where the signature starts … When I sign for the first time, that 
means that I am writing something that I know will have been signed only if the 
addressees come to countersign it. Thus the temporality of the signature is al-
ways this future perfect that naturally politicizes the work, gives it over to 
someone else, that is to say, to society, to an institution, to the possibility of the 
signature. (Wills 1994, 19) 
This idea of the artist refers more to his practice as craftsman than to the idealistic 
tradition of the genius. It is a re-reading of the history of art beyond the dominat-
ing perspective of subjectivity, which Heidegger, as one of the first, criticized in Be-
ing and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art as a false inversion of the onto-
logical relation. The distinction between ‘being at hand’ (Vorhandenheit) as exist-
ence and ‘being to hand’ (Zuhandenheit) as utility led Heidegger to the very impor-
tant assumption that we have no real relation or contact with being as being, but 
that we can only relate to it by transforming it into ‘Zeug’ (from ‘ziehen’: to pull: 
draft in the sense of the trait). This constitutes an implicit re-evaluation of the hand 
as the primordial or basic medium of data processing. Our relationship to the 
world is literally mediated by the hand that tears up the things near us and makes 
them useful. However, in this way, things are only given when they are framed by 
utility and as data of perception; they do not exist in themselves.
Contrary to all utilitarian dealings with things as ‘Zeug’, the mind is confront-
ed with what Heidegger calls the ‘Zeigzeug’: the toolkit, a reference to what turns 
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out, at the moment of the accident to be the annihilation of all readiness or handi-
ness, the withdrawal of the things themselves: to be not at hand, to refuse all utility 
and to be nevertheless there only as a useless obstacle. In this sense, things are re-
duced to their pure and mere being-there, their Vorhandenheit, their being at hand, 
which, strictly speaking, does not at all stand in relation to any hand or handiness. 
They do not speak to the hand, but to the eye. We are dealing here with the very 
important occidental difference between the visual and the haptical (a seeing by 
touching, as when we say that blind men see with their hands). And it is no wonder 
that this dimension was largely developed in the new technical media, such as pho-
tography, where the artist’s hand is substituted by a machine, by the so-called ap-
paratus, with whose help ‘Nature’ inscribes itself as ‘Pencil of Nature’ (Talbot): 
This most exact technique can give the presentation a magical value that a 
painted picture can never possess for us.... [T]he viewer feels an irresistible 
compulsion to seek the tiny spark of accident, the here and now. (Benjamin 
1980, 202)
But this alienation as distance changes to a transcendental condition of magic, 
called aura: the aura of authenticity as absence or distance. The aura, as Benjamin 
argues, is the opposite of the trait, the track as presence:
What is aura? A strange web of time and space: the unique appearance of a dis-
tance, however close at hand. On a summer noon, resting, to follow the line of 
a mountain range on the horizon or a twig which throws its shadow on the ob-
server, until the moment or hour begins to be a part of its appearance – that is 
to breathe the aura of these mountains, that twig. Now to bring themselves 
closer – and closer to the masses – is as passionate a contemporary trend as is 
the conquest of unique things in every situation by their reproduction. Day by 
day the need becomes greater to take possession of the object – from the closest 
proximity – in an image and the reproduction of an image. The removal of the 
object from its shell, the fragmentation of the aura, is the signature of a percep-
tion whose sensitivity for similarity has so grown that by means of reproduc-
tion it defeats even the unique. (Benjamin 1980, 209)
Derrida was aware of the problematic way in which this ideology of reproduction 
tried to forget the difference between the trait as witness (as high fidelity) and the 
artificiality of the made, which Derrida named, in the very context of media stud-
ies, artefactualité (after artificial and factual) and which leads to the question of 
the legitimization of the trace as mise en abyme of authority (Derrida 1996, 11). In 
Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ Derrida refers to another 
text by Benjamin, entitled Critique of Violence. The basic figure of the possibility 
of justice is here referred to as a promise and repetition – a figure similar to iterabil-
ity or the countersignature as re-establishing the original by means of the posteri-
ority of visualization, reception, and representation:
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A foundation is a promise. Every position… permits and promises…. Thus it 
inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the originary.… Position is 
already iterability, a call for self-conserving repetition. Conservation in its turn 
refounds, so that it can conserve what it claims to found. (Derrida 1992, 38)
The founding sign appears as a given hand, a signature. But it is a performative and 
not an affirmative act: if we can say that the trace engenders its own origin without 
proving its legitimacy, the acting or practicing of justice in its own singularity 
(without generalization) generates authority without decidability, guarantee, or 
calculability. This double bind or double mark of the mystical ground as the secret 
of innocence and transgression introduces the hymen of authority, the veil of visi-
bility that cannot be torn without destroying the founding tension of intention as 
a move towards a forthcoming alteration instead of towards a future as reduplica-
tion of the present.
We are also dealing here with a narrative of touch, a narrative of membranes as re-
vived in the well-known anecdote of Balzac’s fear that photography may flay the 
skin. This of course has its roots in Lucretius and late antiquity’s theory of eidola, 
which lives on in the mythical theme of photography as the removed skin of things. 
It also refers to a narrative of the injured gaze, of scarring, stitching, or the ‘suture’ 
mending the gaping hole between the original and the image. The aspects of skin 
under discussion here concern not only the skin on the surface of objects, but also 
the sensitive skin of that which touches. With Derrida we can connect this back to 
the origin of painting, to the story of Dibutade, the daughter of the Corinthian pot-
ter, who records the silhouette of her lover on the wall with a stick before he goes 
off to war:
Unlike the spoken or written sign, it does not cut itself off from the desiring 
body of the person who traces or from the immediately perceived image of the 
other. It is of course still an image which is traced at the tip of the wand, but an 
image that is not completely separated from the person it represents; what the 
drawing draws is almost present in person in his shadow. The distance from 
the shadow or from the wand is almost nothing. She who traces, holding, han-
dling, now the wand, is very close to touching what is very close to being the 
other itself, close by a minute difference; that small difference – visibility, spac-
ing, death – is undoubtedly the origin of the sign and the breaking of immedia-
cy; but it is in reducing it as much as possible that one marks the contours of 
signification. One thinks the sign beginning from its limit, which belongs nei-
ther to nature nor to convention. (Derrida 1976, 234)
The touch, then, lies between denotation and connotation. The trace inscribes it-
self in the course of a development that includes all three aspects: touch, imprint, 
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and its becoming autonomous as an icon. This new autonomy comes about, to put 
it more precisely, by a process of montage, that is, by construction or mise en scène. 
It is, however, determined by an implicit double bind, which deconstruction can 
again make explicit: the double bind between origin and invention. Derrida’s des-
ignation of this minimal gap as différance has a predecessor in Marcel Duchamp’s 
concept of inframince, which may be translated as ‘wafer-thin’ or ‘infra-small’, ‘in-
fra-thin’ or ‘infra-minimal’ (as opposed to ‘ultra-’):
This is one way in which the ‘same’ distances itself from itself, becomes dissim-
ilar to itself, diverging from itself by an ‘infra-minimal distance’. On the spatial 
level... Duchamp connects the question of the infra-minimal with the question 
of ‘sameness’ – that is, a way of tracking a ‘same’ back to a prototype, as in se-
rial fabrication, which served as Duchamp’s model. (Didi-Huberman 1999, 
from the German translation of the French original, 173)
Duchamp had already demonstrated this type of shift in the repetition or differ-
ence of identity in his ready-mades, which ushered into the artistic arena not only 
the industrial principle of pre-fabricated products, but also that of the serial pro-
duction of apparently identical stereotypes. The point, then, about ready-mades – 
such as the Bottle Rack (1914) or the Fountain (1917) that Duchamp apparently 
found in a department store – is that in the process of aesthetic presentation, indi-
vidual examples depart from a context which determines them as a whole unit, so 
that they become totality in themselves, without any reference to what they repre-
sent, like an object identical to its image. Thereby, it suggests the absence of an 
original prototype or object. And here we arrive at the question of the occult, of 
the cryptic element of the mediality of that which represents, or rather – remem-
bering the minuteness, the imperceptible difference of the gap posited by Duchamp 
– of the crypticness of infra-mediality. 
But what is meant by the concept of infra-mediality? One might say it is an an-
swer to the question of the monadological element of the translatability of data in 
the sense of their shifting from the authenticity of the drawn trait to the manipula-
tive re-appropriation as authorship. Our attention is now focused not on interme-
diality’s horizontal shifts, but on the vertical compression of heterogeneity; that is, 
on the relocation of the moments of intermediality – such as ‘fault-lines, gaps, in-
tervals or interstices, as well as borders and thresholds, in which their media differ-
ential plays a part’ – to the interior of a structure with its layerings, dislocations 
and thresholds: as the potentiality or intensity of an inner, infrastructural change 
(Paech 1998, 25). According to Leibniz, monads have no windows, which does 
not, however, mean that they cannot form constellations or represent them. They 
must do this as monads, i.e., as fragments of a whole that develops (further) within 
these fragments, autonomously but at the same time synchronously or affinitively. 
What counts is the media auto-referentiality of the semantics that attains meaning 
by means of the potentiation of the system.
Infra in this sense, then, implies more than simply the immanent or internal. 
Rather, it implies an internal inclusion, subcutaneous virtualities, something con-
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cealed underneath that does not, however, pre-exist as anything substantial but re-
veals itself – like infra-red energy – in its subsequential effects. The use of the term 
in Duchamp’s phrase infra-mince can be applied to Plato’s chora as well as to Der-
rida’s différance. The poem of the same title (‘If tobacco smoke smells of the mouth 
it issued from, both scents are married in infra-mince’) celebrates this definition of 
the transition from the possible to the nascent or the difference ‘between two seri-
ally produced objects (from the same mold)’ (Tono 1984, 55). Infra-mediality, 
then, has to do with the infrastructure of the media as a virtual dispositivity of the 
medium, the inner work: as an internal act of translation, as a version taking all 
things into account, as it were. One might also – with reference to Benjamin’s essay 
‘The Task of the Translator’ – speak of an infra-linear version which, like Ben-
jamin’s ‘interlinear version’ between the original and the translation, sees itself as 
a virtual and transcendental subtext, functioning ‘underneath’ or ‘inside’ (‘infra’), 
representing something like a dispositive or invisible/unconscious ‘matrix’ for its 
intention – but as a symbol for the unconscious of the trait.1 Intention as a kind of 
inner exterior now turns out, in fact, to be an infrastructure – certainly in terms of 
Benjamin’s original phrase, ‘in the intention of the asserted’, where ‘in’ indicates 
how the determination of the kind of assertion occurs ‘inside’.2 And it is in this 
sense that Duchamp himself speaks of creation as ‘osmosis’, ‘a transparence from 
the artist to the spectator… taking place through the inert matter’.
‘Intention’ as a metaphor could not only replace the tiresome division of index 
vs. icon, but could also perform the role of missing link between the three aspects 
of materiality, apparatus and code. One should emphasize the critical valency of 
this reminder of ‘artifactuality’, obligated to the subconscious, as well as recogniz-
ing it as a new impetus for research: inframediality inquires after every medium’s 
intentions with regard to other media in its ‘interlinear version’ (Benjamin). The 
infralinear version, however, reduces each particular mediality by its own compu-
tations and representations of, for example, visual knowledge – through the paper 
or the screen, for instance, as a kind of ‘approximate remembrance’ of the real, 
which clears a path for its own memory in the narrativity of the allegorical aspects 
of the material recording.
The trace or trait thus exhibits its own genealogy, the implements hidden in the 
actual infra-trait. Actually, what we call ‘authentic reproduction’ is projection, be-
cause the authentic can only become visible as trace of the ‘producing’ hand in its 
reproduction and afterwards. Thus we arrive at the final thesis: we cannot close 
the gap between the drawing and the drawn, but need to stay within the chain of 
supplementations, as in a film where the next picture sutures the gap of the one be-
fore. This whole play of difference, delay, and deviation constitutes the artistic 
production and the responsibility of the artist as author: the difference between the 
piece of work in its total materiality and the artist as its first spectator who ‘smells’ 
of what he has done in this afterglow of the infra-thin transformation.
The authenticity of handwriting appears precisely as a re-appropriation of this 
gap. Thus, authenticity does not reveal a reference to a real or ontological origin. 
Rather, it appears as an intention in the sense of a drift of difference. The so-called 
‘infra-thin signature’ disseminates each trait in a kind of performativity of produc-
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tion. The act of signing then resembles less a giving hand in the sense of a source of 
originality that the hand owns and now gives away. Instead, this metaphor of gift 
or present transforms into the slightly different iconography of the presence of a 
touching hand, living on the borderline of the seeking and of the meeting impulse 
of drawing.




1. Compare with Lyotard, Jean-François, 
Discours, Figure. 1971, 339.
2. This phrase, literally Intention vom 
Gemeinten (from: Benjamin, Walter. 
‘Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers’, in: 
R. Tiedemann and H. Schweppenhäuser 
(eds.), Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, 
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Digital media are quite unlike the ‘mechanical’ reproduction media that figure so 
often in the literature of cultural and media studies. Both the interaction between 
author and user through the digital medium, and a number of other intrinsic qual-
ities of many digital media, lead to novel interpretations of the concepts of ‘copy’ 
and ‘authenticity’ in the digital world. Digital media re-introduce some aspects of 
authenticity that were lost through the use of purely mechanical media. Digital 
media also lead to new conceptions of authenticity and power, related to shifts of 
control from author to reader and from publisher to author, and a shift from me-
chanical production to digital reproduction. In addition, digital media result in a 
reduction of commonality and shared reading experiences, and a re-definition of 
the concept of authenticity in terms of readership rather than authorship. These 
are issues that are of growing importance for scientific communication that is be-
coming almost totally dependent on digital media. 
Scientific communication in the modern sense implies the distribution of mul-
tiple copies of an author’s work, preferably on a global scale, although generally 
confined to a specific disciplinary field. It is one of the requirements of the scientif-
ic communication system that these copies are ‘authentic’, i.e., exact copies of a 
certified original, and that they remain authentic over time. This is not easy in a 
Sign Here! / Authencity and Objectivity
61
world where digital information can be manipulated with ease, and where digital 
documents are inherently fluid and unstable. In addition, scientific information is 
required to be ‘objective’ and therefore to abstain from devices that enhance self-
expression rather than content. As we shall see, digital media offer both authors 
and readers various opportunities for self-expression in the communicative act. 
Since ‘authenticity’ may refer to an original, but also to originality, the concept of 
authenticity becomes highly problematic in the context of digital media.
What do we mean by an ‘authentic copy’? In the traditional world of print publica-
tion, the word ‘copy’ usually refers to an abstraction: the original text as estab-
lished by the publisher. This is not necessarily the author’s original text (often re-
ferred to as ‘manuscript’ even when it is not written by hand), and in fact it usually 
is not. As a result of the editorial, certification, and publication processes, the orig-
inal text (i.e., the submitted manuscript) is changed, often quite extensively. In 
form and even in content, the publisher (or the publisher’s proxy, the editor) has 
the final say. In this case, ‘authenticity’ refers to the original published text, not to 
the original text that the author has submitted. The distinction between author 
and publisher is therefore relevant with regard to authenticity. Within the scientific 
community, in the context of legal issues such as copyright, and for the practice of 
archiving, it is always the publication (rather than the manuscript or pre-print) 
that is considered to be the authentic work. 
Written communication can be regarded as a sequential process in which, as 
far as publications are concerned, various actors perform specific functions.1 In its 
simplest form, this ‘information chain’ consists of the sequence Author-Publisher-
Reader (Illustration 1).2 Each of these actors exercises some form of control over 
form and content. But to a large extent it is the publisher who is in control. 
1. The information chain
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The locus of control regarding authenticity has been with the publisher for a con-
siderable period of time, in fact it has been there since the invention of the printing 
press. But this is now shifting in two directions as a result of the introduction of 
digital media: a shift back from publishers to authors, but also a shift from author-
ship to publishing.
Many publishers now require authors to produce camera-ready copy. This 
gives authors more control over the final publication. However, this is offset by 
publishers’ ‘editorial policies’ that put strict requirements on the format to be used 
by the author. A more conspicuous shift towards author-control is self-publishing 
(Harnad 1995). Digital media give authors the opportunity to publish their works 
themselves, usually via the Internet, giving them almost total control over form 
and content (as well as over copyright – the prime motivation for Harnad’s ‘sub-
versive proposal’).
 
However, there is also a shift in the opposite direction. Digital media allow readers 
(or ‘users’) much more freedom to define the visual characteristics of what they 
read. They also allow users to create their own, highly individual paths through 
digital content resources. This implies that users not only have more control over 
form and structure, but also, in a pragmatic sense, over content. By selecting and 
linking fragments of information, the user virtually creates his or her own work. 
The authors – if they exist at all – become mere suppliers of semantic components 
to the user.
The history of media has often been described in terms of major and minor revolu-
tions. The idea behind such a revolution is that it introduces a new medium and a 
new communicative practice that emphasizes the characteristics of the new medi-
um, and has little use for the characteristics of the previous one. It is true that in the 
transition from one medium to another, a certain amount of remediation takes 
place. But eventually the old medium disappears as a technological artifact, and 
with it many of the cultural practices, forms and genres that surrounded it disap-
pear as well. There is nothing new in this. The handwritten medium and the Latin 
language were effectively marginalized by the 20 million books produced by the 
printing press between 1450 and 1500 (Febvre and Martin 1958; see also Birkerts 
1994). Print also destroyed the culture of orality: the practice of reading aloud to 
oneself and to others was replaced by silent reading. 
A later example is the ‘revolution’ caused by the introduction of the keyboard 
as a medium for writing. For many, the keyboard has not only destroyed the spe-
cific characteristics of handwriting, but even the ability of handwriting.3 Now that 
the mechanical keyboard (typewriter) has been replaced by the digital keyboard 
(computer), we have moved even further away from handwriting.
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If the typewriter destroys handwriting, it might be thought that the computer must 
destroy even more. What, in fact, is being destroyed, is authenticity in its most im-
mediate form, and in a sense is very different from that described above in the con-
text of scientific communication. Autography’s claim for authenticity (as opposed 
to typed writing) is based on a conception of handwriting as ‘an un-(ex)changeable, 
unique and authentic “signature” that claims to guarantee the presence of an indi-
vidual writer during an historically unique moment of writing’.4 In contrast, typed 
writing would have to be characterized as allographic, i.e., iterative and reproduc-
ible. The argument, then, is that with handwriting the medium does not only con-
vey information, but also a physical token of identity as an authentic and recogniz-
able expression of the writer as an individual, and that this form of authenticity is 
destroyed by the mechanization involved in typed writing. 
However, handwriting has no claim to this type of authenticity per se. Through-
out the ages, the culture and practice of handwriting has been based on standardi-
zation and the elimination of personal characteristics rather than idiosyncrasy. In 
mediaeval manuscripts it is often very difficult to distinguish between the hand of 
different scribes. Handwriting as learned in the classroom has always been highly 
standardized. Even nowadays the educational goal remains standardized, ‘legible’ 
forms of handwriting, and the Internet offers many solutions for achieving this 
goal, including computerized, interactive learning aids.5 Deviations from the 
standard are commonly described as ‘bad’ handwriting.6 
This standardization is quite reasonable and understandable. At the end of the 
day, writing has a communicative function. Communication theory tells us that it 
benefits from the use of standardized encodings that are shared by both communi-
cator and receiver. The ‘authenticity’ of handwriting therefore either stems from a 
person’s inability to comply with the accepted standard (i.e., a lack of communica-
tive skills), or the writer’s wish to make a specific statement by not playing the 
game in the prescribed way. Enter the artist’s dilemma: authentic communication 
requires breaking the conventional rules of communication. 
The conclusion for scientific communication is clear. The scientist is not an art-
ist, and the expression of his or her personality is not part of the game. The shift 
from handwriting to standardized, mechanized writing is but one of the dimen-
sions of the shift towards objectivity in scientific communication over the centuries 
(Gross et al. 2002).7 For scientific communication, then, the question is whether 
digital media sustain the required objectivity, or regress towards increasing subjec-
tivity. 
Speed, standardization, and reproducibility are three characteristics of typed writ-
ing that are perceived as advantages over handwriting. Standardization guarantees 
a high degree of legibility and therefore supports the communicative function. Re-
producibility in the context of typewriting means two things. First, however often 
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and by whomever a text is typed, it will always lead to more or less the same typo-
graphical result.8 But second, and perhaps more importantly, the typewriter offers 
the possibility of auto-reproduction: the ‘carbon copy’. As such the typewriter is 
not really different from the printing press or even the scriptorium (as a highly 
standardized human copying machine). But what might be relevant as a phenom-
enon in the development of culture is that for the first time the typewriter allows 
for communication and reproduction of content without the intermediary form of 
handwriting: the author expresses ideas directly by means of the typewriter.9 There 
is no handwritten original, and this will become especially relevant in the context 
of digital media. Whereas with typewriting there still remains a physical object 
that could be referred to as the authentic original, that is no longer the case when a 
text resides solely in a computer’s memory. 
If we regard handwriting as a culturally significant phenomenon, then we can 
argue that the author relinquishes his or her authenticity by submitting to the con-
veniences of the typewriter: the written object might as well have been created by 
somebody else. And as far as the medium of writing influences the form and even 
the meaning of writing, the shift from handwriting to typewriting (and further to 
keyboard writing) is at the very least significant.10 
It can be argued, however, that typewriting as a standardized form actually 
safeguards authenticity to a much higher degree than handwriting. This argument 
requires a different approach to the concept of ‘authenticity’. At the level of con-
notation, of conveying meaning, handwriting is problematic. The more individual 
(i.e., ‘authentic’) the handwriting, the greater the danger is that the reader will mis-
read, and therefore misinterpret the meaning of the author as expressed through 
the handwriting. As noted above, this communicative problem of handwriting is 
increased in the context of the ‘artist’s dilemma’. In other words, the authenticity 
of the text (its intended meaning) is undermined by the authenticity of the hand-
writing. In this sense, the typewriter and other systems of mechanical reproduc-
tion, including the digital keyboard, offers a greater chance than handwriting that 
the authentic meaning of the author will be communicated to the reader. 
To a certain extent this paradox would seem to be merely semantic, involving 
two conceptions of ‘authenticity’: 
– Type 1: authenticity with reference to identity (‘that’s me’) 
– Type 2: authenticity with reference to connotation (‘that’s what I mean’).
However, the problem is more intricate, and there is a continuing conflict be-
tween the internal authenticity of meaning and the external authenticity of signa-
ture. The enormous success of mechanical and digital media might indicate that 
most people find the former more important than the latter. Our rational Western 
culture values semantic meaning more than the mode of expression. Yet the prefer-
ence of some people for handwriting in the face of increasing pressure to adopt 
standardized, mechanical, and networked communication media, might point to 
the existence of two distinct psychological types (i.e., external/visual/subjective/
artist versus internal/mental/objective/scientist). 
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The expression of identity is related to the expressiveness of the medium. The 
handwriting author has no more than pen and paper to manifest his/her identity. 
The digital author, on the other hand, has a vast array of means to create a per-
sonal signature in the visual construction of the text.11 Here there certainly is an 
advantage over the typewriter, if not over handwriting. 
The main difference lies in the design and parameterization of the signature. 
Design implies that the visual expression of content on paper or screen is governed 
by the intentional application of a schema or format that has been created con-
sciously beforehand. In the digital context, this type of design is highly parameter-
ized: it consists of a finite set of attribute/value pairs that determine specific charac-
teristics of the visual appearance of the text. Superimposed on the basic design are 
the local choices of the writer to vary the parameters by altering their values. So the 
writer can choose an initial template or style sheet: a schema of layout elements 
such as font family, size, color, etc. In writing, the author then may or may not de-
viate from this schema, e.g., by altering the font, size or by using bold or italics to 
express emphasis. 
The typographical variety available in digital typed writing is therefore not 
necessarily less than that available in handwriting. The main difference is that 
handwriting uses visual elements as a form of immediate, graphical expression, 
whereas in digital writing expression is governed by the ability of the writer to 
command the machine, i.e., to control the application of typographical parame-
ters. In this sense, ergodic reading is supplemented by ergodic writing (Aarseth 
1997). As everyone using digital writing tools knows, the flow of thought is con-
tinually interrupted by the need (or desire) to control layout and typographical pa-
rameters and in general be involved – at least to a certain degree – with the visual 
characteristics of the text.12 
Now, one might argue that this is all very well, but that the essence of hand-
writing has to be found not in typographical elements (e.g., layout, size, color, 
etc.), but in the letter formation itself. The mechanical or digital writer has to 
choose from a finite set of prefabricated, industrial fonts, whereas handwriting 
makes use of highly individual, personal letter formations (Ong 1982). However, 
the borderline between handwritten letters and industrialized fonts has become 
more fluid. To begin with, there are now methods to create a personal font based 
on a person’s own handwriting. On the Internet, one can find commercial services 
that offer to create a personal font based on an example of the client’s handwriting. 
Personal this may be, but it does remain a font in the traditional sense: a fixed set 
of tokens, where every ‘a’ is identical to every other ‘a’. However, recent rule-based 
technologies now allow for a seemingly endless variation of letter forms within a 
personalized font.13 Digital media are re-creating the illusion of personal hand-
writing while retaining all of the other characteristics of digital writing, including 
reproducibility and parameter control. One could argue about how echt this form 
of digital handwriting is. But it is perhaps at least relevant to note that there is ap-
parently a need (and therefore a market) in the digital world for something that 
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will at least provide the illusion of personal handwriting. A more recent example 
of the reverse is a form of digital handwriting recognition that is not based on 
standardized tokens imposed on the writer (as in most personal digital assistants), 
but that recognizes individual handwriting.14
Our thinking about information and media is to a large extent based on the well-
known conduit model that describes information as flowing over a system consist-
ing of at least a sender/origin, a medium/channel and a receiver/destination (Reddy 
1993; Day 2001, chapter 3). This model implies, amongst many other things, au-
thorship and authenticity, i.e., that a message as received should be identical to the 
message sent.15 Authenticity therefore also implies that the message must be stable 
over time (i.e., between sending and receiving).16 That this is not always the case, 
is perceived as a communications problem to be resolved by perfecting the com-
munications system. But in the digital world, things can be different. What if au-
thorship and authenticity are intentionally left out? 
Much information is generated by processes and systems (e.g., sensors, surveil-
lance cameras). It is difficult to understand who or what the author is in these 
cases. The concept of ‘meaning’ in the absence of an author is problematic, as is 
‘authenticity’. But stability over time can be even more contentious. Within the 
prevailing concept of a communications system, information is always by defini-
tion old information: images of history, of what has been. It pertains to something 
from the past that is being conveyed over time and space to the reader. However, 
digital media allow the communication of real-time information that pertains to 
the exact moment that it is received. A moment later the information is no longer 
valid, and it has to be refreshed. Here, authenticity depends on immediacy and can 
be characterized as ‘zero-duration authenticity’. 
Even traditional media such as the newspaper move in this direction once they 
go online. Shayla Thiel has devoted an interesting discussion to online newspapers 
in which she describes the medium as an experience rather than as a product (Thiel 
1998). The online newspaper changes from moment to moment, and is also highly 
personalized.17 Not only traditional documentary characteristics such as quality 
markers and context indicators disappear, but the entire concept of ‘authenticity’ 
has shifted from the author to the reader. There is no longer an authentic expres-
sion of the writer as an individual. What counts is the reader’s feeling of authentic-
ity: whether the newspaper (or any other digital format) provides an authentic ex-
perience and gives the reader the illusion of active involvement in the dynamics of 
the world around him. But, as Thiel observes, the online newspaper is ‘more con-
cerned with look and feel than with getting the best news and information’. Thiel 
is skeptical about this development towards ephemeral media, but she also argues 
that it is well adapted to the postmodern culture of our times, and to future gener-
ations of readers. 
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However this may be, the example shows that with highly dynamic digital media, 
there is no author, no original, no copy, no authenticity, nothing to preserve, and 
therefore no history. It is precisely these characteristics that prohibit such media 
from playing a role in the world of objective knowledge and scientific communica-
tion. 
The lack of fixity has more significance than a mere lack of history – if there is 
nothing to record, who cares about history? However, it also has profound impli-
cations for the role of information in providing a cultural context for communica-
tion and in creating collective experiences and group identities. To explain this, we 
must return to handwriting. In terms of communication, from the reader’s view-
point, handwriting is personal in the sense that it is directed towards the intended 
reader or at least as a member of a limited group of readers. The direct communi-
cative characteristic of handwriting stems to a large degree from the fact that the 
author usually knows the reader(s), and intentionally communicates with him/her/
them through the medium of handwriting. Typed writing on the other hand, be-
cause of its potentially allocutive character, can be directed at a larger group of 
anonymous readers. Handwriting resembles conversation, whereas typed writing 
resembles declamation. Handwriting emulates the body language and tacit knowl-
edge sharing of direct interpersonal interaction, whereas typed writing has to re-
vert to rhetorical techniques in order to achieve communicative results. 
One of the most fundamental (though often neglected) consequences of typed 
writing and other allocutive media, including print, is the creation of shared read-
ing experiences amongst groups of people. In the context of handwriting, people 
can (or have to) tell each other about what has been written to each of them indi-
vidually. In the context of typed writing, people can discuss shared content (know-
ing, or at least, assuming that they have all received the same information), or, per-
haps unconsciously, act and cooperate on the basis of shared information. Scien-
tific communication is based on this concept of shared reading experiences, assum-
ing access to, if not familiarity with, the shared body of knowledge stored in the 
‘canonical archive’ of science and embodied in scientific texts through a network 
of references (Rowland 1997). Shared knowledge and – more generally – shared 
symbolic materials, are the basis of any cultural community and identity, and even 
of the definition of the ‘self’ as individuality with reference to a common ground. 
Thompson (1995) describes the shift from ‘local knowledge’ acquired in the con-
text of face-to-face interaction to a process of self-formation dependent on access 
to mediated forms of communication. As long as there exists a relatively limited 
repertoire of symbolic materials, this shift need not necessarily destroy the com-
mon ground for human interaction and coexistence. To a certain extent the rise of 
mediated forms of communication and informing has widened the common 
ground to facilitate interaction between individuals and groups who formerly 
might not have had anything to share. But the culturally significant switch from in-
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dividual to shared knowledge that was brought about by the gradual move from 
handwriting to typed writing is now being reversed through digital media: reading 
is becoming a more individual and less collective experience. The disappearance of 
collective reading experiences, and therefore the elimination of shared contexts, is 
problematic to say the least. Imagine the difference between a classroom (or board 
meeting) where all of the attendants have read the same materials with one where 
all of the attendants have read entirely different materials – not once but for most 
of their lives. 
There are various reasons why this shift towards individualization of reading 
experiences is happening. One is the use of highly adaptive, interactive, and hyper-
textual digital media. This means that the information presented to the reader, and 
the path traversed by the reader through the available information, is highly indi-
vidual and contextualized. This is not only true in the sense that the reader con-
structs a reading experience from loosely linked fragments, but also in the way that 
literary or scientific texts can be traversed once they are available in hypertext 
form (Svedjedal 2000). Another reason is the availability to the user of enormous 
amounts of information on any topic, diminishing the statistical likelihood that 
two people will obtain the same information. 
With regard to authenticity, it could be argued that where there is no common 
ground, every utterance and every experience is ‘authentic’. But when everything is 
authentic, the whole concept loses its meaning. If digital media do indeed destroy 
authenticity, it is precisely because they destroy commonality. The elimination of 
shared contexts is one of the most problematic effects of digital media. What it will 
mean for communication in general, and for self-perception, group identity and 
even the concept of distinct ‘cultures’ remains to be seen. When background 
knowledge cannot be assumed, and when even a reference (e.g., a hyperlink) need 
not necessarily imply that the reader will encounter the same information as the 
author, the ideal of objective knowledge might break down, and knowledge will 
mean little else than what one happens to know. 
Since the very beginning of printing, there has been a tension between the author 
and publisher with regards to identity. For the author, the work published is his or 
her work, and should be recognizable as such. The publisher of the 16th century, 
however, had little concern for the author, whom he would regard as a mere sup-
plier of raw material. The published text was the publisher’s work, and the transfer 
of copyright from author to publisher that is still common today underlines that in 
this respect little has changed since the 16th century. 
It is important to the publisher that his work be recognizable, i.e., that it has an 
identity, and that it can be seen as an authentic work of the publisher. This under-
lines the fact that, ultimately, a publication is a product rather than a ‘work’. The 
producer seeks a certain profit on any product over the cost of developing, making 
and selling it. Within these financial constraints, the producer has some degree of 
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freedom to vary the ergonomic and aesthetic characteristics of the product. These 
characteristics often distinguish one product from another, i.e., they define the 
product’s identity (as opposed to its functionality), and by proxy, the producer’s 
identity as well. For the products of a publisher, the aesthetic identity is determined 
by factors including typography, page design, and citation style. We all recognize a 
Penguin when we see one, and a doctor will not mistake Nature for the Lancet. 
The commercial importance of product identity is one of the reasons why pub-
lishers (and their predecessors, the printers) have taken over the locus of control 
over what constitutes the authentic work. They were able to do so because the 
copy ultimately has a far greater communicative and economic significance than 
the original. The singular authenticity of the original had to lose out against the 
multiplicity and authority of the copy.18 But at the same time the control invested 
in the publisher resulted in a tightly organized system of certification, distribution, 
and archiving that created a Popperian ‘World 3’ of objective scientific knowledge. 
Without this center of control, scientific information would have remained ‘au-
thentic’ in that other sense: the subjective expression of the individual author. Sci-
entific knowledge as we know it would not exist, there would be only scientific 
opinion.
However, it has already been indicated that the locus of control is now also 
partly shifting towards the user. ict solutions allow the user a certain degree of 
freedom to vary the visual parameters such as font type and size, line length, color, 
inclusion/exclusion of images, and even style of headings, citation style, link style, 
etc. This subverts the producer’s attempts to force his own aesthetics and identity 
on the reader.19 At this stage, we are far off from the authentic handwriting of the 
author, who has no way of even knowing what his text will look like when it reach-
es the reader. 
On the other hand, the author in the digital world has far more opportunities 
for the creation of an informational identity than in the earlier eras of print or 
handwriting. One example is self-publishing on the Internet, which puts the au-
thor in control, even though he is still bound to numerous conventions – from the 
rules of scholarship to the prevailing standards and formats on the Internet. What 
in fact is happening is that the ‘identity’ of the author is becoming bound to his or 
her network presence: ‘I know you from your home page’. If we regard the visual 
expression of network presence as a form of virtual handwriting, then this is in-
deed a complex concept. It could even include the perceivable links to other au-
thors as a network of mental relationships: ‘I am whom I link to’.20 
In this way, authenticity becomes a matter of contextualization. It is not the 
text and its form of expression, nor the author’s signature that defines authenticity. 
The author’s ‘signature’ emerges from the context into which the text is embedded, 
the relationships with other texts and individuals and groups. On the other hand, 
the reader creates an authentic reading experience through exactly the same pro-
cess of contextualization, by interactively linking objects in information space to 
create the unique, personal work that shapes his identity and that nobody else will 
have access to. 
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The use of digital media in contexts where information is used to create permanent 
records has resulted in a great deal of discussion about the concept of ‘authenticity’ 
amongst information professionals. For archivists, an ‘authentic’ document is ei-
ther the original, unmutated document, or an exact and certified copy. For the au-
thor, a document is the expression of his or her ideas, opinions, and beliefs. It is au-
thentic precisely because it relates to his or her identity as an author. That is what 
modern authorship is about, and why works are not published anonymously. It also 
explains why plagiarism produces highly emotional reactions and severe penalties: 
it is not about stealing information, but about negating the author’s identity. 
But if a document is a personal expression of its author, he may wish it to alter it 
as he himself changes, otherwise it would not be him/her any more. One of the con-
spicuous characteristics of self-publishing by scholars and scientists is that they tend 
to continuously revise their ‘publications’. The ‘authentic’ document is therefore 
the one that reflects the author’s current ideas, opinions, and beliefs, not those he 
once had and now might want to distance himself from.21 
These considerations allow us to introduce two further connotations of ‘au-
thenticity’ that are applicable in the fluidity of the digital environment: 
– Type 3: original authenticity (‘that was me then; it’s not me anymore’)
– Type 4: current authenticity (‘that’s me now’).
A different way of looking at this is to regard mental work as an ongoing activ-
ity, i.e., as a process. Documents themselves can be seen as a reflection of this proc-
ess, developing, and changing as the mental process unfolds. From this viewpoint 
there is no ‘final’ or ‘authentic’ version. However, one of the dogmas of scientific 
publishing is that a publication is an ‘official record’ to be entered into the ‘canoni-
cal archive’ of science. The shift in meaning of ‘authenticity’ as a result of the way 
writers make use of digital technology could therefore have a significant impact on 
the role of publications in the scientific process, and on the way we record and pre-
serve scientific output. 
One conclusion that we can draw from all this is that the concept of ‘authenticity’ is 
complex and problematic. In fact, it is a multidimensional concept that can refer 
to: 
– either the person (e.g., the author) or the object (e.g., the ‘document’) and 
 its content
– either the author’s ‘identity’ or his/her ‘meaning’ 
– either the historical moment of creation or the ‘here and now’.
We argue that handwriting is an expression of the author’s identity at the moment 
of creation, whereas a continually updated digital document would reflect the 
author’s current authentic self. What is truly authentic is then a matter of purpose. 
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Another observation we can make is that the concept of ‘copy’ is problematic in 
that it presupposes an ‘original’. It could be argued that mechanical systems such 
as the typewriter produce nothing but copies (or, if one prefers, originals), whereas 
in a digital context it could even be said that copies do not exist, i.e., every user is 
looking at the same ‘original’.22 
At the same time, users have the option to re-create the original, i.e., to impose 
their own expression of ‘identity’ and even meaning on the document. They even 
have (and use) the opportunity to create their own, authentic reading experiences 
from fragmented materials floating around in cyberspace. This is a result of the 
shift of the locus of control from the author, via the editor/printer/publisher, to the 
user. Simultaneously, the author is regaining control over her own work back from 
the publisher, allowing him/her to use digital media in creating a virtual handwrit-
ing within the context of her network presence. 
Another observation is related to the idea that the ‘authenticity’ of authorship 
has to be seen as the individual deviation from common backgrounds and shared 
standards. To the extent that digital media destroy this commonality and enforce 
the heterogeneity of information experiences, the idea of authenticity in this sense 
may lose its meaning.
Handwriting is the ultimate form of authentic expression through the use of 
graphical/symbolic devices to the extent that handwriting knows no copies, but 
only originals. The culture of handwriting has disappeared for two reasons. One is 
the act of and desire for multiplication and multiplicability that was served in time-
ly fashion by the invention of the printing press (but existed long before that event 
in the mediaeval copy shops). Multiplication, and the use of technical and digital 
means that make multiplication possible, isolates both author and reader from the 
authentic expression that handwriting can be considered to be. That is the price 
one has to pay for reaching a wider audience than mere handwriting can address. 
Another reason is the objectivity required by the modern scientific enterprise, 
which can only be achieved through the centralized, standardized, and certified 
procedures developed over the centuries by scholarly publishers.
A third reason is the desire to have greater control over the communication 
process. This is a complex issue. It involves the use of standardized technical means 
to overcome shortcomings in the technique of handwriting. It also involves at-
tempts to control what happens at the receiver end of the communication chain by 
preventing false, i.e., non-authentic interpretations. That this attempt is futile, at 
least in the digital world, is clearly demonstrated by the amount of control the 
‘end-user’ has over layout, structure, sequence and relationships within the body 
of information available in the digital environment. In this sense, not only ‘copy’ 
and ‘authenticity’ have lost their meaning, but the entire concept of ‘authorship’ as 
well. To the extent that the digital medium is rapidly becoming the primary me-
dium, authenticity has shifted from the author to the reader. Perhaps it is a charac-
teristic of a consumer society that the authenticity of reading has taken preference 
over the authenticity of writing. The tragedy is that whoever wishes to return to 
the authenticity of handwriting and thus to authorship, must inevitably lose his 
readership. What we see, then, is a struggle for power between writer and reader: 
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the writer attempting to create an authentic expression of ideas, opinions and feel-
ings; the reader attempting to create his or her own, ‘authentic’ text from the dig-
ital resources available. What is clear is that ‘authenticity’ acquires entirely new 
meanings in a digital world that empowers authors and readers with more control 
over form, structure, and content than ever before.
These new forms of authenticity could easily diminish the objectifying role (in 
terms of certification, standardization, and archiving) of the publisher and might 
eventually reverse the trend towards objectivity that has characterized the devel-
opment of scientific communication since the 17th century. Increasing the authen-
ticity of both writing and the reading experiences through digital devices can only 
result in a more subjective grounding of communication. However, science has no 
need for a ‘unique and authentic signature’ for its authors, and should be capable 
of resisting the temptations offered by the digital medium for regressing towards a 
more subjective mode. Preliminary empirical research shows that the specific char-
acteristics of the digital medium that might move science from its objective stance 
towards more subjectivity are not yet reflected in the primary medium of research: 
the peer-reviewed scientific article (Mackenzie Owen, forthcoming). But there are 
many indications that scientific readers do create their own traversals through in-
formation space, especially when publications are heavily hyperlinked. It will be 
interesting to see how this will develop, and whether authors and readers will con-
tinue to accept objective and authoritative sources above new forms of digital ‘au-
thenticity’.




1. A publication is defined here as a text 
that has been made publicly available in 
any form, allowing undefined users to 
access its contents by any means. 
2. See Duff 1998 and Mackenzie Owen and 
Van Halm 1989. The publisher can be de-
fined as the actor responsible for creating 
and distributing multiple copies of the 
author’s work.
3. Often expressed as ‘typing has ruined 
my handwriting’. 
4. Quoted from Sonja Neef, Handwriting as 
a cultural practice in the age of new 
media. Proposal to NWO. 
5. See <http://www.handwritingforkids.
com/handwrite>. 
6. It is interesting to note that the revival of 
handwriting in the form of calligraphy 
(e.g., as practiced within the ‘Arts and 
Crafts’ movement of the late 19th century) 
is based on highly standardized historical 
examples – such as insular, Carolingian 
and Gothic scripts – for its letterforms. 
When calligraphy deviates from these his-
torical forms, it often shifts towards a pure-
ly visual art form where communicating the 
original meaning of the text is of less im-
portance, or of no significance at all. 
7. Scientific communication serves to 
transform the subjective statements of the 
author into certified, objective information, 
and is, in the field of science, the mecha-
nism behind the transition from ‘subjec-
tive’ to ‘objective’ knowledge as described 
by Popper (1972). 
8. More or less: i.e., on the same machine 
and excluding typing errors and deviations 
in page layout. 
9. Before the typewriter, printed texts were 
of course based on handwritten originals. 
10. For instance, various contributors to 
Guntjahr 2001, argue that the visual repre-
sentation of a text is a component of its 
meaning. See also Olson 1994. Ferris 
2002, even argues that the act of writing 
itself is transformed by digital media, 
becoming more like a conversational 
communication act. 
11. Jerome McGann even argues that 
print’s material (as opposed to handwrit-
ing’s bodily) contingencies open up the 
text in the sense that it can acquire multi-
ple and endlessly possible manifestations 
(McGann 1991). Digital media are, of 
course, no different in this respect. 
12. Writing tools do exist that purport to 
free the author from such concerns. These 
mark-up languages such as TEX, LATEX 
and SGML are based on the concept of 
intentionality rather than control, e.g., the 
writer merely indicates the intention that a 
textual element should be a heading or 
should be emphasized. The ‘program’ then 
applies typographical rules to create the 
intended layout and typographical charac-
teristics. Lyx (see www.lyx.org), an open-
source word processor based on these 
principles, advertises itself as ‘what you 
see is what you mean’ rather than the 
WYSIWYG of standard word processors 
such as Word. 
13. See <http://www.vletter.com/design_
visitor.htm>: To make a natural-looking 
handwriting style, multiple forms of each 
character need to be used. This is because 
the shape of each character depends upon 
the shape and type of connection of each 
surrounding character. vLetter calls this a 
contextual font. In addition, each font has 
a slightly different way of connecting each 




The idea is similar to speech recognition 
systems. What is interesting is that the 
computer will understand a person’s 
speech or handwriting, with the sole intent 
of transforming it immediately into compu-
ter code. ‘For that’s the stuff electronic 
texts are made of’ (Kirschenbaum 2001). 
15. This is what Weaver describes as the 
technical problem: the accuracy with 
which ‘symbols of communication’ can be 
transmitted, as distinct from the semantic 
problem related to the extent to which a 
message is correctly understood by the 
recipient (Weaver 1949). 
16. In the context of written, printed, and 
digital (i.e., documentary) media, the time 
between sending and receiving, and there-
fore the required lifetime of the medium, 
can be extremely long, even spanning 
centuries. Stability over time is therefore a 
culturally significant requirement for any 
system of documentary communication. 
17. Although even printed texts ‘do not 
stay themselves’, as Matthew Kirschen-
baum argues, electronic information ‘has a 
natural inclination to change, to grow and 
finally to disappear’ (Kirschenbaum 2001). 
18. For this is another reason for the pow-
er of the publisher, especially in scientific 
publishing: the publication (i.e., the copy 
rather than the original) obtains its author-
ity from the fact that it is certified by the 
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scientific community through the peer 
review process. The lack of certification is 
also the weakness of the authentic version 
as held by the author (Kling and McGim 
1999; Rockwell and Siemens 2000), a 
weakness that is transferred to the digital 
pre-print repositories that are now multi-
plying under the ‘open archives initiative’ 
(see <http://www.openarchives.org/> and 
Michael Day 2001; Rusch-Feja 2002). A 
number of solutions have been proposed, 
e.g., involving readers in the peer review 
process (Arms 2002; Harnad 1996; Nent-
wich 1999; Roberts 1999; Weller 2000). 
19. This explains why publishers prefer 
secure formats such as PDF above HTML. 
20. This form of contextualization is be-
coming increasingly important in the dig-
ital environment. It relates to an aspect of 
‘collective identity’ that is not specific to 
digital media, but that is greatly facilitated 
within a digital environment, by means of 
multiple (i.e., collective) authorship. Multi-
ple authorship is the outcome of a number 
of trends, the most important of which is 
the growth of international collaborative 
research projects made necessary by the 
scale and cost of contemporary scientific 
problems, and facilitated by the global 
communication facilities of the Internet 
and the digitization of the research pro-
cess itself, culminating in the emerging 
concept of e-science (see De Roure et al. 
2003). 
21. There are various technical solutions 
that facilitate this. One solution is to allow 
a document to have an embedded history, 
i.e., to make it consist of the accumulation 
of consecutive versions, although an au-
thor might not want to be associated with 
ideas that he or she no longer endorses. 
There exists versioning software that 
tracks differences between documents 
and re-creates a version on the basis of 
the original and a series of recorded differ-
ences. It is, of course, also possible to do 
this the other way round, i.e., to retain the 
latest version and to derive previous ver-
sions from it. Primitive forms of versioning 
are a standard functionality of word proc-
essors. Wagner and Graham 1997, de-
scribe the concept of versioning as an 
intrinsic functionality of digital documents. 
22. A contrasting view is offered by Levy 
1999, who suggests that a digital docu-
ment should be regarded as a ‘mini-print-
ing press’ that sends copies of itself to 
anyone requesting it to do so. He also puts 
forward the interesting notion that docu-
ments are ‘objects with the power of 
speech’, things that we send out into the 
world to tell our story. 
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Authenticity in 
Writing has been instrumental in bringing mankind to where it is today, without it, 
accumulating the amount of knowledge currently at our disposal would have been 
unthinkable. Writing has also shaped the legal system into what we know today. 
The existence of nation-states with national laws, as opposed to local customary 
law, is to a large extent a legacy of the printing press, which allowed for legal texts 
to be spread fairly quickly over large regions.1 In this legal landscape, handwriting 
has continuously served as the authentication method of choice.   
The development of information technology is a revolution of at least the same 
magnitude as the printing press. We are only beginning to see its implications for 
society in general and the law in particular. In this paper, a very small aspect of this 
revolution will be explored, namely the issues involved in finding a substitute for 
the handwritten signature suitable for the information society. To narrow the sub-
ject down further, the focus will be placed solely on developments in western con-
tinental Europe, with Belgian law as a case study. 
In the first section, a brief overview will be presented regarding the role played 
by handwriting in general and the signature in particular throughout history. Sub-
sequently, two practical cases – the private contract and the last will and testament 
– will be discussed in order to demonstrate the role that handwriting still plays in 
the current legal system. In the following section, the transition to digital writing 
will be discussed, starting with an introduction to digital signature technology and 
continuing with a short exposition on the legislation enacted to pave the way for 
electronic signatures in the European Union. Finally, a comparison will be made 
between handwritten and digital signatures as legal authentication methods.  
In this paper, I will argue that, although legislation was enacted to accommo-
date electronic signatures, ample evidence remains that the paradigm of handwrit-
ing has not yet been traded for a new one. From a short-term perspective, this does 
not appear to be problematic. However, in the long term a number of serious issues 
surface with regard to the durability of digital documents.  
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Before diving into the turbulent waters of the digital age, a brief excursion into le-
gal history is in order. Writing has not always enjoyed the privileged status that it 
currently has in the eyes of the law; in Roman and medieval times, for example, 
witness testimony was generally preferred, as it was possible to engage in cross-ex-
amination. From the 16th century onwards, documentary evidence gradually 
gained increasing legal standing. In western continental Europe, this evolution cul-
minated in the evidence rules laid down by the Napoleonic codes, which firmly es-
tablished the prevalence of documents over witness testimony (Macneil 2000, 7-9; 
Van Eecke 2004, 77). Documentary evidence became mandatory for certain trans-
actions and was the only form of evidence admissible in court, with the express ex-
clusion of witness testimony.2
The use of handwritten signatures as a method of authentication is also a rela-
tively recent custom. Any use of documentary evidence – as such or in support of 
witness testimony – entailed the inclusion of a reference to the person bound by the 
document in question. Throughout history, seals, signets and handwritten marks 
were used for this purpose. In Roman and medieval times, seals and signets re-
ceived more legal credit than handwritten marks (Van Eecke 2004, 86). As literacy 
increased towards the end of the Middle Ages, documentary evidence was more 
often drawn up by the parties themselves instead of dictated to a scribe.  Gradually, 
the handwritten subscription which usually accompanied a seal or signet gained 
more legal weight as, unlike a seal or signet, only the signatory was capable of 
placing it.  
This evolution was compounded by the introduction of surnames at the end of 
the 10th century. At the outset, the choice of a surname was more or less free, but 
by the 16th century it was customary to pass on a father’s surname to all of his chil-
dren (Van Eecke 2004, 104; Pintens 1981, 14). From that time, the handwritten 
signature, much as we know it today, all but replaced the use of seals and signets in 
western continental Europe (Van Quickenborne 1985; Van Eecke 2004, 87).
Two examples demonstrate the role that handwriting still plays in the current legal 
system: namely the private contract and the last will and testament. In terms of the 
Napoleonic tradition, a binding agreement is concluded when the parties agree on 
its contents (Article 1108, Belgian Civil Code). An oral agreement as such is valid 
and binding. However, a document signed by all parties involved must be drawn 
up for agreements exceeding a specified value. This document is sufficient evidence 
of the agreement and contradicting witness testimony is inadmissible in court (Ar-
ticle 1341, Belgian Civil Code). The reasons for this preference are pragmatic: the 
terms of an oral agreement are notoriously difficult to prove in court. The law goes 
one step further for some exceptional transactions by demanding that a document 
be drawn up as a requirement for the legal act to exist, in addition to proving its 
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terms. It is often the case that certain predefined handwritten notifications must be 
included in the document as well.3
Another legal act that calls for handwriting is the last will and testament.  In 
Belgium, as in many other countries, a will can take the form of either a public in-
strument; a holographic will; or a so-called international will. In the first two cas-
es, handwriting is an essential requirement for the validity of the will. To this date, 
a public will requires that the testator dictate his dispositions to the notary in the 
presence of two witnesses, or alternatively, two notaries (see Articles 971-975 of 
the Belgian Civil Code). The notary is obliged to record the will in person and by 
hand. Afterwards, the will must be read aloud before it is signed by all present. The 
presence of witnesses, by and of itself, is still sufficient evidence of the contents of 
the will. In the opinion of the Court of Cassation, it is irrelevant whether the wit-
nesses are paying attention to what is being said, as long as they are in a position to 
verify whether all formal requirements were fulfilled.4
As the name implies, the holographic will is a document entirely handwritten 
by the testator (see Article 970 of the Belgian Civil Code). To be valid, it must be 
dated, signed, and it must mention where it was drawn up.  Witnesses are not re-
quired and the will does not have to be registered to be valid.  
The international will, by contrast, does not have to be written by hand.5 The 
will must be handed over to a notary in the presence of two witnesses, either open-
ly or in sealed form. The testator must declare the piece to be his last will and must 
then sign it or formally recognize his signature if it is already present. Then, the no-
tary must date and sign the will. Finally, the witnesses must place their signature at 
the bottom of the will. The notary must fill out and sign a form in duplicate, stating 
that all of the formalities have been fulfilled. The will is sealed in the presence of 
the testator and both witnesses and is then archived by the notary.  
From these examples, it is apparent that the signature is the prima donna of evi-
dence law. Until very recently, this term referred exclusively to handwritten signa-
tures. A manually signed document is traditionally granted such high probative 
value in light of the properties that legal scholars attribute to it (see Dumortier, Van 
Eecke, and Anné 1999, 54-56; Gobert, and Etienne Montero 2004, 220-230). 
Firstly, the signature identifies its author in a unique way. Secondly, the signature 
expresses consent with the contents of the document. For this reason it has always 
been insisted upon that the signature is placed by hand directly upon the document 
itself, the use of carbon paper, seals or stamps is prohibited.6 According to some 
scholars, the signature protects the integrity of the document as it signals that the 
document is complete (see Dumortier, Van Eecke and Anné 1999, 52; Van Eecke 
2004, 152; Van Quickenborne 1985, 5-6). Any additions below the signature or in 
the margins of the text are to be disregarded unless they, themselves, are signed. 
Each page of a long document is often signed separately to ensure pages are not in-
serted or replaced afterwards. 
The high regard in which a signed document is held, is most obvious in the dif-
ference in status between an original and a copy. Only an original document is suf-
ficient documentary evidence of agreements exceeding a certain value (see Article 
1341 of the Belgian Civil Code; Verheyden-Jeanmart 1991, 201 ff). The essential 
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characteristic of an original document is precisely that the signature was placed di-
rectly upon it; any document derived from the original, but lacking an original sig-
nature, is merely a copy with less probative value. The method used to create the 
copy, for instance photocopying; use of carbon paper; or scanning is of no impor-
tance. The copy is admissible in court, but the adversary may demand the produc-
tion of the original. However, if the copy is not challenged, the judge must presume 
it to be a faithful rendering of the original and treat it as such.  
In the hierarchy of evidence, the signed document is the highest form of proof. In 
view of the properties attributed to it in legal literature, the original signed docu-
ment appears to be a self-authenticating form of proof. Upon closer examination, 
this picture becomes somewhat unraveled (Dumortier, Van Eecke, and Anné 1999, 
54).
Where the identification function is concerned, handwriting in general, or a 
signature in particular, only serves as a reliable way to identify the author under 
the right conditions.  When a signed document is presented as evidence in court, 
the presumed author is usually already known. Without any contextual data, iden-
tifying the author of a particular piece of handwriting is like searching for a needle 
in a haystack. In principle, the signature should consist of the signatory’s last name, 
but this has been interpreted with some flexibility by the courts; the Court of Cas-
sation emphasizes that the signature must be the handwritten mark that the signa-
tory usually places in order to manifest himself towards others.7 In this spirit, even 
signatures that are illegible to the point that they give no clue whatsoever about the 
signatory’s identity are often accepted. The bottom line is that verification by the 
court in the case at hand must be possible (see Van Quickenborne 1985, 22). Clear-
ly, far from providing instant identification of its author, a signature generally re-
quires the presence of contextual information to perform this function. The neces-
sary context can consist of an acknowledgement by the signatory or the availabil-
ity of reference signatures.
Even when it is known who the supposed author is, there is still the issue of for-
gery.  So real is the risk of forgery that the law allows the presumed signatory of a 
contract to denounce ‘his’ signature as fake, and his heirs may suffice by saying 
they are not familiar with the testator’s handwriting or signature – in either case, 
an expert witness must be appointed to determine whether the signature is genuine 
or not (Articles 1323-1324, Belgian Civil Code).
Concerning the second function, inducing consent merely from the presence of 
a signature is not self-evident either. Clearly, it is only by legal convention that the 
handwritten signature implies consent with the contents of a document, be it a 
contract or a will.  Moreover, signatures are placed in other circumstances without 
implying consent, for instance, the witnesses present at the drafting of a public will 
do not express consent by signing, but only signal their presence at the occasion.  
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With regard to the third function – guaranteeing the integrity of documents – sig-
natures are not the most efficient method to use. Primarily, it is not the signature, 
but the medium of paper, which guarantees the integrity of a document (see Gobert 
and Montero 2000, 23; Wilms 1995-1996, 839). Although not impossible, it is 
difficult to alter text on a page in an undetectable way. Documents that are entirely 
written by hand offer somewhat more protection against alterations by third par-
ties, although they remain vulnerable to alterations made by the original author. 
The law takes these risks into account by making forgery a criminal offence. Also, 
to limit the risks in a contractual setting, the parties are required to create as many 
originals of bilateral agreements as there are parties with a distinct interest. Some 
very important transactions must be entrusted to a notary, who is responsible for 
guarding the integrity of his archives.  
Even though in reality the handwritten signature does not live up to all its as-
cribed functions perfectly, these functions were still normative in the search for a 
substitute suitable for the information society.  
Paper is no longer the medium of choice to record, distribute, and receive informa-
tion, as, to a large extent, information and communication technology (ict) has 
taken its place. Evidently, as this technology is based on electronic pulses repre-
sented by zeros and ones, ict does not accommodate handwriting very well. For 
legal systems that only recognize manual signatures, the writing was on the wall 
– an alternative had to be found to fulfill the functions of the signature, and, by ex-
tension, of handwriting.  
A guiding principle in the adaptation of the law to the digital age is functional 
equivalence theory, a model first used by the un Commission on International 
Trade Law (uncitral) for the development of the Model Law on Electronic Com-
merce in 1996. This approach starts from an analysis of the purposes and func-
tions underlying traditional paper-based requirements with a view to determining 
how those purposes or functions could be fulfilled electronically (see <http://www.
uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm>).
Bearing functional equivalence in mind, the legal world saw great potential in 
asymmetrical encryption technology as the ideal electronic substitute for the hand-
written signature. This technique was promptly dubbed digital signature technol-
ogy. Asymmetrical encryption certainly presents some useful properties for au-
thentication purposes, although it is not without its limitations. 
Digital signatures do not resemble handwritten signatures in any way. Where the 
handwritten signature is a graphical mark with a more or less stable form, the dig-
ital signature is unique for each file to which it is appended. The reason for this is 
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that the digital signature is derived from the file to which it belongs by means of a 
series of complicated mathematical computations.  
In a first step, a hash value or so-called digital fingerprint is calculated for the 
file to be signed.  Hashing is a technique by which electronic information can be re-
duced to a unique fixed-length code: if even a single character in the file is modified 
in transmission or storage, the resulting hash value will change. By comparing the 
original hash value with the current one, one can determine whether a document 
has been altered or not. Of course, the original digital fingerprint must be safe-
guarded against manipulation if it is to be compared later on with a newly calcu-
lated hash value. This is where encryption comes in. Encryption entails that a plain 
text message is transformed into a cipher text that seems meaningless. Symmetrical 
encryption means that the encryption key is only shared by the sender and receiver 
of the message. This protects against manipulation by third parties, but both send-
er and receiver could impersonate the other by using the common key. Asymmetri-
cal encryption avoids this problem by giving each party his own pair of keys, one 
that must remain secret and another that may be made public. A text encrypted 
with one of the keys can only be decrypted with the corresponding key from the 
pair.  
Asymmetrical encryption can serve two purposes. Alice can use Bob’s public 
key to encrypt a message and send it on to him and, as only Bob has the correspond-
ing private key at his disposal, no one else will be able to decrypt the message. Con-
fidential messages can be sent safely through open networks this way. Conversely, 
Alice can encrypt a message with her private key and send it to Bob, who uses Al-
ice’s public key to decrypt it. As Alice’s key is publicly available, anyone can de-
crypt this message. The point here is that Bob can be sure that Alice is the author of 
the message, as only she knows the corresponding private key.  
There is one caveat to this story, however. Neither the hash value, nor the pri-
vate or public key refers to Alice’s identity in any way, as these are just numerical 
values. In this sense, the term digital seal would be more accurate for this technol-
ogy. Bob must use other means to find out who the rightful owner is of the public 
key. Perhaps it was created by Carl, who is impersonating Alice. Alice and Bob 
could exchange public keys in a face-to-face meeting, but this is not always feasible. 
Also, Carl may have stolen the private key from Alice after this meeting took place. 
In open network environments, like the Internet, a public key infrastructure must 
be in place in order to tie public keys to the identity of their rightful owners.  
A public key infrastructure offers a number of services related to digital signa-
tures.  Firstly the service of creating key pairs with which digital signatures can be 
placed. A second service is public key certification, whereby the link between a 
public key and its rightful owner is published for the benefit of recipients of signed 
documents. Depending on the type of certificate, the owner’s identity is checked 
more or less thoroughly. Typically, a directory is kept of all certificates issued as 
well as a revocation list, which is important in the case of the theft of a private key. 
Lastly, time-stamping is an important service, as it is necessary to know whether a 
digital signature was placed before or after revocation of the public key certificate. 
To summarize, a digital signature is a small, encrypted file that is derived from the 
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file to be authenticated. To validate the signature, the signatory’s public key must 
be used to decrypt the signature and information about the public key’s rightful 
owner must be obtained.8
The properties of digital signatures as described above attracted great interest from 
the legal community around the world. A technology that allows one to identify 
the sender of a message, guarantee its integrity, and preclude repudiation by the 
sender after the fact is a prime substitute for handwritten signatures in the infor-
mation society.  In Europe, several legislative initiatives emerged to codify digital 
signatures.9 In order to ensure a harmonized legal framework for the internal mar-
ket, the European Union issued Directive 1999/93/EC on electronic signatures.10 
Initially, the idea was to enact rules attaching legal value to digital signature 
technology but this path was subsequently abandoned due to concerns about the 
longevity of a law tied to one type of technology. Therefore the legislators carefully 
avoided explicit references to digital signature technology in the wording of the di-
rective. The term electronic signature is used and given a broad meaning in an at-
tempt to create a technologically neutral legal framework.  
An electronic signature is any data in electronic form that is attached to or log-
ically associated with other electronic data and serves as a method of authentica-
tion (Article 2, 1° E-signature Directive). A regular e-mail with the sender’s name 
placed at the bottom can be considered an electronically signed document in this 
sense. The legal value attached to electronic signatures as such is fairly weak. Elec-
tronic signatures may not be discriminated against in court just because they are 
electronic (Article 5, §2 E-signature Directive), but they may be dismissed on other 
grounds.  
A stricter definition is given for a subcategory of electronic signatures, namely 
the advanced electronic signature. The requirements are that the signature is 
uniquely linked to the signatory and is capable of identifying the signatory, that it 
is created using means under the sole control of the signatory and that it is linked 
to the relating data in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is de-
tectable (Article 2, 2° E-signature Directive). In the current state of technology, 
only digital signature technology can fulfill all these requirements. 
Advanced electronic signatures, accompanied by a qualified certificate and cre-
ated by a secure-signature-creation device, enjoy a special status in the directive. In 
legal literature this type of advanced electronic signature is usually termed a quali-
fied electronic signature.  Such qualified electronic signatures must be admissible 
as evidence in legal proceedings and must receive the same legal consequences as a 
handwritten signature would in similar circumstances (Article 5, §1 E-signature 
Directive). The benefit of the qualified electronic signature is that it has the same 
legal value in the whole internal market. 
In transposing the E-signature Directive, the Belgian legislator literally copied 
the definitions of electronic signatures in general and qualified electronic signa-
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tures in particular.11 In contrast to the directive, the advanced electronic signature 
was given specific legal consequences as well.12 For the purpose of creating origi-
nal proof of a private agreement, the handwritten signature may be replaced by an 
electronic signature that can be attributed to its author and that guarantees the in-
tegrity of the document it is supposed to authenticate. 
With regard to digital signature technology, two questions arise: How well do dig-
ital signatures perform the authentication functions expected of a signature and 
how do they compare with handwritten signatures?
Concerning the identification function, a digital signature alone does not re-
veal the signatory’s identity, as it is just a computer code. Unlike a handwritten sig-
nature, a digital signature does not contain any direct reference to a person. How-
ever, depending on the contents and the reliability of the accompanying certificate, 
the signatory can be readily identified. Thus, both the handwritten and the digital 
signature require the presence of contextual information in order to be useful, al-
beit for different reasons.  
The theft of a private key is problematic, as is forgery in the case of handwrit-
ten signatures. By law, the legal risks of this happening are distributed among the 
parties involved. The rightful owner is responsible for the use of his private key, 
until he revokes it (Article 19 §2 csp Law). If the owner neglects to do so, the own-
er can be held liable for any damages under tort law. After revocation, any recipi-
ent of a signed document must consult the revocation list. Of course, the person 
unlawfully using the private key can be sued for damages by either party (Monte-
ro, 43-45).
When it comes to the expression of consent, it is but a social or legal conven-
tion that placing a signature entails consent to the signed document, as is the case 
for handwritten signatures.  Digital signature technology makes this fact all the 
more evident, as machines are perfectly capable of digitally signing documents 
without any human intervention. Already, various automatic processes use digital 
signature technology for security reasons, with no intention whatsoever of ex-
pressing consent on anyone’s behalf. Digital time stamps, for example, are nothing 
more than digitally signed text files containing the hash value of a file and an indi-
cation of the time of receipt.
With regard to the integrity function, digital signatures are touted as the per-
fect way of ensuring the integrity of signed documents. Although not false, this 
claim should not be taken at face value.  Firstly, digital signature technology does 
not actively protect integrity, it only signals if the integrity of the bitstream has 
been compromised.  Modifications in the bitstream may or may not entail a signif-
icant change in the contents of the signed message.  If the money owed in a contract 
is changed from 100 to 1,000 per item, the integrity of the contractual terms is 
clearly compromised.  If one pixel in a photograph changes from one shade of gray 
to another, this is probably not at all relevant for the message conveyed.  Single bits 
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‘falling over’ is a common occurrence and rejecting any file where this has occurred 
would be overreacting. Digital signature technology is only capable of signaling 
integrity on the bit level, not on document level. This limitation makes it a rather 
fragile authentication tool.
Digital signatures make no pretense whatsoever of producing self-authenticat-
ing documents. This technology claims to be functionally equivalent to the hand-
written signature, which does appear justified, at least if one only takes short-term 
perspectives into account.  
The validity of documentary evidence, notably wills and contracts, usually only 
becomes an issue a long time after their creation. In comparing handwritten and 
electronic signatures, the durability of these authentication techniques must be in-
vestigated as well.  
On average, manually signed paper documents are easy to preserve, even for 
extended periods of time. Under the right conditions, paper records can be kept for 
hundreds of years.  Several copies of the Gutenburg Bible, printed in 1455, still ex-
ist today (see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gutenberg_Bible>).
By contrast, the shelf life of digitally signed documents is dubious. As hinted 
above, the greatest strength of digital signature technology, signaling manipula-
tion of the bitstream, is also its greatest weakness. Validation of a digital signature 
is only possible as long as the original bitstream remains perfectly intact. The per-
fect storage of bitstreams, even for a relatively short time, remains a challenge in 
itself. Even storage media that are specifically designed for this purpose, like cd-
worm disks, suffer from bit degradation to the extent that all readers come 
equipped with software to correct errors (see Boudrez, 10; Starret 2000). Digital 
signature technology by itself does nothing to prevent any changes to a bitstream. 
Storing computer files intact is only part of the story. In itself, a bitstream is of 
little interest to us as it is not readable by humans. Both the necessary hardware 
and software must be available to translate the bitstream into an intelligible for-
mat on screen or in print.  Hardware and software platforms come and go at an 
alarmingly high rate, resulting in the obsolescence of the file formats that depend 
on them. An example of what this can lead to is the case of the cnes (Centre Na-
tional des Etudes Spatiales, France), which was forced to have documents that 
were created in 1985, re-typed manually in 1990 and again in 1997, because the 
newer generations of word processors could not read the original files with suffi-
cient accuracy (Valoris 2003, 38). In order to cope with file format obsolescence, 
archivists generally put forward two distinct strategies, namely migration and em-
ulation.  
Migration entails the translation of a computer file into a suitable archival for-
mat.  Depending on the specifics of the format chosen, the characteristics of the 
original file may be preserved or lost. For instance, when converting ms Word files 
to flat file, the original look and feel is lost; if the same ms Word files are migrated 
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to uncompressed Tiff files, the original look and feel of the document is preserved, 
but the ability to reuse the content is lost instead. Distinguishing between essential 
and incidental characteristics is the responsibility of the archivist. Whichever for-
mat is chosen, migration breaks any digital signatures accompanying the original 
file, as the new file is represented by its own distinct bitstream.  
With regard to the preservation of digital signatures, emulation appears to be a 
more promising archival strategy. The functions and behavior of the obsolete plat-
form – meaning the old hardware, software or both – is recreated on a contempo-
rary computer platform, allowing the original files to be accessed. Notwithstand-
ing some exceptions, current emulators are still in a highly experimental phase of 
development.13 Developing emulators is very difficult, especially for platforms 
that are not fully documented, and as a consequence, the costs involved are consid-
erable. It is highly unlikely that emulators will be created for all possible platforms 
that exist today and for all future platforms to come. Moreover, emulators devel-
oped to run on today’s platform will become obsolete in their turn, making either 
a chain of emulators or constant redevelopment necessary. If this chain is broken 
or redevelopment is omitted, the original file is lost, as it can no longer be accessed 
(Boudrez 2005, 83-84). The fact that the digital signature accompanying the file 
can still be validated offers little consolation.  
Even if abstraction is made of these hurdles, the digital signature itself is at risk 
of becoming obsolete. Asymmetrical encryption works on the assumption that it is 
practically infeasible to crack the code by trying all the possible key combinations 
because the necessary computer power is not available.  As time goes by, however, 
ever more powerful computers are developed, and eventually trying all the key 
combinations becomes a distinct possibility. Alternatively, flaws may be found in 
the encryption or hash algorithm, opening up new avenues of attack (Libon and 
Van den Eynde 2000, 22-23). To alleviate these problems, the length of the encryp-
tion keys is increased to match the pace of computer development and new encryp-
tion algorithms are introduced. Of course, this does not offer a solution for the 
legacy of digital signatures. Once the key or the algorithm is broken, fake digital 
signatures, indistinguishable from genuine ones, can be created.  
One proposed solution to the weakening of digital signatures, is re-signing old 
signatures with more recent technology (see Blanchette 2004, 24 ff.; Libon, and 
Van den Eynde 2000, 17-32). Although certainly technically feasible, this scenario 
quickly becomes very cumbersome. Not only the obsolescence of the digital signa-
ture itself must be taken into account, but also of the certificate identifying its 
rightful owner and any available time stamps. Such certificates and time stamps 
are no more than small files digitally signed by the service provider.  
Archivists feel that the investment in time and effort to preserve fully function-
al digital signatures is just not worth it. Instead of applying costly procedures to 
ensure the integrity of the signature and the entire validation chain behind it, they 
propose to invest only in ensuring the integrity of the document itself. In this sce-
nario, any signatures accompanying a document will be transformed into metada-
ta, which mention who authenticated the document at a certain point in time 
(Blanchette 2004, 32-36 ff.). 
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From a long-term perspective, digital signatures perform poorly in comparison 
with handwritten signatures. This does not imply that digital signature technolo-
gy should be abandoned, only that appropriate measures should be taken to coun-
ter such shortcomings.  Several technical and organizational possibilities are pro-
posed by archivists and engineers, but the question remains to what extent these 
are accommodated by the legal framework.  
The legal community still lives with assumptions and expectations rooted in the 
paper environment. One of these is the idea that the original signature must be 
preserved.  For paper documents, this is a reasonable requirement, as a handwrit-
ten signature on a paper medium is relatively easy to preserve, even for extended 
periods of time. Moreover, the signature continues to fulfill its authenticating 
functions more or less identically throughout its life span. Thus an original docu-
ment provides the same clues to determine its authenticity on the day of its crea-
tion as it does 50 years later.  
Originality is a good proxy for authenticity with regards to paper documents, 
but this is not the case for digital records. As digital signatures are difficult to pre-
serve and lose their authenticating functions after a relatively short period of time, 
indications about the authenticity of digital records should be sought elsewhere. 
The most obvious source of clues about document authenticity is the system in 
which these documents reside. Of course, the reliability of a record-keeping sys-
tem is a function of the trustworthiness of its keeper.  
By way of example, the e-invoicing Directive takes a clear step away from re-
quiring originality in favor of a more direct evaluation of authenticity.14 Electron-
ic invoices are valid as long as the ‘authenticity of their origin and the integrity of 
their content’ remain guaranteed. However, member states may impose invoices 
to be preserved in the form they were sent, either on paper or electronically and 
thus may choose to uphold the originality requirement to some extent, but they 
are not encouraged to do so. 
In the e-signature Directive, the originality requirement is still present in both 
concepts of advanced and qualified electronic signatures. By definition their crea-
tion must be under the sole control of the signatory and the signatures themselves 
must guarantee the integrity of the document they accompany (see Art. 2 §2d 
Electronic Signature Directive). Qualified electronic signatures enjoy a privileged 
legal status, but their preservation along with the entire validation chain is cum-
bersome.  
A very tentative step away from the originality requirement can be found in 
the generic definition of electronic signatures as given in the E-signature Directive. 
Any electronic data which serves as a method of authentication falls within its 
scope. Hence not only an original electronic signature may qualify, but also relia-
ble metadata detailing validation results of defunct advanced or qualified signa-
tures. However, the legal status of generic electronic signatures is somewhat vague 
Sign Here! / Authenticity in Bits and Bytes
87
and undefined. The member states need only ensure their admissibility before the 
courts on a non-discriminatory basis; this means that an electronic signature may 
not be rejected just because it is electronic, though it may be denied legal value be-
cause the technology used is unreliable. Still, this concept opens the door for the 
courts to evaluate the authenticity of the documents presented to them directly by 
assessing the reliability of record-keeping systems and the trustworthiness of their 
keepers.  
In Belgian law, the admissibility of generic electronic signatures has been intro-
duced as mandated, though the advanced electronic signature has taken prece-
dence in the areas of law where it matters most, for instance, regarding the law on 
evidence of contractual obligations. The revised Civil Code starts off by broadly 
stating that an electronic signature must be attributable to its author, but then it 
goes on to say that the signature itself must guarantee document integrity. In other 
words, the originality requirement still shines through. There are some preexisting 
exceptions to the originality requirement that may provide a backdoor for a more 
direct approach to examining document authenticity. However, this only provides 
a solution for a limited number of cases. 
As it stands, the law favors emulation as an archiving strategy. In practice, 
there are other factors to be taken into account, specifically cost-effectiveness and 
risk. In the end, it comes down to the parties involved to decide what costs they are 
willing to incur in order to preserve their digitally signed documents. Some will opt 
to preserve their digital signatures complete with validation chain, in order to ben-
efit from their privileged legal status. Others may decide to entrust their signed 
records to a third party custodian, vouching for authenticity on the basis of the re-
liability of his record-keeping system. As standard best practices with regard to the 
preservation of digitally signed documents evolve, the inappropriateness of the 
originality requirement for digital documents will become increasingly apparent.  
The rise of the information society has forced legal scholars to look at basic con-
cepts from an entirely different angle. One result of this exercise has been the en-
actment of legislation paving the way for electronic signatures. Upon closer in-
spection, ample evidence exists that legislators have yet to trade the paradigm of 
handwriting for a new one. The legal value of the qualified electronic signature is 
explicitly linked to that of handwritten signatures, which marks it as a transitional 
concept. The definition of the advanced electronic signature mimics the workings 
of handwritten signatures. As a consequence, this type of signature is rigidly bound 
to its original form, making signed documents highly vulnerable to technological 
obsolescence. The generic electronic signature does not suffer from these con-
straints, but the legal certainty it provides is low. Basically, citizens can either strive 
to fulfill the originality requirement for their digitally signed documents or venture 
into uncharted territory.  
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Although electronic signatures are called upon in the legal world to play the same 
role as handwritten signatures, both authentication methods function according 
to a different logic. Looking at the long-term perspective for signed documents 
makes this very clear. Instead of trying to force one into the mould of the other, 
these differences should be acknowledged in an appropriate way by the legal sys-
tem. For one, the appropriateness of the originality requirement should be as-
sessed in this light. More generally, a legal frame of reference should be developed 
for the evaluation of authenticity and authentication of digital documents.
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in an Age of Digital 
Remediation
On the morning of December 10, 2003, I opened my Eudora in-box to find an un-
read e-mail message from a person I had never met, named Sonja Neef, with the 
intriguing subject line: ‘Invitation’. Opening the e-mail, I was flattered to find a let-
ter inviting me to be the keynote speaker at a conference on ‘remediating hand-
writing’ planned for Weimar the following June. The letter concluded convention-
ally with ‘Best regards, Sonja Neef’. But because it was an e-mail letter, it lacked 
the conventional handwritten signature of a printed letter. Instead, beneath the 
customary signatory formulation on this electronic letter, which (like the letter it-
self) Dr. Neef had composed specifically for the purpose of inviting me to this con-
ference, was another signature, her ‘sig file’, which (like her return address at the 
top of the e-mail message) had already been composed before she began writing 
this letter, and was included as part of the automated formatting of her e-mail pro-
gram.1 Underneath this sig file was an icon indicating the presence of the attach-
ment referred to in the body of the message, a document in Microsoft Word enti-
tled ‘ReMediating Handwriting’.
Although in 2003 there was nothing at all remarkable about such electronic 
epistolary details, in the context of a book on handwriting in an age of new media 
this unremarkability is worth considering. Ten years ago, an invitation like this 
one would most likely have arrived in the form of a word-processed and printed 
letter; twenty years ago it would have probably arrived as a typed letter; a century 
ago it would have arrived as a handwritten letter. Differences in the materiality of 
mediation aside, there is one thing that all three of these historically hypothetical 
letters would have had in common: they all would have come with a signature in 
Sonja Neef’s hand. While the materiality of the medium for composing such a let-
ter has changed in the past century from handwriting to typewriting to word-
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processing to e-mail, it is only with the advent of e-mail that we have witnessed a 
change in the materiality of the signature from a handwritten autograph to a pre-
mediated digital signature file. What are the implications of this change?
One obvious implication is temporal or sequential. In print or handwritten let-
ters, the signature has, historically, come at the end of the process of composing the 
letter. The last thing that the letter writer writes, the signature marks the letter as 
an authentic expression of the signatory; it marks the letter as a communication 
underwritten or authorized by, or accountable to, the signatory. In e-mail the sig 
file and return address that authorize and authenticate the communication are 
written prior to the composition of the letter; they are pre-mediated. In other 
words, unlike a conventional handwritten signature or return address, the sig file 
and return address are already ‘written’ at the beginning of the process of compos-
ing an e-mail, upon the initiation of the command to compose a new message; in-
deed in some sense they constitute the medial or technological condition of possi-
bility of an e-mail message. In e-mail the sig file and return address exist prior to 
anything that the letter writer writes, says, or promises; the letter is marked as au-
thorized by its sender before it is even composed. Of course, one might contend 
that it is only after the e-mail is written or sent, when the signatory gives the com-
mand to send the message, that the signature and return address are actualized. 
But the same is true of a hand-signed letter sent through the mail; clicking ‘send’ is 
only the digital equivalent of mailing the letter. Alternatively, one might counter 
that in some sense such temporal premediation has always been the case insofar as 
the epistolary conventions informing handwritten signatures have always pre-ex-
isted any specific instance of letter writing. This is undoubtedly true; letter writing 
has for centuries been a regularized and conventionalized genre. Nonetheless, the 
premediation of the signature and return address still constitutes a temporal and 
sequential reversal of the acts of writing a letter and signing it, a material remedia-
tion of the handwritten signature whose consequences should not be dismissed or 
overlooked.
In addition to this shift in the sequentiality of the signature and the letter, there 
is a difference in what we might call the ‘content’ between a handwritten signature 
and a sig file. As famously cited by Jacques Derrida, in an essay to which my title 
alludes, J.L. Austin maintains that the handwritten signature functions as the guar-
antor of the authenticity or originality or uniqueness of one’s written expression, 
standing in the absence of the writer in the same relation to the written utterance 
as a speaker’s body does to the spoken utterance (Derrida 1984, 307-330). As the 
unique mark or index of the signatory’s name, which itself has been seen by phi-
losophers of language to bear an indexical relation to its reference, the handwrit-
ten signature does not refer to a group or class of individuals, but only to the par-
ticular individual who has done the signing. Derrida challenges Austin’s belief that 
the signature is categorically distinct from other forms of writing. Austin would 
distinguish the signature (and similarly speech) from writing because writing is it-
erable and citational but a signature (or a spoken utterance) is not. Derrida, on the 
other hand, argues that iterability and citationality are the properties of all com-
municative acts, written or spoken. For Derrida speech acts and handwritten sig-
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natures are both forms of writing insofar as they are iterable and citable like any 
other written utterance; handwritten signatures do not provide any fundamentally 
different relation to their authors than do speech acts or any other forms of writ-
ing. 
At the beginning of the 21st century, iterability and citationality are among the 
hallmarks of digital media, serving as sources both of creativity and of crisis in 
contemporary communication and culture – as evident in such practices as sam-
pling, rip ’n’ burn, P2P software, piracy, or the proliferation of computer worms 
and viruses. Unlike the supposed uniqueness and authenticity of the handwritten 
signature, the sig file is theoretically infinitely reproducible. The sig file functions 
to identify the writer’s coordinates within a complex web of heterogeneous institu-
tional, geographic, and telecommunication networks. The handwritten signature 
has a temporal, indexical function, with the graphic inscription attesting that the 
signatory had been present at the writing of the letter. The sig file, on the other 
hand, has a spatial, locational function, attesting to the institutional position, geo-
graphical location, and telecommunicational coordinates of the signatory. 
In this essay, I consider how something like the premediation of the signature 
in one’s sig file speaks to the issues raised by Derrida’s critique of Austin. In other 
words, at the present historical moment, what does it mean for the premediated 
signature (as constituted precisely by the iterability, citationality, and alienabilty of 
digital mediation) to take the place of the handwritten signature (as a form of me-
diation indexically bound to the ‘original’ context of its performance as an event)? 
More broadly, I want to explore the ways in which the premediation of one’s im-
age, the audio-visual, digital remediation of the self, is beginning to stand along 
with, if not exactly eclipse, the signature as the juridical mark of one’s intentional-
ity and legal responsibility/accountability. I will argue throughout that the regime 
of handwriting as guarantor of conscious, legal, or political intention is making 
way for a regime of digital imaging. My aim is not to claim that digital remediation 
is somehow categorically distinct from writing, or is taking its place, but that writ-
ing and remediation alike share features of iterability, citationality, and alienabili-
ty, even if these features manifest themselves differently in different technical me-
dia and at different cultural and historical moments.
Before moving into the body of my argument, I should say a couple of words 
about what I mean by ‘premediation’. Premediation is a concept I have been devel-
oping to account for a particular aspect of the logic of remediation that Jay Bolter 
and I had overlooked at the end of the 1990s, an aspect of remediation that has 
been emerging for some time, but which has become much more acutely manifest 
after the shocking events of September 11, 2001. In a recent article, I have defined 
the threefold desire that motivates the logic of premediation at the beginning of the 
third millennium (Grusin 2004, 17-39). First, where remediation entailed the re-
fashioning of prior media forms and technologies, premediation entails the cultur-
al desire to remediate future media forms and technologies. This desire is quite vis-
ible in recent Hollywood cinema – in the vr-like ‘wire’ in Kathryne Bigelow’s 
Strange Days; in the heterogeneous networked technology of pre-crime and pre-
cognition in Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report; or in the high-powered telescope 
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that allows one to literally see into the future in John Woo’s Paycheck. Second, pre-
mediation entails the desire to remediate the future before it happens, the desire to 
never again let catastrophic events like those of 9/11 catch us unawares. This de-
sire to avoid the catastrophic immediacy of watching a plane crash into the World 
Trade Center live on television, or the Twin Towers burning and collapsing, is evi-
dent in the global news media’s increasing emphasis away from reporting on the 
present or recent past and toward pre-mediating events of the future, events which 
may or may not ever come to pass. Finally, the desire to premediate the future be-
fore it happens is accompanied by a desire to colonize the future by extending our 
networks of media technologies not only spatially across the globe and beyond, 
but also temporally into the future. This desire is manifest in the way that the het-
erogeneous networks of global capitalism work to ensure that the future is always 
so fully mediated by new media practices, forms, and technologies that it is unable 
to emerge into the present without having already been premediated in the past. 
It is this latter sense of premediation that bears most directly on the issues 
raised in this essay, particularly insofar as I am interested in thinking through the 
implications of the fact that in electronic communication the signature is increas-
ingly premediated before the letter or other document it is meant to endorse is even 
composed. To see the digital signature as premediated is not, I need to insist, to see 
it as a Baudrillardian simulacrum; despite their apparent affinities, premediation is 
not simulation. For Baudrillard the 
logic of simulation… no longer has anything to do with a logic of facts and 
an order of reason. Simulation is characterized by a precession of the mod-
el, of all the models based on the merest fact – the models come first, their 
circulation, orbital like that of the bomb, constitutes the genuine magnetic 
field of the event. The facts no longer have a specific trajectory, they are 
born at the intersection of models, a single fact can be engendered by all the 
models at once. (Baudrillard 1994, 16-17)
Although it might seem that what I am calling premediation is simply a restate-
ment of Baudrillard’s claim that the logic of simulation is marked by a ‘precession 
of the model’, in which ‘the models come first’ and ‘their circulation… constitutes 
the genuine magnetic field of the event’, this is not the case. Where I see the preme-
diation of the future as inseparably connected with the remediation of the present 
and past, Baudrillard sees the precession of the model in the logic of simulation as 
marking a radical break with the ‘logic of facts’ or the ‘order of reason’ that marked 
human history prior to the advent of the logic of simulation. Baudrillardian simu-
lation is always marked by the apocalyptic rhetoric of ‘no longer’: simulation ‘no 
longer has anything to do with a logic of facts’; ‘the facts no longer have a specific 
trajectory’ (emphasis added). Unlike Baudrillard’s logic of simulation, the concept 
of premediation imagines neither a world of total entropy or absolute mediation, 
an endless circulation without meaning, nor an absence of the real or its hyper-re-
ality. Rather, in describing the way in which the future has already been pre-medi-
ated, premediation conceives of this mediation as remediation, as always entailing 
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the real in relation to prior media forms or previous media formations. In taking up 
the premediation of the signature at our current historical moment, I do not mean 
to celebrate or bemoan a radical break with past signatory practices – indeed I 
refuse to accept Baudrillard’s notion of such a break. I mean instead to historicize 
both the present and the future in terms of their remediation of past signatory prac-
tices – in order to understand the specificity and particularity not only of the present 
moment’s differences with the past but also of their continuities. 
For some time now, commercially available software has allowed an image of one’s 
handwritten signature to be incorporated into a printed/word-processed letter. Bill 
and Hilary Clinton, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Robert Redford, George W. Bush, and 
John Kerry are among those whose handwritten signatures (or, more accurately, 
printed versions of their signatures’ digital images) have come to me through the 
mail in recent years. Electronically generated signatures on private and public sec-
tor bank checks are now nearly universal. Gone are the days when in 1971-72, as a 
young cashier at Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, my daily responsibilities 
included typing out in triplicate and co-signing by hand disbursement checks for 
the brokerage house’s clients. Such checks are now generated and signed by com-
puterized processes and nobody thinks anything of it. The same technology that in-
corporates an image of one’s signature into an automated accounts payable system 
or mass-produced marketing letters from celebrities or other public figures, can 
now be used for electronically transmitted letters as well. So it is no longer unusual 
to receive an e-mail attachment in Microsoft Word that has a memo or letter with 
an appropriately placed digital image of the sender’s signature. 
Although the e-mail invitation I received from Sonja Neef in December 2003 
did not bear her handwritten signature, it could have come with an image of that 
signature if she had so chosen. The technology to do so has existed for some time 
now and is readily available on the Web. Indeed, there are any number of different 
ways in which one can append a signature to one’s e-mail or other electronic corre-
spondence. Some websites offer to send you generic handwritten signatures to use 
as your e-mail’s sig file. If you choose, you can have this generic signature animat-
ed. For a slightly larger fee, you can have your own signature scanned as a digital 
image and incorporated into your e-mail. And this signature, too, can be animated. 
While us and international legislation has made electronic signatures legally bind-
ing since October 1, 2000, one online purveyor of electronic signatures, LiveSigna-
tures, denies that the products it sells can be considered legal signatures. In re-
sponse to the first question on its faq page, which asks if it is safe to send one’s 
LiveSignature via the Internet, LiveSignatures implies that because this signature is 
only an image of one’s signature and not the signature itself, its customers should 
not worry about their digital signatures being stolen or misused by identity thieves 




If a digital image of one’s signature is not considered legally binding, what then 
would constitute a legal electronic signature? esign, the Electronic Signatures in 
Global and National Commerce Act passed by the us Congress in 2001, legislates 
that a signature cannot be denied to be valid simply because it is in an electronic or 
digital format.2 Businesses and governments may implement electronic signature 
technologies that can, with certain exceptions, function in place of written signa-
tures. Because of significant differences between the media of paper and electronic 
documents, however, esign stipulates some interesting preconditions to the ac-
ceptance of electronic signatures, ostensibly with an eye towards protecting the 
consumer. The esign act requires governments or businesses seeking to substitute 
electronic for paper documents to ensure that:
the consumer consents electronically, or confirms his or her consent elec-
tronically, in a manner that reasonably demonstrates that the consumer can 
access information in the electronic form that will be used to provide the in-
formation that is the subject of the consent. (‘esign’,101(c)(1)(C)(ii)) 
Furthermore, the esign act directed the us Department of Commerce and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to conduct a study within 12 months of the passage of the 
bill on the benefits and burdens to consumers and businesses of the provisions set 
forth in the consumer protection sections (‘esign’, 105(b)). This study was based 
largely on a public workshop consisting of ‘moderated round table discussions 
with representatives from industry, government, consumer advocate groups and 
other interested parties’.3 Among the study’s conclusions is that by requiring ‘busi-
nesses to obtain from consumers electronic consent or confirmation to receive in-
formation electronically that a law requires to be in writing’, the esign act insists 
‘that the e-commerce business determine whether the consumer has the ability to 
receive an electronic notice before transmitting the legally required notices to the 
consumer’ (‘esign Consumer Consent’, iii.a.1). According to several of the pub-
licly solicited comments from the workshop, this consumer protection provision:
ensures that the consumer has access to a computer and to the Internet; en-
sures that the consumer has access to the software necessary to open the 
documents that are to be transmitted electronically; and raises the consum-
er’s awareness of the importance of the documents received and the impor-
tance of receiving the documents electronically. (‘esign Consumer Con-
sent’, iii.a.1)
As all of these comments make clear, the esign Act marks a recognition by us gov-
ernment, industry, and consumer advocate groups that electronic commerce and 
electronic signatures cannot exist, nor can they have any legal or commercial effi-
cacy, without having already been premediated. The requirement that consumers 
consent in advance to doing business electronically (or more accurately allowing 
themselves to sign electronically and receive legally mandated reports electronical-
ly) recognizes that there must be a premediated network in which the consumer 
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participates and within which the consumer knows how to act. This confirmation 
must of course be in advance of the implementation of electronic signatures or de-
livery of electronic documents that the law already stipulates must be in writing. 
This legally required premediation does not, as Baudrillard might have it, do away 
with individual agency or meaning in favor of an endless circulation of digital me-
diation. On the contrary, it defines the terms and conditions through which juridi-
cal and economic agency function in our current historical moment. 
The esign Act is generally regarded as technologically neutral; it does not 
specify any particular technology that can or cannot count as an electronic signa-
ture, which it defines simply as any ‘electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached 
to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or accepted 
by a person with the intent to sign the record’ (‘esign’,106 (5)). While this defini-
tion is vague enough that it could (under the right conditions) cover such digital 
images of signatures as those offered by online businesses like LiveSignatures, the 
esign act has fostered the development and marketing of several different prod-
ucts to capitalize on these new possibilities, including digital certificates author-
ized by public key infrastructure (pki), fingerprints, iris scans, and handwritten 
electronic signatures. All of these electronic signature technologies use algorithms 
to support some form of certification, encryption, and decoding; the latter three 
technologies all connect the electronic signature function to the presence of the hu-
man body at a particular place and time. 
For the purposes of this essay, the most interesting of these technologies is, of 
course, electronic signature technology, which begins by capturing a handwritten 
signature via handwriting recognition software, then transforms the captured sig-
nature algorithmically into an encrypted file which is bound to the document, 
stored in a database, and able to be decrypted as visible signature at the end. Cur-
rent technology not only stores the signature as an image, but also stores biometric 
data connected with the signature process to provide an extra element of security 
in guaranteeing that the signature was not forged by another person or otherwise 
faked. The deployment of biometric verification relies upon the assumption that 
written signatures are premediated in the body as something like an automatism, 
not unlike the way in which a sub-routine, or JavaScript, or embedded program 
can be premediated in a website or other digital artifact. The idea behind these bio-
metric measurements, then, is that the body itself is a medium, or perhaps an en-
gine of mediation; such practices or actions as signing one’s name or writing by 
hand are understood to exist as habitual automatisms that, when triggered, oper-
ate in the same way every time to produce the same handwriting, the same signa-
ture.4 These automatisms are understood to be built into the body, not unlike the 
way that sig files or return addresses, for example, are built into your e-mail pro-
gram. 
One us company that is aggressively marketing this new electronic signature 
technology is Interlink Electronics, which offers a Flash video on its website to tout 
its new E-Pad product line.5 The voice-over on Interlink’s marketing video dramat-
ically demonstrates the way in which proponents of electronic signature technol-
ogy seek to preserve the traditional role played by the handwritten signature even 
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while capitalizing on the opportunities brought about by newly legalized elec-
tronic signatures, contending that: ‘Interlink’s E-Pad captures the traditionally ac-
cepted personal handwritten signature, biometrically transforming it for secure 
use in the digital domain’ (‘Electronic Transactions’, 2005). The video opens with 
a more elaborate version of this double gesture, aiming both to preserve the his-
torical role of the signature and to remediate it for the digital revolution: 
As individual as dna, the personal signature has been used for hundreds 
of years to close letters, finalize agreements, certify applications, and au-
thorize transactions. Recent legislation, however, has sparked a revolution 
in the way personal signatures are used. Throughout most of the world 
electronic signatures are now considered to be as legally binding as those 
written on paper. e-pad, from Interlink Electronics, is an electronic signa-
ture solution, that employs the time-tested handwritten signature, captur-
ing and converting it to a biometrically secure e-signature, that once bound 
into an electronic document, cannot be removed, reused, or altered. 
As one example of the persistence of the handwritten signature in an age of digital 
remediation, Interlink Electronic’s new ‘electronic signature solution’ reflects the 
corporate and cultural desire that ‘the digital domain’ will hold on to the stability 
of an older techno-juridical regime in which handwriting is seen to have an unal-
ienable relationship to identity.
Because of this supposedly inalienable relationship, which the Interlink video 
updates for the 21st century by likening the uniqueness of one’s signature to the 
uniqueness of one’s dna, signatures have played a key role in authorizing or guar-
anteeing one’s legal or economic agency in modernity. Historical understandings 
of the exact nature of this relationship, however, have changed over the past two 
centuries or more. The Romantic sense in which handwriting is seen to reveal 
one’s character by proceeding from the unconscious as an automatic gesture, has 
given way to the more modern sense in which the signature is connected physio-
logically (or now biometrically) to one’s distinct, unique identity not as a repre-
sentation of one’s character but as an automatized guarantor of one’s legal, con-
tractual, economic agency (Thornton 1996, chapters 3 and 4). Although in elec-
tronic signature capture the distinctiveness of one’s handwriting is authenticated 
by means of a series of networked information protocols, the signature continues 
to function as a unique marker of identity in these remediated electronic signature 
technologies. The handwritten signature is biometrically recorded so that elec-
tronic signature technologies can continue to provide assurance that the digitally 
encoded signature has not been stolen or hijacked or pirated by another.
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Legislation like the esign Act (and its counterpart, the European Union Electronic 
Signatures Directive), as well as the technological and juridical practices of elec-
tronic signatures that have been developed in conjunction with such legislation, re-
flect the way in which the notion of the signature as an irreducible and inalienable 
marker of identity persists in an era of digital remediation. In us (and increasingly 
global) culture, however, there are many indications that this historical sense of 
stable identity is making way for a notion in which one’s relation to one’s identity 
is much more fluid and changeable, in which one’s identity is coming to be marked 
not by one’s handwritten signature but by one’s digital image. And it is indeed pre-
cisely because digital images (like other digital mediations) are, unlike one’s signa-
ture, in theory nearly infinitely reproducible and remediable, that technologies like 
electronic signature capture have been developed to authenticate contractual iden-
tity in a digital age. 
The coexistence of these two different regimes of identity is plainly visible on 
the websites of the Motion Picture Association of America (mpaa) and the Record-
ing Industry Association of America (riaa), both of which include links to the two 
organizations’ jointly authored ‘Corporate Policy Guide to Copyright Use and Se-
curity on the Internet’.6 
1. MPAA/RIAA Letter 
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This policy guide is authorized and authenticated by an introductory ‘Open Letter 
to America’s Corporate Leaders’ from Hilary B. Rosen, chairman and ceo of the 
riaa, and Jack Valenti, president and ceo of the mpaa. The letter is signed by 
Rosen and Valenti, with their digitally reproduced photographs added underneath 
their names and titles. In their letter, the two ceos explain that the document ad-
dresses ‘the problem of copyright theft in the corporate and office environment’, a 
problem exacerbated by the fact that digitally encoded films and sound recordings 
can be illegally copied and reproduced without permission. The mpaa-riaa docu-
ment itself is presented as a pdf file, which cannot easily be sampled; for example, 
the photos of the two signatories cannot, as with most images on the web, be eas-
ily copied and pasted elsewhere, nor can the two signatures. Yet the Corporate Pol-
icy Guide also includes a sample memo to employees that is meant to be used by 
corporate management teams to put their own mpaa- and riaa-sanctioned poli-
cies on use of copyrighted material into place; samples of such policies are also in-
cluded in the online document. 
2. RIAA/MPAA Sample Memo
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These sample memos and policies, unlike the copyrighted material they are meant 
to protect, are intended to be borrowed and appropriated, presumably without ci-
tation or acknowledgment, from the mpaa-riaa document – even while being pre-
sented in a digital format (pdf) that makes such borrowing more difficult than if 
the sample memos and policies were available as downloadable Word files, for ex-
ample. This joint document enacts and promotes one position on borrowing the 
work of others even while advocating another. And these two positions on expres-
sion – as the inalienable private property of its author and as sharable, reproduci-
ble common property – are enacted in the doubled ‘signatures’ of the authorizing 
letter.
The format of this letter is a fairly typical remediation of the format of the print 
letter, which adds to the digital images of the handwritten signatures digitized pho-
tographic images of the letter’s two signatories as another kind of signature or au-
thorization or identification. Indeed we find a very similar format in a letter on the 
Citigroup website, in which Sandy Weill, chairman of Citigroup, Inc., reports on 





But what makes this joint mpaa-riaa document particularly interesting is the way 
in which the open letter’s supplementation of the signature with the digital image 
emblematizes the two regimes of copyright, authorship, or ownership that are 
contesting one another with regard to current digital media practices – an older re-
gime in which identity is authorized or guaranteed by the uniqueness of the signa-
ture, and the current regime of digital remediation in which one’s word, one’s intel-
lectual property, or one’s identity, is guaranteed by means of the replicability (or 
iterability) of digital mediation. Like one’s signature in an earlier regime, one’s dig-
ital image is able to persist independently of the self to authorize one’s action, ex-
pression, or communication. But because, unlike a handwritten signature, digital 
imagery is so easily reproducible and changeable, it poses a threat that corporate 
interests like those represented by the mpaa and riaa are determined to resist. 
These competing notions of identity in our age of digital remediation are very 
much at play in a 2004 Citibank ad campaign about identity theft, which cleverly 
links together identity theft with the theft of one’s digital, audiovisual image. Aired 
primarily in the us, this series of television commercials represents the theft of 
one’s identity not as the loss of one’s financial information or the unauthorized ac-
cess to one’s digital data, but rather as the loss of control over one’s audiovisual im-
age, the hijacking or appropriation of one’s body as if it were a puppet. In these 
commercials the video image of a person talking is accompanied by an audio track 
of the words of the person who has stolen their identity. In each case the two iden-
tities are cross-gendered. The ads also suggest other differences between the voice 
of the thief and the body of the victim in terms of age, class, race, and ethnicity. In 
one commercial, for example, we see a video of a young African-American wom-
an, ‘Sandra T.’, seated in a beauty salon, drying her nails and soaking her feet in a 
Jacuzzi; the woman speaks to the camera, however, in the voice of a young white 
male nerd or geek, bragging about how he broke through her firewall, stole her ac-
count number, and purchased a 64-inch screen plasma television and a ‘girl robot’ 
for his prom date. In another commercial, a working-class white man, Jake B., is 
sitting in a leather chair in what looks like his den or television room; he speaks to 
the viewer in the voice of a young woman with a New York accent, who brags 
about emptying his checking account, going to the mall, and buying ‘a sexy little 
outfit’, spending ‘$1500 for a leather bustier’ that ‘lifts and separates’. In these Cit-
ibank commercials the metaphor of identity theft – the illegal use of another’s fi-
nancial, political, or legal information – is literalized. Identity theft is represented 
in these ads as stealing and manipulating somebody’s mediated image, as one per-
son making another person’s self say what the first person wants, making one’s self 
do (in terms of its function as a consumer) what another wants. Rather than de-
picting what might actually happen in case of identity theft, i.e., an identity thief 
acting in his or her own body as if he or she possessed the identity of another (con-
suming or spending or contracting as another), this commercial reverses the ‘real’ 
situation, and has the audiovisual image of the person whose identity has been sto-
len speaking in the voice of the identity thief, who is manipulating that person’s 
body, not its information or its credit.7 Rather than presenting identity theft as the 
channeling of the victim’s information through the thief’s body and actions, these 
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commercials present identity theft as a kind of body-snatching, a channeling of the 
thief’s voice and actions through the body of the victim. 
Fallon, the advertising agency responsible for this television campaign, fol-
lowed it up with an analogous print campaign, in which still photographs of the 
victim of the identity theft are portrayed in the situations in which the identity thief 
has used their credit (see May 23, 2005. <http://www.magazine.org/advertising_
and_pib/kelly_awards/ Winners_and _Finalists/11682.cfm>). 
4. Citibank Print Ads
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Rather than depend upon the shock value of an incongruity between body and 
voice, these print ads depend upon the shock value of the incongruity between the 
body of the victim and the action or situation in which he or she is placed. Thus 
one ad shows a middle-aged woman being given a tattoo in a tattoo parlor. A sec-
ond presents a bearded, overweight man in a sleeveless gray T-shirt, holding a can 
of soda or beer, asleep under a hair drier in a beauty salon, next to three younger 
women. The tagline for each ad is ‘It didn’t seem right to us, either’, emphasizing 
Citibank’s ‘early warning’ protection, which looks out for purchases that don’t 
match a profile of a user’s purchasing history. Like the television commercials, 
these print ads work by reversing the identity theft situation, imagining that the 
identity thief manipulates not simply the victim’s credit, but the victim’s digital im-
age as well, as if one’s identity was in fact the sum total of one’s financial informa-
tion.
Where the Citibank ads seem chiefly concerned with the crime or scandal of 
manipulating another person’s digital image, the 19th-century legal and economic 
system was preoccupied with the scandal of manipulating another’s signature, and 
was thus largely concerned with the problem of preventing forgery, in order to 
maintain the economic-juridical legitimacy or uniqueness of one’s signature 
(Thornton 1996, 101-103). In this earlier model, identity and voice or identity and 
body (like identity and handwriting), were thought to be inseparably tied together. 
In fact it is the (explicitly schematized) disjunction between voice and body in the 
Citibank television commercials that dramatizes identity theft; in so doing, the 
commercials depend for their force upon the conventional link between voice and 
body, as well as between voice and self. In this older notion of identity, the conjunc-
tion of voice, body, and self, like the identity between one’s signature and one’s self, 
authorized or attested to the legal responsibility of the rational individual in an En-
lightenment-derived modern capitalist society. This traditional model of identity is 
now being challenged by new information technologies, which allow this bond to 
be severed, because one’s identity is no longer authorized solely by one’s voice or 
one’s handwriting, but also (increasingly) by one’s digital image, one’s audio-visual 
remediation. Because this bond can so easily be severed, one’s identity (as agent of 
cyber-capitalism, legally and economically responsible for one’s words and ac-
tions) can more readily be counterfeited or stolen, and thus one must work to pro-
tect one’s identity; to preserve the link between one’s body and one’s voice; be-
tween one’s words and one’s actions. While Citibank’s ads portray the victims of 
identity theft as working or relaxing in their local, domestic contexts, the voices of 
the identity thieves are the voices of mobile consumers, whose chief crime is ex-
travagant spending of a kind that cyber-capitalism has been structured to accom-
modate (and indeed to encourage – the identity thieves all seem to be having much 
more fun in these commercials than their puppet victims). These voices control (at 
least for the duration of the commercials or ads) both the bodies of the identity 
theft victims and their credit. This redefinition of identity as analogous to credit is 
a redefinition of identity as always already premediated, as the totality of one’s fi-
nancial and (by extension) other juridical or institutional information, not as the 
indissoluble connection to one’s body via the voice or the hand. In these ads, iden-
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tity is imaged as embodiment even though it is identity as information that has 
been stolen. 
Of course, as Katherine Hayles and others have reminded us, in the digital 
realm embodiment is information; the audio-visual representation of human bod-
ies is made up of digital code or information (Hayles 1999). This linkage of iden-
tity and information informs the Citibank ads, in which the body, or its digitized 
audio-visual image, is ‘forged’ or ‘stolen’, or in certain respects ‘played’ as some-
thing like a character in a computer or video game. In these commercials, to be-
come a victim of identity theft is in some sense to become an ‘avatar’ for the thief. 
Indeed, corporations like Citibank understand their customers to exist in relation 
to their juridico-economic identities in much the same way as game players relate 
to their avatars. Unlike the distinctive relation between handwriting and character 
or individuality that was historically imagined to run through the body and the 
hand, in our age of digital remediation the body (as digital image) is necessarily, by 
definition, alienable from one’s self or identity – and one relates to it as a character 
or avatar one plays in a game and not as an indissoluble part or expression of self. 
These ads participate in a broader corporate media effort to displace or exaggerate 
the nature of the ‘theft’ to which consumers are vulnerable. Thus, while the mass 
news media regularly report on the nightmares of people like us having their iden-
tities stolen, the threat portrayed by identity theft (charging lots of purchases on 
another’s credit card) is a minimal one – in the us each victim is legally liable for 
only $50 per card. So, by equating this financial loss with loss of control of one’s 
body and one’s words to another, Citibank’s commercials exaggerate the threat to 
its customers. Although identity theft is being portrayed exclusively as a threat to 
the individual consumer whose identity might be stolen, it is in fact equally or 
more substantially a threat to multinational finance companies like Citigroup. 
Thus, what is also being displaced in this ad is the relation between multinational 
corporations like Citigroup and its customers, which is, itself, also very much like 
a relation between a game-playing agent and its avatars. The unmentioned victims 
of ‘identity theft’ are corporations like Citibank itself, whose liability is greater in 
terms of both current and future economic costs because it has millions of dollars 
at stake in maintaining an e-commerce environment in which its customers feel se-
cure. 
Citibank’s identity theft ad campaign portrays credit card fraud in terms of a 
shift from the fear that someone might forge your signature to the fear that some-
one might hijack and control your digital image. In the process, these commercials 
dramatize the way in which new digital media have begun to destabilize the histor-
ical relationship between one’s handwritten signature and one’s veracity, liability, 
or accountability. To say this, however, is not to deny the powerful way in which 
the signature still operates in political, legal, and cultural discourse. Signatures still 
function millions of times every day in legal, commercial, and social transactions. 
Signatures enact laws, close contracts, and authorize actions of innumerable kinds. 
Nor is it to claim that the instability of the handwritten signature is solely a phe-
nomenon of our digital age. After all, signatures have always been able to be forged 
and thus have always been subject to challenge, in whatever medium they may oc-
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cur. Yet, despite (or perhaps in addition to) the ways in which the signature persists 
in an age of digital remediation, its challengability or revocability has been height-
ened in our current digital regime. As digital images replace signatures, what it 
means to authorize or authenticate one’s words becomes less and less clear. The 
supplementation of the handwritten signature by the digital image appears to sig-
nal some kind of shift in the way in which human identity, and thus human ac-
countability or responsibility, is currently understood. It is not (as Baudrillard 
might say) that the signature ‘no longer’ functions as it has for centuries now, in or-
der to authorize or authenticate individual agency or responsibility, but that the sig-
nature (and all of its digital remediations) functions in a variety of media and for-
mats that may not have been available in an earlier medial regime. Changes in the 
technologies through which identity and property are licensed, represented, and 
owned bring with them (or perhaps are brought about by) different understandings 
of the relationships among writing, self, identity, ownership, and property. 
At least since Plato’s ‘Phaedrus’, the question of writing has been tied up with the 
notion of memory. Indeed this is one of the underlying reasons for the legal efficacy 
of handwritten signatures, which are meant to stand as written records of an indi-
vidual’s intention that can persist beyond any one or more individual’s memories of 
those intentions. Several recent Hollywood films have dramatized the changing 
conceptions of the self, not as an internalized essence or quality bearing an inalien-
able relationship to one’s identity, but as a form of digital content, something alien-
able, made up of, or identified with, a set of mediated, or remediated, audiovisual 
images and sounds. In these films, memory is increasingly supplemented not only 
by writing, but also by images. One powerful example is Memento (2000), where 
the main character’s short-term memory disorder forces him to use Polaroid snap-
shots with handwritten notes on the back of the photos to serve in lieu of his mem-
ory of people, places, or promises. A more light-hearted treatment of memory dis-
order can be found in the romantic comedy 50 First Dates (2004), in which a young 
woman cannot remember anything past the date on which she had a horrible car 
accident; at the end of the film her ‘memory’ is brought back to her each morning 
by a multimedia presentation that reintroduces her to her husband and daughter, 
both of whom post-date her memory loss. 
The preoccupation with memory and identity also recurs in a number of recent 
mainstream Hollywood films that have premediated the idea of memory as consti-
tuted by a collection of audiovisual images that can be erased and stored by digital 
technologies. The Final Cut (2004), for example, premediates a society in which 
parents can choose to purchase a biotechnological memory chip to be implanted in 
their newborn child, which will record their child’s entire life as first-person point-
of-view audiovisual content. And Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (2004) 
premediates a different kind of future media technology, one that can be used not to 
preserve but to erase memories, usually those of a beloved person (or a pet). Al-
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though The Final Cut premediates a technology that seeks to preserve memories 
after death and while Eternal Sunshine premediates a technology that would erase 
memories during life, both participate in the current Hollywood project to imag-
ine memory and therefore identity as a kind of biotechnological, networked, au-
diovisual content. 
Perhaps the most interesting of these recent Hollywood films is John Woo’s 
Paycheck (2003), in which the question of memory as audiovisual content is also 
at play. Significantly, the question of memory is here tied directly to the relation be-
tween signature and identity. Based on a story by Philip K. Dick, Paycheck con-
cerns a software engineer named Michael Jennings (played by Ben Affleck) who 
uses reverse engineering to pirate other companies’ proprietary technologies, in 
exchange for a large paycheck, hence the title. To protect his employers, however, 
he signs an agreement prior to commencing each job to have his memory erased 
from the day on which he receives the paycheck for his completed work to the day 
before he signed his contract. The film’s plot is built upon disjunctions between his 
erased memory and several instances in which his intentionality is expressed by his 
signature, contrary to the memories that he retains. 
The first disjunction occurs when Jennings goes to collect on his payment for 
an unusually long three-year job, stock options worth upwards of $92 million. 
When he arrives at the financial institution to determine how to invest his earnings, 
he is told that he had voluntarily signed away his stock options four weeks earlier 
in exchange for an envelope of miscellaneous, apparently random, personal items. 
When Jennings (after having his memory wiped according to the contract he signed 
before beginning the job), discovers that he has somehow been tricked or swin-
dled, that he has signed away his rights to the multi-million dollar payoff in stock 
options in exchange for an envelope of worthless personal possessions that he does 
not even recognize as his own, the point that the film underscores is that even in the 
hypermediated society of the near future signatures abide, that signatures, not 
memory, have legal (as well as cinematic) force. Although the audience is clearly 
led to believe, as Jennings himself does, that he has been swindled, that somebody 
must have signed his name or made him sign his name against his will or intention, 
it becomes evident well before the end of the film that his signature in fact does sig-
nify his intentionality or purposefulness irrespective of apparent logic or reason, 
or of his memory (or lack thereof). More precisely, however, what the audience 
(and Jennings) eventually discover is that this signature-authorized intention con-
stitutes a premediation of his future actions that provides him with the clues and 
the necessary tools that will allow him to escape his pursuers and ultimately to de-
stroy the dangerous technology he has just helped to create through reverse engi-
neering.
The second disjunction between Jennings’ signature and his memory occurs 
shortly after he discovers that he had signed away his paycheck, when two fbi 
agents apprehend him for patent applications he had taken out on technologies 
that had been illegally stolen from the federal government, applications that were 
authorized by his signature. ‘These are patent applications’, they tell him, as the 
screen shows a digital image of a government form. ‘Look whose signature is on 
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these documents’. The technology for which Jennings had taken out a patent, and 
which he was then determined to destroy, was a technology literally to pre-mediate 
the future, to see the future before it becomes reality. This technology is described 
by the two fbi agents as a visual laser powerful enough for its user to look around 
the curvature of the universe so completely that he ends up looking back at him-
self, not in the present or past, but in the future. Despite its fascination with preme-
diation, paycheck presents this futuristic technology as a dangerous threat that 
must be done away with. In so doing, the film ends up maintaining the value of the 
signature as a genuine expression of self, of intentionality, as against a notion of 
the self as remediated audiovisual content. Indeed, not only does Jennings succeed 
in destroying this technology, but, in typical Hollywood fashion, he ends up get-
ting his fortune as well, by having ‘seen’ the lottery numbers of a future drawing, 
whose winning ticket is one of the items he has left himself in the envelope. 
In paycheck the plot elements involving Jennings’ signature depend on the le-
gal force of his signature to affirm his intention, independent of his memory or (in 
the case of his $92 million) of any apparent logic or reason. Additionally, the invo-
cation of patents can hardly be accidental, as they are precisely part of the older re-
gime of copyright and intellectual property that is currently being challenged by 
new digital media technologies and practices. Paycheck thus dramatizes the con-
flict between the two competing regimes of identity and memory at play in contem-
porary culture. Although on the one hand, this film characterizes human identity 
as a kind of media content, made up of alienable memories and experiences that 
can be erased from one’s memory, by the end of the film it turns out that the inten-
tionality authorized by the signature that gives up the stock options is finally ful-
filled, insofar as the items that Michael Jennings receives in exchange for them, 
prove necessary for him to destroy the technology he had created and to receive 
even more money than he would have received from the stock options. Despite its 
fascination with the premediation of future technologies and the portrayal of 
memory as audiovisual content fundamentally alienable from identity, Paycheck 
finally wants to hold on to an earlier regime of handwriting as key to enforcing or 
authorizing the intentions of the self independent either of memory or against the 
audiovisual premediation of the future. Like The Final Cut and Eternal Sunshine, 
Paycheck participates in Hollywood’s (and in a broader sense, multinational capi-
talism’s) double stance towards the cultural practice of remediating identity as dig-
ital, or audiovisual, content – a fascination with the idea and with its technological 
manifestation at the same time that an older notion of the self ends up governing 
these films’ narratives. 
I want to conclude, then, by raising some broader questions that need to be ex-
plored concerning this double stance towards, or contradictory role of, individual 
responsibility or accountability in contemporary culture. Does the proliferation of 
different technologies for authenticating identity in social, cultural, interpersonal, 
legal, commercial exchange bring with it new and significant implications for our 
understanding of property, of responsibility, of identity, and other practices that 
we consider legal or ethical or appropriate? Are ideas of an autonomous individu-
al, of legal rights and responsibilities, of rationalized, consistent positions, of pri-
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vate property, rooted in an outmoded Enlightenment notion of self, private prop-
erty, or freedom, that is bound up with older technologies of writing or mediation, 
and thus less viable under our current medial regime? Have such ideas, if not per-
haps eliminated completely or replaced, been eroded by the emergence of another 
model, a model of networked identity and action and events in which the self does 
not exist prior to its actions, and in which the self is not accountable as the source 
or guarantor of its actions, but rather exists only as the product of an already pre-
mediated network of possible actions? Does the desire to premediate the future, to 
anticipate structurally all possible futures, many of which will never come about, 
do away with, or at the very least minimize, the consequences of being contradic-
tory or untruthful? 
In an age of digital mediation, my answer to these questions and others like 
them is inevitably doubled. On the one hand, I feel that the changes in the nature 
of the signature that I have articulated here, the supplementation of the handwrit-
ten signature by the premediated digital image, mark something fundamentally 
different about the way in which identity functions under the regime of digital me-
diation. On the other hand, I do not want to be seen as arguing that this difference 
marks the apocalyptic end of a stable regime of individual agency and responsibil-
ity. Instead, I cannot help but suspect that what we are now witnessing is only the 
latest chapter in an ongoing and constantly changing historical relationship among 





1. A SIG file is defined as ‘A short block of 
text at the end of a message identifying the 
sender and providing additional informa-
tion about them…. A .sig file is [a] small 
text file (with a .sig extension) that can be 
automatically attached to the end of email 
messages. The phrase SIG file is also used 
to identify blocks of text used for similar 
purposes through different channels, such 
as discussion group messages. For per-
sonal use, SIG files often include humor-
ous sayings or signature art. These can be 
automatically rotated so frequent recipi-
ents do not see the same message every 
time. For business use, SIG files often 
include a mix of contact information and 
business promotion. This may include the 
sender’s name, job title, company name, 
phone #, fax #, email address, Web site 
address, tag line and brief benefits of your 
products or services.’ MarketingTerms.
com. May 16, 2005. Available at: <http://
www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/sig_
file/>. 
2. ‘Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act.’ Pub. L. No. 106-
229, 114 Stat. 464, 2000 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.). All references to 
this act will be cited parenthetically by 
section number in the text as ‘ESIGN’. 
3. ‘Electronic Signatures in Global and 
National Commerce Act, The Consumer 
Consent Provision in Section 101 (c) (1) 
(C) (ii).’ Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, 
Appendix D, 2000 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
Sign Here! / Signature Identity Content
§ 7001 et seq.). All subsequent references 
to this publication will be cited parentheti-
cally in the text as ‘ESIGN Consumer Con-
sent’.
4. For further discussion of the body as 
medium, see Bolter, Jay David, Remedia-
tion: Understanding New Media. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1999, 236-240.
5. Interlink Electronics is a publicly traded 
company (Nasdaq: LINK) which describes 
itself on its home page as ‘a world leader 
in the design and manufacture of intuitive 
interface technologies and products’. May 
23, 2005. Available at: <http://www.inter-
linkelec.com/]>. 
6. When this address was written in May 
2004, the document was linked to both 
organizations’ home pages. The MPAA link 
was still on its home page as of May 2005 
at <http://mpaa.org/anti-piracy/
press/2003/2003_02_13.pdf>; last ac-
cessed May 23, 2005. As of May 23, 2005, 
the RIAA link is buried on its press page: 
<http://www.riaa.com/news\newslet-
ter\021303.asp> and the link to the joint 
document is broken: <www.riaa.com/pdf/
brochure2003.pdf>.
7. The idea of identity as a form of what I 
would call ‘premediated’ credit is one that 
Derrida explored in a number of places, 
most recently in his work on the impossi-
bility of the gift. See especially Given Time: 
1. Counterfeit Money Trans. Peggy Kamuf, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992. 
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Writing the
Of Diaries and 
Weblogs
A cartoon that  recently appeared in a Dutch newspaper shows a man and a wom-
an lying in bed, smoking a cigarette apparently after having sex. ‘Do you keep a di-
ary?’ the man asks his partner, and upon her response of ‘no’, he comments: ‘Good. 
I don’t like it when a woman immortalizes her intimate experiences with me on pa-
per’. In the last frame, we see the woman sitting behind a computer screen and typ-
ing ‘Dear weblog…’, while the man snores away on the bed behind her. In this 
short cartoon, we can detect a number of preconceived notions about diaries and 
weblogs, but the clue to this joke is the paradox that the weblog is not considered 
a digital equivalent of the diary and yet it is.1
For centuries, the diary has been characterized as a private, handwritten docu-
ment that chronicles the experiences, observations, and reflections of a single per-
son at the moment of inscription. Although the diary as a cultural form is varied 
and heterogeneous, it typically represents the record of an ‘I’ who constructs a 
view of him/herself in connection to the world at large. Diary writing, as a quotid-
ian cultural practice, involves reflection and expression; it is also a peculiarly hy-
brid act of communication, always intended for private use, yet often betraying an 
awareness of its potential to be read by others. Inviting the translation from 
thoughts into words via the technologies of pen and paper, the old-fashioned diary 
symbolized a safe haven for a person’s most private thoughts. Personal notebooks 
were often treasured as stilled moments of a forlorn past, and kept in safe places to 
be retrieved many years later – much like photographs. But what has happened to 
the diary as we enter the age of digital technologies? 
With digitization affecting practically every domain of public and private life, 
the diary is no exception. ‘Weblogs’ have become a popular genre on the Internet, 
as millions of people (particularly teenagers and young adults) are now heavily en-
gaged in the activity of ‘blogging’. By the end of 2004, there were about 10 million 
weblog users in the United States alone.2 But can weblogs and blogging be consid-
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ered the digital counterpart of what used to be a paper diary and diary writing? As 
the cartoon implies, the answer to this question is a paradoxical ‘yes and no’. Cul-
tural practices or forms never simply adapt to new technological conditions, but 
always inherently change along with the technologies and the potentialities of their 
use. In the case of weblogs, the digital materiality of the Internet engenders a new 
type of reflection and communication that shows traces of the former analogue 
genre, but also functions substantially differently. 
Richard Grusin and Jay Bolter have used the term ‘remediation’ to account for 
the ways in which new media forms consolidate but also change existing forms 
(Bolter and Grusin 1999). In a critique of this term, Andreas Kitzmann argues that 
‘remediation’ does not sufficiently account for the intrinsic shaping power of tech-
nology, and proposes to focus on the wider phenomenon of ‘material complexifi-
cation’ to understand the continuities and changes between old and new media, 
for instance weblogs and webcams (Kitzmann 2003, 48-65).3 Both Bolter and 
Grusin and Kitzmann have a point. But I would argue that studying media changes 
is not a question of either cultural form or technology. In this chapter, I suggest ex-
amining not two but three dimensions of mediated cultural change: the materiality 
and technology of (hand)written diaries versus weblogs, the diary or weblog as a 
cultural form or genre, and the cultural practice of diary writing in comparison to 
the activities of so-called bloggers. While tracing the transformation of personal 
records in the face of new digital technologies, I will argue that weblogs are not 
outcomes but rather signifiers of cultural change as they both reflect and construct 
new epistemologies. 
Diaries are commonly valued for their contents rather than for their look or feel. 
Nevertheless, the materiality of diaries as well as the technology through which 
these artifacts have come into being are crucial factors in their signification.4 Two 
typical concepts of diaries spring to mind: the empty diary, preformatted for daily 
use, which we can buy in stationary stores; and the original manuscripts of private 
diaries which have later appeared in print. The physical appearance of a prefab di-
ary prefigures the functions of its intended use: empty pages, with or without lines, 
bound or unbound, dated or undated, offer the author stimuli to fill the more or 
less blank surface with personal inscriptions and thoughts. In some cases, the diary 
is completed by a lock and key – a potent symbol of its private nature. The prefor-
matted diary has always been, to some extent, a product of contemporary fashion, 
its design and layout representing a particular style and catering to a specific age or 
taste. A diary’s materiality forms an essential part of its content: pages, cover, key, 
colors, ink and paper (its look, feel, and smell) are all part of the act of memory. 
Over the years, diarists often grow fond of the material look of their notebooks – 
fading colors, youthful handwriting, and ink blobs trigger reminiscences in a way 
that photographs might. The diary’s contents, when reread at a later stage in life, 
may either elicit nostalgic yearning or retroactive embarrassment, in some cases 
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even leading to a definitive destruction of the object. A reified memory object of 
one’s past, the diary is the stilled result of a creative and communicative act.
Diary writing is not necessarily inspired by prefab formats: on the contrary, 
many diaries which were later discovered and subsequently published in print, had 
first been written in ordinary notebooks or scribbled on individual sheets of paper. 
The actual manuscript of such a diary, its original form of inscription, becomes a 
vital sign of authenticity – often stored in special places and only accessible to own-
ers or researchers. In the case of Anne Frank’s diary, which consisted partly of 
notebooks and partly of separate sheets of paper, the gradual discovery and recon-
struction of the various ‘versions’ of the manuscript became part of the Dutch 
teenager’s legacy.5 The original manuscript, stored in Amsterdam, appeared to be 
in such demand that the Anne Frank Foundation had two exact duplicates made: 
one to replace the original on display at the museum, the other to satisfy the many 
requests from film directors, researchers and documentary makers for pictures of 
the original. The materiality of the manuscript constitutes an intricate part of the 
diary’s genesis and, later, its controversial claims to authenticity, (uncensored) 
originality and completeness. 
Pivotal to the materiality of diaries, up to the age of computers, has been the 
notion of script: the concept of a diary is commonly associated with (hand)writing, 
signifying not just authenticity, but personality. Handwriting has historically been 
believed to betray the personality of its producer – graphology being the study that 
yields clues to the writer’s character such as age and even personality traits. Re-
garded as the first ‘technologizing of the word’, the availability of pen and paper 
facilitated the need to make oneself legible to the ‘other’ or to the future self (Ong 
1982). Writing is thus intimately tied to a stage in one’s personal development: a 
teenager’s scrawls betray his or her inexperience with the prime tool of literacy – 
the immaturity of body or mind.6 As Sonja Neef argues, handwriting is an embod-
ied practice: moving a pen onto paper involves a direct connection between body 
and script, an act in which the eye and hand are intimately interwoven with the 
technology of paper and pen and the techniques of deploying them; the hand – a 
body part instrumental to the ‘Verkörperung’ (embodiment) of thoughts – fixes the 
inner self to the outside world (Neef 2002).7
Since other technologies have gradually replaced handwriting, the tools of a 
diarist have changed accordingly. When Sigmund Freud wrote his essay ‘A Note 
Upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”’, in 1925, he regarded writing and technology as 
external aids or supplements to memory. Freud described memory in terms of writ-
ing, comparing it to the surface of a writing pad that allowed the scribbling of 
notes that could subsequently be erased and yet remain stored in the ‘subcon-
scious’ layers of the pad, below its material surface. Jacques Derrida, commenting 
upon Freud’s essay, dismisses his notion of writing as an external memory and em-
phasizes instead technology’s instrumental relationship to language and represen-
tation (Derrida 1995).8 Technologies, including writing utensils, are machines that 
engender representations while infiltrating agency. Pen and paper, therefore, pro-
duce different modes of writing than the typewriter or the word processor.9 Hand-
writing never simply structures reflections or thoughts, but literally creates them; 
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by the same token, a typewriter constitutes a different relation between author, 
words, and representation. It may not be a coincidence that typewriters never be-
came popular in connection with diary writing; unlike handwriting, the noise of 
fingers pounding on a machine severed the physical intimacy between body and 
word.10 As the technologies for writing change, so does our way of creating self-re-
flective records. Handwritten diaries are material artifacts that are themselves me-
morials – traces of a past self. Memory, in other words, is always implicated in the 
act and technology of writing.
The advent of the personal word processor, as the successor to the (electronic) 
typewriter, further disembodied the production of written language, as not only 
the keyboard but also the screen interfered with the continuity between hand and 
words. Yet two essential features of word processing may have restored some of 
the intimacy lost with the typewriter. First, the relative silence of word processors 
refurbished part of the quietude inherent in solitary writing, while speeding up the 
production of text and maintaining standardized letter output. Even more pro-
found has been the ability of word processors to produce tentative texts, provi-
sional versions of thoughts, forever amenable to changes of mind; the editing of 
visualized words does not leave a trace in the ultimate print. Words on the screen, 
stored in digital memory, thus formed a new stage in the trajectory between imma-
terial thoughts and textual products, allowing for invisible revisionist interferen-
ces in one’s memory. On top of that, digital files may never materialize into print, 
and they can remain stored in the black box of the personal computer, without ever 
being erased or retrieved (by the writer or by others). Diaries produced by a word 
processor, therefore, are fundamentally different from diaries produced by means 
of handwriting or typewriters because the personal computer provides an intrinsic 
textual paintbrush with which to edit one’s personal records. The potential of dig-
ital editing at a later stage diluted the concept of the diary as a material, ‘authentic’ 
artifact, inscribed in time and on paper. 
In the 1990s, when individual word processors gradually gave way to net-
worked computers and the Internet became a popular medium for interaction, the 
diary seemed a doomed genre, incommensurable with the prime demands of ubiq-
uitous connection rooted in digital materiality. The evanescence of the Internet ap-
pears at odds with the genre preference for a fixed material output. Moreover, the 
private nature of diary writing intrinsically conflicts with the connectedness of the 
electronic superhighway. Between body and words on paper there is no longer just 
a piece of equipment but a global network of connected individuals and communi-
ties. Such technological machinery is likely to hinder, rather than benefit, the pri-
vacy and intimacy of self-reflexive writing. And yet, perhaps surprisingly, the web-
log is one of the most popular genres booming on the Internet today.11 The weblog 
appears, at first sight, to be a digital descendant of the paper diary, except that 
there is no printed output, only a screen-based one; since computers do not smell, 
and the screen has no particular feel, how can we define what the digital matter of 
weblogs actually consists of?
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Analogous to the preformatted paper diary and the diarist’s handwriting, we can 
locate the materiality of weblogs in two different areas: weblog software and the 
signature of its users. Weblogs or webdiaries emerged in 1996, but only in the past 
four years has their popularity soared. Initially, blogs were typically personal web-
sites operated by individuals who compiled chronological lists of links, inter-
spersed with information and editorialized and personal asides.12 They later be-
came experiments in self-expression, creating blog-communities where people 
read each other’s weblogs and cross-linked their personal websites. The first web-
logs were operated mostly by digirati, but as specially developed software made 
blogging technically easy, more people without any specific technological skills 
joined the various kinds of ‘blogging groups’.13 Since 2000, a large number of soft-
ware packages have flooded the market, enabling even the clumsiest person to be-
come a sophisticated blogger. Today, users can choose from a variety of different 
packages, aside from open diaries on the web, such as Opendiary.com and My-
DearDiary.com, there are also weblog services for which you need to sign up or 
even be introduced by a member, like LiveJournal, Blurty, Xanga, DeadJournal, 
Blogger, and DiaryLand. The formats may differ in layout and digital possibilities, 
but they all basically serve the same purpose.14 To some extent, these different de-
signs resemble the preformatted paper diaries for sale at stationary stores. Various 
software formats attract different crowds, catering to heterogeneous tastes and 
lifestyles among teenagers, much like the brand names of fashion products. Web-
logs are also dynamic material artifacts; they are not meant to be printed out and 
their contents are constantly evolving. Actually, a blogger may decide to leave its 
content exactly as it was first posted (and post additional comments) but of course 
the possibilities for editing, erasing, storing, cutting, and pasting are endless. 
Software, however, merely constitutes the technological condition for its var-
ied individualized use. Digital weblogs may, in terms of their materiality, not even 
remotely resemble their paper precursor, but there is a distinct continuity in their 
personal signature. If handwriting betrayed a diary writer’s character and level of 
maturity, the typewriter and later the word processor had already erased that 
trademark of personality, and yet, through word choice, style, punctuation, and 
the use of emoticons it is remarkable how much the entries give away a person’s 
character. On top of that, the personality of a diarist is even more traceable by 
means of her prolific choices of cultural contents; the blogosphere is part of a vast 
reservoir of texts, visuals and sounds, and most software packages support their 
inclusion via links or sidebars (e.g., to newspapers, fan sites, discussion groups, 
political lists, etc.).15 Weblogs seem particularly suited to accommodate the needs 
of teenagers, whose growth into adulthood is often characterized by quickly evolv-
ing loyalties to styles, fashions, and brands. Despite prescriptive software formats, 
weblogs offer a relatively high degree of creative freedom; users can discover their 
own taste by cutting, pasting, and commenting, thus exploring the relationship be-
tween the self and culture at large. Some weblog software (like OpenDiary.com) 
allows users to search entries by age group, gender, theme of the week, subject or 
cultural preferences.
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Although the multimedia weblog looks very different from the preformatted lock-
and-key paper diary, each materiality gives away clues to an author’s personality. 
Just as paper diaries reflected someone’s age, taste, and preference at a particular 
moment in one’s life, the software and signature of blogs seem to accommodate the 
needs of contemporary teens and young adults to express and sort out their identity 
in an increasingly wired, mediated world. But technology does not tell the whole 
story. In conjunction with changing technologies and materialities, we need to pay 
closer attention to the cultural forms and practices of diary writing, to see how they 
change along with evolving notions of intimacy, privacy and memory. 
Another paradox surfacing in the cartoon discussed at the beginning of this article, 
is the idea that diaries are a strictly private genre, whereas weblogs are private yet 
open to all who want to read. Both assumptions are incorrect. Over the past centu-
ries, the diary as a cultural form has been defined in a number of ways: the diary as 
therapy or self-help, as a means of confession, as a chronicle of adventurous jour-
neys (both spiritual and physical), or as a scrapbook for creative endeavors.16 Bea-
trice Didier, a French literary theorist, articulates a more general distinction, based 
on the content of the entries, between the personal or private ‘diary’ (‘le journal in-
time’) and the more public or factual ‘journal’ (Didier 1976). Another French liter-
ary scholar, Eric Marty, classifies diaries by their addressees: are they strictly secret 
or written for others as well? (Marty 1985). In general, the taxonomy of the old-
fashioned paper diary tends to be based either on its contents (personal, intimate 
self-expressions vis-à-vis daily records of fact) or on its directionality (intended for 
private reading vis-à-vis public use). But how useful is this genre classification along 
the axes of self and others, of intimacy and openness? And how does this distinc-
tion hold up in the face of new digital cultural forms and publishing practises?
The myth that the diary is a private genre, strictly written for oneself, is as mis-
leading as it is persistent. A binary distinction between the diary as a personal 
record written for private purposes in contrast to a journal of fact written to show 
others, is hardly tenable.17 As Thomas Mallon argues, no one ever kept a diary just 
for himself; pointing out the continuity between the ‘journal’ and the ‘diary’, he 
concludes that both are directed towards an audience and ‘both [are] rooted in the 
idea of dailiness, but perhaps because of the journal’s links to the newspaper trade 
and diary’s to ‘dear’, the latter seems more intimate than the former’ (Mallon 1984, 
p. xvi). Of all the varieties within the genre, some diaries are written with a reader 
in mind more than others, but an essential feature of all diaries is their addressee. 
Whereas some authors directed their diaries to an imagined friend (like Anne 
Frank’s ‘Kitty’, or André Gide’s mysterious addressee), to God, or to the world-at-
large, the notion of addressing is crucial to the recognition of diary writing as an act 
of communication.18 Writing, even as a form of self-expression, signals the need to 
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connect, either to someone or something else, or to oneself later in life. William 
M. Decker, who theorized the evolution of epistolary writing in the United States, 
observes that letters, much like diaries, carry the aura of a private genre, whereas 
the genre encodes itself according to public standards: ‘What we identify as the 
private life is a conventionalized and hence public construction’ (Decker 1998, 
6). Diary writing is, to a large extent, a cultural form firmly rooted in rhetorical 
conventions: intimacy and privacy are effects rather than intrinsic features of the 
genre. 
Another paradox we can trace in the genealogy of diaries is the belief that 
their creation is usually associated with individual voice and authorship, whereas 
in reality the genre has often been deployed as a communal means of expressing 
and remembering. To many religious congregations, for instance, the diary was a 
semi-public record, shared within but never outside of a community. Elizabeth 
Yakel describes in her intriguing account of the Maryknoll Sisters’ archive how, 
between 1912 and 1967, this religious community adapted the genre as a collec-
tive means of expression to record and exchange spiritual and intellectual jour-
neys to each other (Yakel 2003, 142-150). Their record-keeping practices suited 
various goals, from expressing individual beliefs to communicating information 
across time and space with like-minded congregations: ‘The diaries had multiple 
audiences – they were a means of internal communication within the community 
and also served as a mechanism for external communication to Catholics and 
others interested in their mission activities’ (Yakel 2003, 143). In the history of 
diary writing, the genre as a communal means of expression has found many 
practitioners, from South Pole explorers keeping logbooks to pows writing their 
war diaries while held in captivity. As Michael Piggott, archivist at the University 
of Melbourne discovered, Australian archives contain many such collective ego 
documents, chronicling important episodes from the 16th to the 19th centuries 
through the eyes of transient groups (Piggott 2003, 68-75). For many groups 
bound together by an adventurous ordeal, a joint diary was a means to trust one’s 
personal emotions to a relatively safe medium and share the experience with 
mates held captive under the same conditions. Diaries have thus historically been 
produced by both individuals and groups, regardless of their degree of intimacy 
or their potential to appear in print. Since its very inception, the genre has been 
dialogic rather than monologic, hence obliterating the line between private and 
public. 
Upon entering the digital era, the diary as a cultural (or literary) form appears 
to have survived in its many varieties and its layered complexity. Searching on the 
Internet today, one can find a plethora of digital forms, everything from travel 
blogs chronicling the climbing of Mount Everest to personal blogs commenting 
on books or music; from the spiritual journey of a born-again Christian to the in-
timate exchange of sexual experiences between teenagers, and from outbursts of 
psychological distress to the quotidian musings of a psychiatrist. If you search 
Google under ‘blogs’ you will find travel blogs, sex blogs, personal blogs, politi-
cal blogs, religious blogs and what have you. The SlowTravelersBlog (www.
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slowtrav.com), including webcam pictures and essays mostly by hikers, could not 
be more different from the musings on Bitter-Girl.com. It is impossible to charac-
terize some blogs as personal and others as public, and yet we typically character-
ize all of them as blogs. Obviously, privacy or publicness is not a standard feature 
of weblogs and it would be misleading to subdivide the genre accordingly. 
The digital successor of the diary is as polymorphous as its paper precursor, 
and yet, when researching the new functions and forms of diary writing in the dig-
ital era, the old typology of the diary in terms of content and directionality still of-
ten informs the epistemology of the weblog. For instance, a 1998 Japanese study 
into the formal structures and uses of diaries on the Internet, departs from the no-
tion that they can be classified according to their contents as ‘records of fact’ or 
‘expression of sentiment’, or according to their directionality as ‘written for one-
self’ or ‘written for others’ (Kawaura, Kawakami, and Yamashita 1998, 234-45).19 
This classification along binary axes results in a new typology of diaries on the 
World Wide Web as ‘memoirs’, ‘journals’, ‘narrowly defined diaries’ and ‘open di-
aries.’ The researchers’ attenuated conclusion that writing a web diary is primarily 
communicative behavior, however, also applies to paper diaries. Digital cultural 
forms are often erroneously ascribed ‘unique’ features such as interactivity or com-
municability. As I argued above, though, paper diaries have always shown a pecu-
liar mixture of intimacy and publicity, of individual and communal effort, of self-
expression and communication. If we look at weblogs, we can observe a similar 
blend. In order to explain the paradoxes and discontinuities embodied by diaries 
and blogs, we need to shift our focus away from genre typologies and pay more at-
tention to how these forms are actually used. 
Many researchers, like the ones discussed above, assume that the digital diary is a 
seamless continuation of the paper diary, thus ignoring the emergence of a new me-
diating apparatus. The Internet, however, is not simply an amplification of the in-
dividual word processor, but is a new tool that also encompasses many features of 
the old. In our focus on technology, we often tend to underemphasize how social 
and cultural conditions change along with the apparatus. Both diary writing and 
blogging are interesting cultural practices – quotidian habits or daily rituals which 
gradually receive a place in a person’s life. Cultural practices, in the past century, 
have become increasingly mediated: watching television, talking on the phone, 
taking pictures or writing e-mails are only a few of many potential communicative 
acts by means of which a person articulates herself. With the introduction of the 
Internet, some of these daily rituals are gradually changing, often fusing old prac-
tices with new conventions. For instance, e-mails can be regarded as ‘remedia-
tions’ of hand-written letters, but, more profoundly, the emergence of e-mail also 
substantially transformed one’s daily ritual of communication and interaction, 
along with one’s sense of physical or psychological presence – just as the telephone 
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changed communicative patterns along with notions of proximity and presence a 
hundred years earlier. It is important to note that these changes always involve 
both technology and practice, the mutual shaping of which is firmly embedded in 
culture. 
Writing a diary, of course, never happened in a social vacuum; the ritual occu-
pied its own niche alongside other acts of communication, such as talking, listen-
ing, reading, etc. As a quotidian habit, diary keeping gives meaning and structure 
to someone’s life. In the case of Anne Frank, writing a journal created a zone of si-
lence and refuge in a small space, densely crowded and heavily trafficked by hu-
man interaction. Her daily ritual was an act of self-protection as much as self-ex-
pression. By carving out a discursive space, she was able to articulate her private 
thoughts and define her position in relation to others and the world at large. Diary 
writers fashion a habit by choosing a medium; the creation of that mediated habit 
is always inspired by cultural conventions and prevailing fashions.20 Quotidian 
acts such as diary writing should thus not only be regarded as stilled reflections of 
life, but as ways of constructing life. They always coexist amidst a number of other 
communicative habits and culturally determined practices.
For the contemporary blogger, the Internet is just one of a host of media 
through which to express agency, and blogging is one of many competing practic-
es, such as speaking (both face-to-face and phone conversations), writing (letters, 
sms, e-mail), watching (television, film, photographs) and listening (music, talk). 
The practices that fill the mediated lives of today’s youngsters are deployed con-
currently and complementarily; the weblog offers a few amenities that other media 
lack, such as the ability to combine extensive written comments with pictures, 
tunes, links and clips, as well as the possibility to post something online to a large 
anonymous readership; blogging is potentially a multimedia practice – a combina-
tion of old-fashioned diary writing, letter writing, the exchange of cultural objects, 
publication, and even conversation.21 New hybrid rituals always emerge in dia-
logue (and in competition) with already existing practices. Viewed from that an-
gle, it should come as no surprise to find that, while about half of all personal blogs 
do, indeed, fully exploit the multimedia potential of the Internet, the other half 
contains no links at all.22 As the practice evolves, these numbers are likely to 
change, but at this moment of transformation we can observe how conventional 
habits of diary writing coexists with a truly multimedia version of blogging. 
The networked computer is instrumental in the way a blogger simultaneously 
fashions his/her identity and creates a sense of community. Blogging both comple-
ments and interferes with everyday ‘live’ communication: weblog entries are part 
of a person’s ecosystem of various community circles through which they move 
and shape their lives. Some of these circles overlap, some do not. The by and large 
reflexive nature of the weblog has its place within the contact zones of everyday life 
that each individual constructs, and which are usually a mixture of real-life and 
virtual experiences. Through their LiveJournals or Xangas, teenagers do not only 
express themselves, but create a communal sense of values and thoughts deemed 
worthy of being shared. In a weblog, one may blurt out confessions of loneliness 
and insecurity – behavior inhibited in face-to-face encounters – despite the fact 
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that everyone in a peer group can potentially read these outbursts. Bloggers usu-
ally do not talk about what they say online, even though in real life they may speak 
to each other on a daily basis.23 Online posts can be read and responded to by im-
mediate friends and relatives, while they may also invoke reciprocity from com-
plete strangers, adding another dimension to the small world of immediate peers. 
The distribution features of blogging software are a subtler version of the lock-
and-key-diary; with each posting users can decide to whom they make content 
available – options ranging from ‘just myself’ to ‘friends only’ to ‘anyone’. Defin-
ing one’s readership is bound to define one’s sense of inclusion in and exclusion 
from a community, whatever shape that community may take – actual or virtual, 
intellectually formative or emotionally supportive. In contrast to the paper diary, 
the weblog is part of a mediated continuum, a lived world in which the individual 
is always connected.24 Although reciprocity is the default mode of blogging, still 
half the number of internet diaries turn out to be non-reciprocal (Herring). Appar-
ently, old habits of diary writing coexist with new connected practices, while they 
become gradually incorporated by a medium that shifts the technological condi-
tion from isolation to connection. 
The inclusion and exclusion of (potential) readers from one’s weblog consti-
tutes an intricate game, the stakes of which are identity formation and community 
construction. Identity, as Australian media theorist Esther Milne claims, is always, 
in varying degrees, a performance: ‘It is the result of complex cultural, technologi-
cal, economic and institutional forces rather than being a natural, somatic or psy-
chological process that is fundamentally independent of historical influences’ 
(Milne 2004, 8). Current ‘complex forces’ are geared towards swift and easy dis-
tribution of ideas. In the past, the ability to expose oneself to a wider audience of 
unknown readers was something for which a paper diarist was previously depend-
ent on a publisher who would print and distribute the diary, usually resulting in a 
considerable time lag between the moment of writing and of publication. A blog-
ger can make her own decision concerning publication and distribution at the very 
moment of writing. Sharing intimate narratives with an anonymous readership is 
no longer a future possibility but an actual choice for webloggers; the effect of this 
technological option is immediacy – instant distribution, without intervention by 
a publishing institution. From a survey performed by the mit Media Lab Sociable 
Media Group, we learn that 76% of bloggers do not limit their readership in any 
way, and they have no idea who their readers are, apart from a core audience (Vi-
egas, ‘Blog Survey’). 
Weblogs or digital diaries are perhaps primarily about synchronizing one’s ex-
perience with others, about testing one’s evaluations against the outside world. 
Blogging, aside from being an act of self-disclosure, is also a ritual of exchange: 
bloggers expect to be signaled and perhaps to be responded to. If not, why would 
they publish their musings on the Internet instead of letting them sit in their per-
sonal files? It may be instructive to compare blogs and blogging to the use of the 
mobile phone. In their study of teenager’s use of mobiles, Alex Taylor and Richard 
Harper note how phone-mediated activities resemble established social practices 
such as gift-giving – the ritual of gift exchange is now extended to symbolic mes-
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sages (sms or spoken), and, like the material equivalent, rooted in a mental scheme 
of obligation and reciprocation (Taylor and Harper 2003, 267-296). Through a 
subtle system of shared norms for exchanging phones, rationing access to personal 
messages, and obligations to respond, users assign symbolic value to tangible or 
virtual objects. A similar process can be identified in blogging. Opening up one’s 
secret diary to a selection of friends and relatives, and expecting them to do the 
same, is an old practice refurbished by webloggers. Attaching cultural items is 
quite similar to swapping music albums, books, or personal accessories – a system 
of sharing symbolic meanings with friends that is firmly rooted in the material cul-
ture of gift exchange. But the potential to open up this process to an anonymous 
and potentially large readership is new; bloggers are constantly connected to the 
world-at-large, and are aware of their exposure to it. Synchronization, however, 
does not prohibit self-reflection, just as privacy does not preclude openness. Old 
and new functions of diary writing thus peculiarly merge into a hybrid networked 
practice of blogging. 
At first sight, a prime function of diary writing seems to be virtually absent in 
the practice of blogging: paper diaries were meant to fix experience in time, to 
freeze one’s thoughts and ideas into words (and perhaps illustrated materials) to 
serve as a reminder of former experience later on in life. In contrast, blogging 
seems to be more about revising one’s experience over time, allowing one to adjust 
one’s former observations and reflections as time goes by and as personality 
evolves. This difference in function is all too easily ascribed to a material fixity of 
paper diaries as opposed to the evanescent quality of software or screen content. 
Yet if we focus on cultural practices in conjunction with technology or form, we 
may find this opposition to be quite ungrounded. For one thing, paper diaries were 
never ‘finished’ paper products; they were often exercises of writing prone to later 
revision, because of a changing insight, retroactive embarrassment, or due to a 
changing ambition or purpose in writing the journal. Anne Frank, for instance, 
started to write a revised version of her diary in March of 1944, several months be-
fore she was deported to a concentration camp.25 The two ‘versions’ of Anne 
Frank’s diary signify how time changes a person’s experience as well as her memo-
ry of that experience. Revising one’s diary entries is inherent in personal growth, 
particularly at a younger age. 
Weblogs obviously meet the revisionist need of a diary writer, as entries can be 
endlessly edited and deleted. Yet, from the contemporary weblogger’s perspective, 
that does not obliterate the urge to fix experience. Blogging is often considered a 
transitory cultural practice, comparable to talking on the phone or sending short 
text messages. But even in the case of telephone conversations or short messages, 
the desire for storage and retrieval is evident. One of the teenagers included in Tay-
lor and Harper’s research admits that she would like to store each sms exchange 
on a memory card because she wants to recall her experience later: the message’s 
physical properties (form, content, time, and date stamp) all work in combination 
to instill meaning in the physical (Taylor and Harper 2003). We can see a similar 
reconciliation of seemingly opposite functions in the use of digital diaries. For one 
thing, the very fact that bloggers use writing as a basic form of expression indicates 
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a desire to secure these symbolic exchanges in some retrievable form. And even if 
weblogs look more like a written conversation or stream of consciousness, almost 
every software program contains an ‘archive’ holding selected entries and com-
ments, going back to the very beginning of a person’s weblog. Bloggers tend to val-
ue their archives, as their entries gradually turn into interesting memory objects of 
past experiences. In other words, the assumption that digital materiality inherently 
favors transience over permanence is hardly tenable in the face of the overwhelm-
ing popularity of weblog archives. Synchronizing experience and fixing experience 
in time are not at all contradictory functions, but they have perfectly merged in to-
day’s weblogs. 
Looking at weblogs and the cultural forms and practices they engender, we can de-
duce an interesting reinvention of age-old rituals, newly attuned to the modalities 
of digitization. Like the writing of paper diaries, blogging is a process that helps 
express and order thoughts through rituals, thus defining a sense of self in relation 
to others. Diaries and weblogs are both acts and artifacts, in which materiality and 
technology are interdependent on their changing cultural form, their use and us-
ers. Rather than pinpoint differences and continuities, I have tried to signal how 
functions and features of the analogue and digital genre coexist and co-evolve. 
Some seemingly conflicting genre features that have always existed are now recon-
ciled in the face of evolving hybrid practices, while other paradoxes persist. Even 
though pen and paper were gradually replaced by (networked) computers, multi-
media materiality still reflects the personality and individuality that was formerly 
signified by handwriting and paper objects. The classification dilemma of distin-
guishing diaries as strictly private (written for oneself and by one person) or public 
(written to be read by others) does not disappear with the advent of weblogs, on 
the contrary, the ambiguity is amplified by the potential of instant publishing. And 
finally, the cultural practice of blogging easily blends the need to synchronize expe-
rience with the desire to fix and revise experience in time. However, analyzing the 
evolution of a single case of technology-form-practice has never been a goal in it-
self; rather, I would like to explain how this particular case signifies a larger tech-
no-cultural transformation that is much more profound than its traces left on the 
World Wide Web. In tracking how a new hybrid practice of blogging evolves, it is 
crucial to acknowledge how it sustains old and constructs new epistemologies and 
how it indicates a transformation of important cultural notions, specifically the 
paired-off notions individual and collective, privacy and publicness, and memory 
and experience. 
Individuality and collectivity are redefined in the face of a culture that values 
sharing. Weblog architecture favors a connected exploration of the personal; what 
the Internet does best is to create a forum for collective discourses. Although recip-
rocation is certainly not a condition for participating in the blogosphere, the de-
fault mode for diary writing has gradually moved from isolation to connection. Of 
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all the weblogs present on the Internet today, some still resemble conventional pa-
per diaries while others have morphed into completely new interactive formats, 
firmly rooted in Internet culture. Through weblogs, intimate reflections and reve-
lations about personal, intellectual, and artistic preferences are consciously shared 
with both known and anonymous audiences. Weblogs and blogging might be seen 
as part of a larger participatory turn in culture. In this culture of sharing, the web-
log finds its natural habitat so that the digital diary becomes instrumental as its 
multimedial modality equally allows for the creation of one’s personal entries as 
well as for the exchange of cultural contents (clippings, files, songs). Blogging soft-
ware and Internet hardware, in this argument, are neither neutral technical con-
duits nor simple commodities, but they are cultural artifacts facilitating a social 
process in which generalized exchange and participation are conditions for enact-
ing citizenship. 
However, there is another side to this techno-cultural transformation that of-
ten gets underemphasized. The culture of reciprocation is not solely based on link-
ing the self to the Net, but also on linking the Net to the self. Tracing cultural or 
political preferences of other bloggers, one can decide to connect to people with 
similar tastes and preferences; it is precisely this feature that makes weblogs inter-
esting for outsiders. With the use of fairly simple software applications like All-
Consuming.net, it becomes increasingly easy to find a correlation between blog-
gers and the cultural products they mention via links or sidebars: books, music, 
television programs, movies, etc.26 Tracking software allows a glimpse of the pat-
terns and trends that emerge out of the topics shared by a group. Coupled with 
vast databases like Amazon and Google, the possibilities for polling and market-
ing research are endless, explaining Google’s eagerness to buy start-up companies 
like Blogger.27 Whereas many diaries (like OpenDiary and DearDiary) started out 
as small communities of like-minded individuals, many of these services are now 
owned by corporations. The downside of the culture of reciprocity is instant mar-
ketability: personal taste and cultural choices become instantaneously traceable 
and marketable to commercial ventures. In a networked environment, where in-
formation is constantly cached, weblogs have become gold mines for data diggers. 
For bloggers, social norms concerning individuality and collectivity appear to be 
in flux; old notions of personality and belonging persist, while the new media real-
ity prompts a keener awareness of manipulative strategies enforcing individual 
taste and community building.
The same ambiguity applies to the blogger’s notions of privacy and openness. 
As I pointed out above, privacy has always been an effect rather than an intrinsic 
feature of a paper diary’s content, often achieved through one’s familiarity with 
conventions for publication and publicity. Our norms and laws of privacy protec-
tion are still based on a strict distinction between ego documents and public 
records; if boundaries were often crossed in the past, for bloggers they become in-
creasingly fuzzy. Emily Nussbaum notes in her journalistic-ethnographic report 
that bloggers have a ‘degraded or relaxed sense of privacy’, depending on your per-
spective: ‘Their experiences may be personal, but there is no shame in sharing…
[and they get back] a new kind of intimacy, a sense that they are known and lis-
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tened to’ (Nussbaum 2004). There is not only no shame in sharing: bloggers take 
pride and find purpose in sharing. Privacy is an effect determined by a click of the 
mouse. Instant publication, however, changes the rules of the game. As the mit 
Media Lab survey shows, bloggers are hardly concerned with the persistent nature 
of what they publish; the overwhelming majority publishes private information 
about themselves or other people without thinking about legal or moral conse-
quences. Not surprisingly, more than one third of all bloggers have gotten into 
trouble because of things they have written in their blogs and the majority has little 
notion of defamation or liability when writing about others in networked environ-
ments.28 Their notions of privacy and publicness appear full of contradictions: 
comments are personal yet readable by everyone, intimate yet public. Old and new 
notions of privacy are contested in the blogosphere; courts and lawyers are cur-
rently wrestling with emerging questions like whether entries posted with restrict-
ed access can be ‘stolen’ when they are posted on an open website? Are public of-
ficials or state employees free to speak their minds in the ‘private’ sphere of restrict-
ed blog communities? It will take a number of years before this hybrid practice will 
have stabilized and become grounded in social and legal norms. 
Weblogs do not only signal altering notions of individuality and privacy, but 
also of personal memory in relation to lived experience. The paper diary reflected 
the idea that the memory object is a petrified, unchangeable relic, stored in its au-
thentic form and retrieved to invoke a past experience. When a diary’s contents 
were still published by means of an intermediate process of editing, printing and 
distribution, we were mostly concerned with how the ‘original’ words – assumedly 
the recordings of experiences – matched the words published in print. The fusion 
of old and new technologies results in a hybrid tool that seamlessly combines com-
municative and archival functions; blogging allows for exchanging, storing, and 
revising entries all at the same time.29 Blogging itself becomes a (real life) experi-
ence, a construction of self that is always mediated by tools for communication 
and expression; in other words, the medium is the experience, not the message. If 
the meaning of experience is slowly changing, so is the meaning of memory. As 
time proceeds, memories of experiences inevitably evolve, revising one’s past in-
scriptions is a natural part of a process of personal growth. Rather than being fixed 
in material paper objects, memory mutates by means of digital materiality. Al-
though the Internet is often characterized as a transient, evanescent medium, web-
logs have both the ability to fix and the potential to morph; blogging constitutes a 
new concept of memory, allowing for preservation and erasure simultaneously. 
Bloggers are retooling the practice of diary writing, meanwhile creating a new 
type of cultural knowledge and social interaction via their tools. The reciprocity 
inherent in networked systems points at a profound reorganization in social con-
sciousness. Media change may be traced through its technology-materiality, as 
Kitzman proposes, or through its specific cultural forms, as Bolter and Grusin sug-
gest, but as I have tried to show here, it is important to examine technological and 
cultural changes in constant connection with socio-cultural practices, in order to 
come to understand larger socio-cultural transformations. In the case of weblogs, 
I have argued how old and new technologies, forms and practices co-exist and yet 
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co-evolve into hybrid practices. These hybrid practices both reflect and construct 
new social norms and cultural concepts, such as individual and community, priva-
cy and publicness, experience and memory. In a period of transition, these con-
cepts fluctuate and will continue to fluctuate, but unraveling complex transforma-
tion may help us sort out newly emerging cultural values. If we look back at the 
cartoon, cited at the beginning of this article, we now comprehend that the woman 
who starts typing her weblog just after denying her partner’s question whether she 
keeps a diary, is not necessarily lying. In fact, the three frames of this cartoon per-
fectly reflect the ambiguous reality in which millions of bloggers find themselves 
today. 
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            on the 
Document: 
                     T Archive
I have been working for many years on the development of an artistic practice that 
has involved the acquisition, administration and display of historical archival 
source materials. The ‘T Project’ is one of a series of ongoing works that looks at 
the archival traces of the individual as represented in written storage. 
Whereas parallel projects, such as my Who’s Who in Central & East Europe 
1933 (Dreyblatt, 1991, 1995) are based on biographical data from thousands of 
people as a representation of the collective, the ‘T Project’ concerns one individual, 
a marginal and mostly forgotten Central European historical figure whose multi-
ple identities span three continents (Europe, North America, and Asia) and ob-
liquely touch on many of the most important events of the pre-war period. More 
importantly, during the last 28 years of his adult life, Mr. T was followed and ob-
served nearly every day by the intelligence services of various world powers. 
This enormous effort in collecting documents resulted in the accumulation of 
thousands of daily reports and various forms of correspondence between 1915 
and 1943, forming a vast communication network in which the observation of the 
activities of one individual becomes a kind of international discussion held over 
three decades between intelligence agencies, which is, in turn, cross-referenced in 
my artistic projects with historical events, international personalities, and geo-
graphic locations.
In this essay, we will examine the roles of handwriting in this archive of docu-
ments about T, and interrogate the ways in which handwriting relates to other ma-
terial dimensions of the documents. We will write in two ‘voices’: I, Arnold Drey-
blatt, speak in the first person about my work, while Jeffrey Wallen comments on 
it in the indented paragraphs.
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One may look at a series of representations of this biography, which in turn trace 
the development of this project. Here is a selected list of chronological events, as 
they would appear in a short biography of a Mr. T:
- born April 4, 1879, Paks, Hungary
- student at Budapest Drama Academy
- conversion to Christianity
- adopts ‘name’ Lincoln
- Protestant missionary in Montreal
- social research in Belgium and France
- election as member of Parliament in England
- oil speculation in Romania and Galicia 
- fraudulent business deals
- under arrest in Bucharest
- arrested in Brooklyn as German spy
- escapes from prison
- rearrested
- deported to England
- imprisoned in England as German spy
- suffers nervous breakdown
- involvement with German rightists 
- involvement with Kapp Putsch in Berlin
- encounters Adolf Hitler
- involvement with the White International
- arrested and tried in Vienna
- arrives in Shanghai
- involvement with rebel Chinese warlords
- obsession with Tibet
- abandons sons in China
- ruined in Monte Carlo
- mystical delusions in Ceylon
- second son sentenced to death for murder
- adopts name ‘Chao Kung’
- Buddhist missionary in Europe
- heads Buddhist monastery
- letters to Adolf Hitler
- visits Canada
- deported from Liverpool
- establishes ‘League of Truth’
- seeks return to Hungary
- calls for world peace
- espionage in Japanese-occupied China
- contacts with Nazis
- dies October 6, 1943, in Shanghai
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While the form is familiar, the seemingly linear format betrays an unstable pattern, 
jumping geographically and professionally in a refusal to be ‘pinned-down’ to one 
historical identity. In fact, Mr. T was not only observed continuously by the intel-
ligence services, he, in turn, furnished a stream of misinformation, countless false 
identities or aliases such as: Abbot Chao-Kung, Theodor Lakatos, Heinrich Lam-
precht, Thomas Langford, Dr. Tibor Lehotsky, Jack Fisher, I.T.T. Lincoln, Thomas 
Langford, Thomas Lorinz, Vilmos Ludwig, Wilhelm Ludwig, H. Ruh, Henry 
Fischer, Thomas Tandler, Theodore Trautwein, Dr. Johann Lange, Patrick Keelan, 
Joseph Schlesinger.
For this work, I created a duplicate or mirror archive, which entailed the acquisi-
tion of copies of over 4,000 intelligence documents from State Archives in Europe 
and North America.1 It was through this long process of data acquisition, and then 
the administration of these data materials, that the focus of the project moved 
away from and beyond the familiar chronology or biography of T. I became fasci-
nated with issues of fragmentation and loss and with the dynamics of the storage 
and migration of data through governmental agencies and archival institutions. 
Within the transformations of the artistic project, these ‘originally sanctioned ar-
chival copies’ were re-scanned, digitized, altered, displayed as paper and project-
ed, re-archived and re-lent.
The ‘T Project’ follows the physical movement of paper as an ‘original’ passes 
from hand to hand, being sent and received internally within an agency and exter-
nally from agency to agency, often around the globe, by post and by telegraphic ca-
bles. Carbon copies are made and forwarded, and in the process are annotated, 
signed, stamped and initialed, leaving a ‘paper trace’ or evidence revealing a net-
work or ‘biography’ of the document itself. Eventually the document becomes in-
active, is filed away, migrating in medium from microfilm to photocopy and finally 
to digital bits and bytes.
Recently, a major news story in the us revealed that the laboratory 
director of the Secret Service had lied under oath in his testimony 
during the Martha Stewart trial (Glater, 2004). Stewart was per-
haps one of the most powerful and richest businesswoman in the 
us, and she was on trial for having lied about her reasons for selling 
her shares in another company after having received inside infor-
mation that that company’s share price was about to collapse. A 
Mr. Stewart, the Secret Service agent (and no relation to Ms. Stew-
art), had testified about the results of his analysis of a handwritten 
Sign Here! / Hands on the Document
137
annotation to a document in the files of Martha Stewart’s stockbro-
ker. Mr. Stewart testified that his analysis of the notation ‘@60’ 
showed that it was written in an ink different from ‘other marks on 
the documents’, and that it was therefore likely that this notation 
had been added separately, and at a later date, from other hand-
written entries on the page. The defense countered with their own 
ink expert, who testified that the analysis of the ink did not support 
any of these conclusions.
At stake in the testimony was whether the analysis of certain 
handwritten annotations to a document can reveal the intention of 
another party (the intentions of Martha Stewart, and her stockbro-
ker who made the annotations supposedly in response to her or-
ders). Did she, in fact, intend for these shares to be sold automati-
cally if the price ever fell to $60 a share? And can the point in time 
at which this communication of an intention took place be deter-
mined? The handwritten mark, from the perspective of both the 
prosecution and the defense, is privileged, as providing access to an 
understanding, an agreement, that stood only on the margins of, as 
an addendum to, the more formal set of transactions, which either 
confirmed an order communicated verbally over the telephone, or, 
more sinisterly, from the prosecution’s perspective, was intended to 
give the false appearance of the prior existence of such an agree-
ment. For the prosecution, this handwritten annotation was an ille-
gal, after-the-fact alteration – a falsification of the document.
Ironically, a couple of months after the trial, the Secret Service 
expert on the authenticity of documents (he had also served as an 
expert on ‘the authenticity of documents used in a Nazi war crimes 
case’ – such comments in newspaper articles are always meant to 
show us that the person has had direct contact with the most over-
powering event of the 20th century) was now being accused of lying 
about his personal role in the analysis of the ink, and about the 
point in time at which he gained knowledge of the fact that two of 
his subordinates were writing a book containing a chapter on ‘a 
certain type of ink analysis’. During the trial he claimed he had per-
formed the ink tests while analyzing the document, whereas now it 
was revealed that he had not performed any of the tests and had not 
even participated in the analysis at all (the work had been done en-
tirely by his subordinates); and that, at the time he appeared on the 
witness stand, he had no knowledge of the book his employees were 
writing. The authority of the handwriting and document expert is 
based on the presumption that he can scientifically demonstrate 
whether someone had been present at a certain point in time (wheth-
er the document reveals their presence) and that he can reveal to us 
facts about the temporal chain of events in the life of a document 
(whether it was produced before or after a certain time; certain 
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marks were simultaneous to or later interpolations on the earlier 
content). Now the expert was being prosecuted for these identical is-
sues: for lying about having a direct, ‘hands on’ relation to these 
documents, and for having a knowledge of the intentions of others 
at an earlier time than he actually had.
I think this incident, which was ‘newsworthy’ only because of 
the celebrity of Martha Stewart, serves as an allegory for much of 
our current relation to texts and to handwriting. In our era of word 
processing, telecommunications, and the Internet, handwriting is 
now likely to be something added later, a note on another text, rath-
er than the mark of the original, the trace of the earliest intention, 
the first stage in the life of a document. The handwritten is now 
largely the mark of a reader; it calls attention to the hands through 
which documents have passed. The ‘analysis’ of handwriting, rather 
than revealing to us an individual identity, an original intention, and 
a specific moment of presence (the moment of the coincidence be-
tween the writer’s thinking and the written expression of that 
thought), will instead tell us more about the many different ways in 
which the hand interacts with the written.
Yet we are also still driven by the desire to establish the priority 
of the human agent in relation to the transmission, circulation, re-
production, and migration across media of writing. The fear of the 
reversal of perspective, in which the human becomes merely the 
servant of the written, is an old one, and is the subject of powerful 
stories by Melville, Kafka, and many others.1 In the age of the video 
replay, the simulation, and the delayed ‘live’ transmission, we espe-
cially want to be able to come into contact with or at least determine 
the presence of the author, and to be able to fix exactly the point in 
time in which a written event takes place. The Stewart trials reveal 
yet again that the bureaucratic institutions charged with preserving 
the belief that we can read, can retrace, and can fix the precise mean-
ings of the marks left by our hands are themselves thoroughly haunt-
ed by the processes of circulation and remediation that undermine 
any claims to clear and direct knowledge about the presence, mo-
ment of action, and intention of an ‘individual identity’.
Arnold Dreyblatt’s work, and his T Projects in particular, help 
us reflect on and think through these dynamics. These projects re-
volve around the remediation and redisplay of a huge collection of 
documents, gathered from various archives, regarding the life of a 
marginal world-historical figure (this oxymoron, or tension between 
‘marginal’ and ‘world historical’, will play out in many ways). 
Through different media, they present to us or give us access to the 
archival traces of an individual biography, and help us to re-orient 
our perspective and to understand more clearly important aspects of 
our relation to documents, to handwriting, and to remediation. 
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Dreyblatt’s work is not simply an aid to critical understanding, or a 
challenge or resistance to the conventional ways of thinking. These 
projects do much more than mark the shift in perspective from the 
‘human’ to the ‘bureaucratic’, from a biographical life and from the 
generation of a document to the archive, to the transmission and 
circulation of texts, and to the life and afterlife of documents. Rath-
er, they immerse us in, and encourage us to explore, reflect, and play 
with, the layers and the traces of the passage of a person through 
the observation, transmission, and information storage systems of 
the major world powers.
We can move to a second level of representation, in which the chronological list of 
biographical events is transformed into an administrative, bureaucratic structure 
that reflects a categorization and systematization performed by the archival insti-
tutions upon the documents:
Record Group 59
11.41T73
Goldstein to Roundtree, 10-11 July, 1914
Record Group 58-137, Book 1, Page 105-70, 4 October 1946
Record Group 65
FBI OG 500\BS202600-1356 
State Department Decimal File
862.2.898
Court Extradition Hearing and Related Documents
Records of the Office of the Special Agent
The above represents a frozen moment in the archival process in which the chrono-
logical biographical or autobiographical form is fragmented and exploded into 
thousands of individual files, found under various classification systems and in di-
verse geographical locations. The identity and credit card databases, which reduce 
the contemporary individual to a number, find their origins in this administration 
of archival data.
At a primary level, the T-projects have as their basis the reproduc-
tion of several thousand pages of documents concerning ‘T’, and 
the remediation and redisplay of selections from these documents. 
This is done through newly created ‘original’ versions of these doc-
uments; or through the creation (as one part of a larger ‘Memory 
Arena’ project) of an actual working archive (staffed by archivists) 
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where one could search, request, and then read a version of some of 
these documents; or, later, through various computer interfaces. In 
order to make this less abstract, I will discuss a couple of docu-
ments in order to reveal some of the ways that Dreyblatt’s projects 
shift our processes of reading and the processing of this material 
(selecting and displaying one document in this manner, however, 
short-circuits the aesthetic mediation and the recontextualization 
that is integral to the project).
1. Document #1
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2. Document #100
What leaps out at once is the immensity of the document-producing 
structures – Deputy Secretary, Government of India, Foreign and 
Political Departments, Superintendent, Government of Bengal, 
and so forth – rather than the figure who is the apparent focal point. 
Dreyblatt has stamped out the name of the figure with ‘-T-’, adding 
another layer to this palimpsestic document, both defacing and 
drawing attention to the apparent connection thread of these pa-
pers (though here, the recently adopted alias ‘Jack Fischer’ remains 
unmarked). More powerful still are the ‘marginal’ handwritten no-
tations: ‘Communicated by India’ – who wrote that? Its literal 
Arnold Dreyblatt and Jeffrey Wallen
142
meaning (with the synecdoche here of the whole standing in for the 
part, ‘India’ standing for one officer and one office within the impe-
rial governing structure of India) seems clear, but what sort of per-
formative speech act is it to note on this document, ‘Communicated 
by India’? And what follows the content of the message is equally 
intriguing: a name and title; then ‘Attested’ with another name and 
title; and especially the ‘copy to’ with its wonderful fill-in-the-blank 
quality of another imperial province (not a person or office), here 
‘Bengal’.
The scope and craziness of this ‘mission’ is mind boggling, but there 
is also a euphoria (and a vertigo) that opens up on the surface of the 
document itself. The ‘content’ here occupies only a small rectangu-
lar box. The other compartments (‘registry number’, ‘from’, ‘re-
ceived in registry’, ‘minutes,’ ‘References’, ‘Last paper’, ‘ how dis-
posed of)’; the stamps acknowledging receipt and processing of the 
document; and the various hand-written annotations under ‘min-
utes’ and ‘how disposed of’ (marking the different offices to which 
the document has been sent, and/or the offices and people who have 
reviewed the document?) draw our attention and our imagination 
inexorably to all the circuits of transmission, review, and reproduc-
tion through which information is being passed, and to our own re-
lations to and implication in these circuits through this further ‘re-
mediation’.
I want to make a few fairly straightforward points about some 
of the shifts in perspective that Dreyblatt’s work call forth. A basic 
transcription of these documents, focusing on their ‘content’ and 
on simply following the target (‘-T-’), would filter out many of the 
layers and traces of circulation in order to sharpen the picture of the 
story of an individual, and his passages through ‘world history’. 
Dreyblatt’s ‘remediation’ gives us a different standpoint: the ‘life’ of 
the document. Rather than drawing us toward trying to ascertain 
or understand a precipitating event, the true happening, some ac-
tual moment in the ‘life’ of a person that generates these series of 
observations (what was T really trying to accomplish in November 
of 1934?), this redisplay of material displaces our attention from an 
origin to an afterlife, and from the individual to the archival, to the 
now public traces that continue to circulate. Any desire to recover 
an original moment of intention or of action or of observation or of 
inscription or of transmission (and the multiplication of possible 
starting points already testifies to a crisis of determination) gives 
way, when one becomes drawn in to the ‘T Project’, to other fasci-
nations. By reorganizing, cutting up, reconnecting, and/or redis-
playing the material, Dreyblatt helps make visible to us the rever-
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berations – the further movement, circulation, and connection – of 
each point of contact between an individual and state networks of 
power. 
A passage from Jacques Derrida’s ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ provides 
an interesting perspective on Dreyblatt’s use of the archive:
The ‘outside’ does not begin at the point where what we now call 
the psychic and the physical meet, but at the point where the mne--
me-, instead of being present to itself in its life as a movement of 
truth, is supplanted by the archive, evicted by a sign of re-memora-
tion or of com-memoration. The space of writing, space as writing, 
is opened up in the violent movement of this surrogation, in the dif-
ference between mne-me-�[living, knowing memory] and hypomne--
sis [re-memoration, recollection, consignation]. The outside is al-
ready within the work of memory. (p. 109)
Derrida argues that Plato’s hope for a ‘mne-me-�with no hypomne--
sis, no pharmakon’ is an impossible dream, and that the ‘living, 
knowing memory’ is always already being ‘supplanted by the ar-
chive’. Dreyblatt’s work shifts our perspective, so that the catego-
ries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘living’ and ‘recollected’ (and one 
might add ‘handwritten’ and ‘machine printed’), lose their ground 
in the ‘simple alternative presence/absence’. The archive itself is for 
us no longer ‘hypo-,’ no longer ‘beneath’, ‘under’, ‘in a lower rela-
tion’.
I will discuss three differing instances involving this mirror T archive in my artistic 
practice over the last twelve years. 
The installation T-Docs (1993) playfully contrasts the nature and authority of 
the ‘original’ as found in the archival institution with the display of the original in 
art. In T-Docs, 110 original archive documents (officially sanctioned institutional 
copies) have been digitized and faked by specially developed printing techniques 
utilizing diluted inks and applied to the reverse side of postwar East German archi-
val material, which poses questions about the identity of both the subject’s person-
ality and the authenticity of the documents themselves. The documents are pre-
sented in chronological order as both archival and ‘art’ originals (which are ironi-
cally not signed by the artist). All occurrences of ‘Mr. T’s’ name are digitally re-
moved and hand-stamped with a large red ‘T’. The reprinting process attempts to 
retain the ‘hand’, in this case, as the ‘typing hand’ along with subsequent hand-
written commentary and markings which later appeared, including this ‘real’ hand 
stamp.
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Exhibitions of this work often lead to viewer irritation because they raise the ques-
tion: were these illegally displayed ‘real’ documents actually stolen from an ar-
chive? Yet the biographical content is too improbable to be ‘real’ and therefore 
‘original’. Are the documents faked or is the content ‘original’ in terms of being 
‘thought up’ and thereby ‘faked’? The art world is immune to these problems, be-
ing unconcerned with ‘real’ but rather with the ‘original hand’ of the artist, and 
with the artist’s ‘originality’.
The Reading Projects 
In a second instance, the document is no longer isolated and displayed on a wall 
but is now found in its rightful home in a file folder in an archive box, within a fil-
ing system and inside a ‘real’ archive. Here the ‘original’ and its copies are stored, 
protected, categorized, according to archival practice.
Influenced by my experiences in document collection at various archives for 
the ‘T Project’, I began a series of projects in which I became interested in simulat-
ing the living environment in which data is stored with the intention of making this 
process transparent and interactive within an installation and performance con-
text. All of the documents contained in the archive could be searched for in a cata-
log (card or digital) and ordered and lent out to be read in a special reading room. 
Copies of the ‘T’ documents were among the archive holdings.
re: Card Catalog
The Archive contains the following types of Files:
1. Class ‘D’ Files: copies of all Files that are read in the Arena.
2. Class ‘QI, QII’ Files: Personal Biography Data Files of Visitors and Readers 
and from Memory Arena I and II.
3. Class ‘QIII’ Files: Personal Biography Data Files for Visitors and Readers 
from Memory Arena III; (entered into the Archive as they are filled in).
4. Additional Archive Material including: texts by Archivists (Class ‘A’ Files); 
copies of Original ‘T’ Files (Class ‘T’ Files), etc.
Sections 2 through to 4 of the archive are available for reading by visitors for a lim-
ited time at tables within the Reading Room Area. The archive personnel assist vis-
itors in the use of the card catalog and in the selection and ordering of files.
The viewer is now a participant in a temporary functioning archival system. 
One cannot browse the ‘stacks’, one must know what one is looking for before-
hand. One is only allowed to browse the catalog, where one must imagine ‘con-
tent’ from the bureaucratic classification of numbers, dates, and short titles (which 
may be designed to protect rather than to reveal!). One must wait for a functionary 
to locate and deliver the file. One has a period of time in which to hold the ‘origi-
nal’ in one’s hands before returning it to its home in the ‘archive’, and one must of 
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course sign out the document with one’s signature. The participant, filling out a re-
quest form for documents by hand, and then reading them, re-enacts the role of 
those in the various agencies who had earlier reviewed these same documents. The 
reader handles the documents, and leaves behind the traces of his or her own path-
way through the archive—the handwritten requests and signatures for documents. 
In addition, participants in the readings and in the archive were invited to fill out 
biographical questionnaires and to donate them to the archive’s administration, 
thereby taking part in a process of autobiographical, bureaucratic description.
3. T-Mail
In a third stage, T-Mail, in the migration of the T Documents through my various 
projects, the data is digitized and automated. One thousand documents were se-
lected from my larger mirror-archive, in which the identity of a sender and receiver 
is clearly visible. I consider the collection as a kind of pre-war e-mail, composed of 
a network of international communications. The content of the selected docu-
ments was transcribed into a growing database over several years. The database 
form allows multiple realizations by searching and hyperlinking details of con-
tent.
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In the automated display of ‘T-Mail’, new documents are chosen randomly from 
the database, a scan of the next document gradually slides into view as various the-
matic categories and cross-links are activated. Text writings are simultaneously 
emitted sonically as Morse code, in five different sine wave frequencies that change 
with each subsequent paragraph. The viewer becomes unnecessary here. Even 
without a public presence, the computer continually searches and updates infor-
mation in the database, hereby functioning as a form of ‘automatic writing’ in 
which history seems to ‘write itself’, without further human intervention. Much as 
the Internet saves and preserves our information traces without our knowledge, 
scanned handwriting and ascii text are equally displayed without concern for dif-
ferences in authenticity, source, or receiver.
The mark of the hand here leaves a public mark, not merely the out-
ward sign of personal, inner, or unique intention. We are presented 
with the intersections of a person with the bureaucratic, in some 
sense ‘public’ systems of recording information. What we also have 
here, in Dreyblatt’s work, is the gesture, and the performance, of 
making public. These documents were originally parts of non-pub-
lic, government files, but in the democratic state systems of govern-
ment (and in the us and the uk, in particular), the government 
record, often after a ‘suitable’ delay, becomes the public record, ac-
cessible, (potentially) to anyone. Some of the most important polit-
ical battles going on in the us today involve the current Bush admin-
istration’s attempts to radically redefine the nature of government, 
so that what is open to the public will only be what the president ex-
plicitly wants the ‘public’ to see. At one level, Dreyblatt’s ‘remedia-
tion’ makes these documents public: it retrieves them from the ar-
chive, from a closed, guarded, often locked room, for anyone to see. 
It also makes visible to us some of the recording and circulating 
processes that mark the lives of individuals. But more than this, it 
also exposes to us, and crosses for us, the threshold that separates 
the closed or ‘secret’ from the open or public. And it is this very act 
of crossing the threshold that is at the essence of any construction of 
a public.
Dreyblatt’s Memory Projects, which often have as their point of 
departure excerpts that he culled from the book Who’s Who in Cen-
tral and East Europe (1935), confront us with a juxtaposition of 
different moments in time; a juxtaposition of interpretive frame-
works, (as biography, history, and other theoretical groundings no 
longer function as they once did); and a juxtaposition of informa-
tion collection and display systems (the ‘remediation’ of the con-
tents of a book by means of a multitude of old and new modes of 
presentation). A haunting dimension of the project, of course, is 
our knowledge that so many of the lives whose fragments we read 
or hear were violently ended in the ensuing years. The various ‘T 
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Projects’ center more on making visible to us some of the enormous 
systems for observing and recording the traces of a life. While these 
projects focus on written texts, the various practices of artistic dis-
play, from the ‘forging’ of ‘original’ documents (using old paper 
and old typewriters to present documents that look as if they were 
taken from an archive) to the latest hypertext programs, also help 
focus our attention on the hands that type or write or write on or 
read these documents (reading the printed document is an activity 
of the hand as well as the eye). Dreyblatt’s project, like his musical 
works, calls attention to the overtones, to the often-unnoticed vi-
brations and movements that take place ‘above’ or around the 
dominant line of information flow. The hands on the document 
produce overtones, which Dreyblatt now helps us to hear and see. 
Artistic practice, in relation to bureaucratic information sys-
tems and in relation to new media, often attempts to interrupt a 
flow of information or to draw attention to the medium (or media) 
through which information is passing. The attempt is often to ob-
struct, at least minimally, some operation of power, and to make 
people more aware of all the shaping and controlling forces that de-
termine what we are presented with. The hope of ‘media literacy’, 
for example, is that if the ‘consumers’ of media are made more 
aware of the technical, economic, and political processes that deter-
mine what they see and hear, they will be less susceptible to its influ-
ences. Art is now often a symbolic substitute for the seeming ineffi-
cacy of most ‘political’ action. Dreyblatt’s projects, in contrast, op-
erate less by interrupting or calling attention to the medium (which 
does not take much artistic skill) than by opening up new possibili-
ties. The power and beauty of new and old media of display fasci-
nate us, but here they also provoke us to ask further questions, and 
to seek further responses. The works, that engage us in the flow of 
information and invite us to participate, are unsettling: we continu-
ally want to know something more, or to reflect further on some 
point of connection.
The document in the archive is often seen as a repository of the past, kept and pro-
tected for the future. The material seems to be frozen and secure, but the situation 
is ultimately quite unstable. We find it difficult to choose – as in the preservation of 
ruins and historical or monumental sites – which document state is actually au-
thentic. The document is migrating through media and technologies much as Mr. 
T is migrating geographically with his unstable identity.
Furthermore, the handwritten annotations and signatures marking the docu-
ments cannot lead us back to a hand or to a sign of human intention or to the inter-
Arnold Dreyblatt and Jeffrey Wallen
148
document relations that had previously existed. The imprint on paper caused by 
handheld bureaucratic rubber stamps does not bring us closer to the sender or re-
ceivers of these documents, nor do they help us to control their authenticity.
A reconstruction of the life of Mr. T was and is no longer possible, not for the 
intelligence agents who have to contend with T’s multiple identities and continu-
ous issuing of misinformation and downright lies or ‘noise’, not for the archivists 
who have to contend with these often conflicting and fragmentary documents, not 
for the historians who try to make narrative sense of it all, not for me as an artist, 
and not for the viewer/reader. 
The marks of the hand do not function like precious bits of original, 
authentic material. They will not allow the crime scene investigator 
to recover the evidence that will determine exactly who is responsi-
ble for the death. They will not someday allow us - like the scientists 
in Jurassic Park, who bring dinosaurs back to life after the discov-
ery, decoding, and regeneration of bits of their genetic material - to 
reconstruct either a unique life, or the social network that observed 
and noted a person’s activities. 
Handwriting no longer betokens the unity of the hand and the indi-
vidual life, or the intimate connection between the work of the hand 
and human identity. In the age of technical reproduction, in the ar-
chive, in the T Projects, the handwritten indicates Nachträglichkeit 
rather than original intention. We can no longer hope to reconnect 
all the varied movements of hands, documents, and identities into 
an image of a human life, or into a reflection of ourselves. 
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Notes
1. Documents were acquired from the fol-
lowing archives: The Public Record Office 
and The British Library, London; The Na-
tional Archives, Washington, DC; Bunde-
sarchiv Koblenz; Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn.
2. See Herman Melville’s ‘Bartleby the 
Scrivener’ and Franz Kafka’s ‘Ein Traum’ 
or ‘In der Strafkolonie’.
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Faithfully Submitted: 
The Logic of the          
                                in 
Marcel Proust’s 
A la recherche
Proust, known for having handwritten most of the 4,000 pages of his A la recher-
che du temps perdu, an essential work of modernist narrative prose, lying in bed 
on loose pieces of paper, had terrible handwriting. Small, densely written on any 
scrap of paper that he could lay his hands on, full of corrections, the augustly 
named ‘manuscripts’ make the task of putting these scraps in printed form a daunt-
ing one. The editors of the two successive Pléiade editions, one in three volumes in 
1954 and one in four volumes with ample editorial notes in 1987-89, have accom-
plished a seemingly impossible task, monumentalizing what once threatened to 
disappear for want of takers. 
It is not as if, oblivious of posterity, Proust was indifferent or oblivious to the 
adventure of the lines and curves produced by pen on paper miraculously becom-
ing ‘language’ and, in the best case scenario, literature. At a few key points, this 
handwritten novel ponders the status of handwriting: its aesthetics, its readability, 
its delayed arrival. Together, these three aspects of handwriting – the way it looks, 
its capacity to communicate, and the time it actually takes to be read – which 
Proust explores in his musings on the signature of a friend, lie at the heart of nar-
rative’s extraordinary ability to create visual images. This ability constitutes more 
than the contested area between poetry and painting. Under Proust’s hands, it be-
comes an emblem of what matters in the artistic endeavor beyond such rivalry. In 
this paper, I will briefly outline these stakes by attending to the signature that the 
Proustian narrator reads, misreads, and retrospectively incarnates. 
Proust’s work loosely centers around the relationship with two would-be lov-
ers, the love of his young years, Gilberte, daughter of Charles Swann and Odette, 
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and later, the somewhat vulgar beach girl, Albertine, who lived with him as a vir-
tual prisoner, until she ran away and died in a riding accident. In no other passage 
of Proust’s novel are the paradoxical implications of the literary image made clearer 
than in the repeated mise en abyme in which the signature of a childhood friend of 
the hero of La recherche, Gilberte, is described graphically. What is a written im-
age, how can it be read? This paper is dedicated to this question of method, which 
is developed by means of a ‘visual’ reading of handwriting in Proust. I will explore 
the relations between text and image in this author’s work through a key image of 
their complexity; yet, there will be no reduction of the gulf separating the properly 
visual domain from the domain of language. 
The first feature of the signature of the narrator’s childhood sweetheart Gilberte 
– herself the image of the taboo placed on the name in that she rejects and changes 
her own – is an aesthetic one. Gilberte writes both badly, in other words illegibly, 
and well, since she creates a beautiful form. Emblematic of the difficulty of seeing, 
which only grows with desire and closer inspection, the first description of this sig-
nature suggests an extreme illegibility due to an excess of pen strokes. The effect of 
this signature is characterized by a delayed action, an incomprehensible Nach-
träglichkeit where the joy that the narrator should have felt in receiving a note from 
his dear friend is not instantaneous. Much later, when the narrator is in Venice with 
his mother, the same signature leads him to think that Albertine, whom he knows to 
be dead, has been resuscitated. All of this would come close to being incoherent if it 
were not precisely for the question of what is involved in image-writing, that is, in 
a ‘flat’ writing. This is a writing that neither carves nor scratches, as in etching, nor 
obeys the modernist norms of aesthetics, readability, and temporal delay mentioned 
above. Instead, flat writing is something that Proust appears to envision as placed 
between writing proper and abstract visual expression, detached from the writer’s 
intention and inaccessible to its addressee.
Gilberte’s signature – or is it Albertine’s? – is the emblematic instance of flat 
writing. It is, indeed, its exemplary representation. The hero has just recently come 
back into contact with Gilberte, having brushed against her, watched her, and then 
been introduced to her without having recognized her as his childhood friend. 
When he receives the telegram in Venice, logically speaking he does not see the sig-
nature of his correspondent, as is the case with all telegrams. He first attributes the 
telegram to Albertine, his long-term obsessive love object and focus of jealousy 
who, at that point, is already dead. Again, Nachträglichkeit intervenes and it takes 
him some time to ‘recognize’ the telegram as coming from Gilberte. Nevertheless, 
and despite his earlier failure to recognize her face, he is able to describe Gilberte’s 
signature, which he saw once as a child, without seeing it, and in such minute detail 
that all concerns for plausibility are suspended (3.671/ IV 235).1 
With a keen sense of the primary property of writing, he acknowledges in this 
passage that the signature is the paradoxical sign that guarantees the authenticity 
and the originality of the subject by virtues of the latter’s absence. In this respect, it 
is the most characteristic index, seductive as this type of sign tends to be. The signa-
ture is one of those ‘traces’ of a human individual that sets in motion the desire to 
trace. This desire is the motor of narrative, but one that also informs the persistent 
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presence of narrative in sciences such as history, medicine, and psychoanalysis. 
Thus, a signature is in and of itself a mise en abyme of narrative. 
Carlo Ginzburg’s seminal article on clues remains key to our understanding of 
how the kind of thinking based on a narrativity that is informed by the index, and 
of which the authenticating value of handwriting is a significant instance, has been 
a long-standing presence in the world of the sciences and the humanities alike 
(1983). In this article, the historian analyzes the kind of reasoning that underlies 
the notion of the signature itself, and in its wake, the discourse of the ‘hand’ that 
continues to predominate in art historical connoisseurship. Quoting from the 
17th-century medical doctor and art collector Giulio Mancini, Ginzburg establish-
es a parallel between painting and writing:
And these parts of a painting are like strokes of the pen and flourishes in 
handwriting, which need the master’s sure and resolute touch. The same 
care should be taken to look for particularly bold or brilliant strokes, which 
the master throws off with an assurance that cannot be matched; for in-
stance in the folds and glints of drapes, which may have more to do with 
the master’s bold imagination than with the truth of how they actually 
hung. (Mancini, 1956-57, 134, quoted in Ginzburg, 1983, 96)
And Ginzburg develops this parallel between painting and writing into a persua-
sive theory of reasoning by way of the symptom or involuntary index. Thus, the 
detail is more decisive than the overall content. Mancini focused on ears, finger-
nails, and other anatomical details that could easily be overlooked when copying a 
painting because a certain automatism is in operation. Reading in detail becomes 
reading ‘flat writing’ when this automatism comes to stand between the reader and 
comprehension, and the written text becomes an (abstract) visual image, rather 
than a readable message.
Yet the signature, like all handwriting and painting, is also capable of being fal-
sified. This turns the index into an icon. This possibility is in the nature of the sign, 
and distinguishes signs from their referents. By first attributing the telegram erro-
neously to the dead Albertine, Proust foregrounds that inherent capacity to de-
ceive. By means of the graphic signature of Gilberte/Albertine, the imaginary 
graphics and the image of grammè, the importance of the visual for Proustian po-
etics is sketched out and ‘signs itself’. To sum this up briefly: handwriting possesses 
the virtue of flatness. 
To understand the significance of flatness, we must look at what is said about 
the effect of Gilberte’s name, which is invested with all the charges associated with 
naming. Gilberte’s signature transforms into a dis-figure of writing. By extension, 
the name itself, so heavily invested with memory in Proust’s universe, transforms 
from the label of the person into the latter’s breezing presence-absence in transi-
tory, fleeting, ungraspable alterity. In the following passage, this function of the 
name is quite clearly evoked:
Sign Here! / Faithfully Submitted
153
The name of Gilberte passed close by me, evoking all the more forcefully the 
girl whom it labelled in that it did not merely refer to her, as one speaks of 
someone in his absence, but was directly addressed to her; it passed thus 
close by me, in action so to speak, with a force that increased with the curve 
of its trajectory and the proximity of its target... (1.428/I 387)
In the first part, the description of the name resembles a pragmatic theory of the 
sign in general; when ‘in action’ the name becomes a projectile, a weapon, the rele-
vant characteristic of which is its curved flight. But a projectile presupposes a dis-
tance, ‘a depth’. The object projected comes from the inside out, propelled with 
force. If Gilberte’s name stemmed from the inside, this dimension of the name 
would place in peril the whole delicate enterprise in which the text is involved. But 
as signature – authenticated through the flourishes and excess of pen strokes that 
escape legibility – the name can serve the philosophy of flatness lying over the liter-
ary work.
The narrator of La recherche ‘explains’ the philosophical implications of this 
poetic in an often-quoted passage: ‘How often, when driving, do we not come upon 
a bright street beginning a few feet away from us, when what we have actually be-
fore our eyes is merely a patch of wall glaringly lit which has given us the mirage of 
depth!’ (2.435/II 712). If depth is a mirage, the visual image, with its two dimen-
sions, which make it in one sense ‘flat’, holds a truth of a quite different depth. It is 
worth exploring the consequences of such a paradoxical vision of A la recherche du 
temps perdu. Such a reading is based upon the hypothesis that the references to vis-
ual images, the frequency and the importance of which for this text have been 
pointed out many a time, suggest a significance of particularly rich, even fundamen-
tal value for the poetics of this work, without, of course, this being thereby the only 
possible meaning.
The motivation for this significance is not a simple aesthetic preference, nor 
does it suggest a simple exploration of a particularly rich domain of perception and 
sensation. The ‘flat’ image combines multiple stances, multiple needs of not only an 
affective order, but also a perceptual, epistemological and poetic order. All aspects 
of Proust’s poetics of flatness, such as the scopic pulsion, the obsessional voyeur-
ism, the recurrent interest in visual art, the numerous and frequent metaphors bor-
rowed from the domains of optics and photography, the practice of narrative ambi-
guity in the descriptions, the visual fantasies, the fascination with flatness and the 
absence of volume, all these well-known aspects of Proust’s work come together 
within a homogeneous framework.
The term flatness sums up and conceptualizes handwriting in Proust in its in-
sistent and ambiguous quality. On the one hand, it designates by inference the ab-
sence of volume and of a third dimension. Thus it emphasizes the disappointing and 
deceptive nature of fiction as well as of the humanistic illusion: ‘mirage of depth’. A 
literal and concrete flatness is the price paid for a visualization of the diegetic uni-
verse of the novel; but it is also the pay-off that buys almost total freedom for the 
imagination. On the other hand, far from being systematically associated with the 
exalted aesthetics of art, flatness also tends towards a sense of platitude or banality, 
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such as is found in Charles Bovary’s conversation which is ‘flat like a sidewalk’, 
and in the salons of Mme. Verdurin and the Duchesse de Guermantes where the 
conversation is also flat in the metaphorical sense of the term. 
This particular flatness is the other side of the poetics of the work, which would 
otherwise suffer irrevocably from ‘elevated language’. The principal point is, then, 
that the tension and the inharmonious resolution of the two meanings of the word 
‘flatness’ constitute a central impulse to Proust’s literary project. Handwriting, in 
its quintessential image of the signature, embodies this project. It is, in the terms of 
Jean-François Lyotard, an emblematic case of the production, in situ, of the con-
cept of the wordimage, or the figural: a force that ‘erodes the distinction between 
letter and line’ (Rodowick 2001, 1) 
But literature is a verbal art. The visual domain can only be present within it by 
means of different subterfuges. The principal means of visualization is, of course, 
metaphor, which causes something ‘to be seen’ in a way not revealed by the literal 
meaning, but only accessible through visualization. Furthermore, represented 
space is very often depicted by using visual images. The narrator describes what he 
sees or what he saw when he was younger, and this gives a particular importance 
to the subject of the gaze, which I refer to as the focalizer.2 But, in a doubling of this 
visualization, that which is described is often not a space or a vision but a visual 
representation: an image, a painting, an engraving or a photograph. On other oc-
casions, the visualization is not doubled, but, instead, is underlined or intensified. 
The thing seen is described as if it were seen through a magnifying glass or a tele-
scope, or as a projection from a magic lantern, or the framing of a shot seen through 
the lens of a camera. 
My particular concern is one specific aspect of this composition. It involves a 
visual image, artistic or banal, explicit or implicit, that becomes the mechanism 
around which the writing will form or deform itself, such that we can think of this 
writing as properly visual writing. Rather than endorsing the Lyotardian term of 
the figural, I wish to foreground the generating aspect of the novel more than the 
kind of signification or the type of sign itself. This generating aspect that stems 
from the visual, I call figuration. 
While I thus approach La recherche first and foremost as a visual novel, it is 
also a novel in which the subject is threatened with failure. The signature’s vagaries 
embody the connection between these two aspects. And it is through the bond be-
tween visuality and the failure of the subject to sustain itself that, I contend, 
Proust’s text lays out the relevance of the reflections on handwriting to which this 
volume is devoted. The variability, the pluralization and the breaking-up of the 
subject leads, as Hubert Damisch would say, to a situation in which ‘the subject 
hangs only by one thread’ (1987, 354). It is to this thread that the limbs of Proust’s 
puppet-like characters are attached. The novel is written in the first person, but, as 
we know, je est un autre, ‘I is an other’. And by way of a rejoinder to this otherness, 
it quickly becomes clear that the other is ‘I’. The narrator’s identification with the 
three key figures of different masculinities – Charles Swann, an epitome of hetero-
sexual obsession and a model of jealousy, Robert de Saint-Loup whom the narra-
tor invests with idealization, and the often ridiculed yet closest to the ‘out’ homo-
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sexual, Baron de Charlus – is of the same order as the strange ‘flatness’ of the char-
acter Albertine, who moves on the waves of the hero’s desire without ever express-
ing the slightest will. Like them, she is a projection of the narrator, which remains 
nonetheless unknowable to him. For although the other is ‘I’, I remains irreducibly 
other. 
The subject is, then, constantly in danger of being absorbed into the other. 
Here is where figuration comes to do its work. This threatening of the subject is fig-
ured, is given form, in the flat image that the narrator, as focalizer, can both con-
template fully and never know. Reduced to being a flat surface, the image con-
fronts the subject at the limits of vision. From a distance, the spectacle loses all life, 
the colors disappear and the movement of the sea is stilled. Close up, everything 
becomes muddled. When the hero leans to kiss the cheek he so desires, he is unable 
to feel any pleasure in it because he can no longer see it. As Bachelard has already 
said, in the visual domain, there is a rift between minute detail and clarity.
Flatness is given philosophical ‘depth’ in its bond with the signature, simulta-
neously unique and imitable. The problem for the subject is that he wants to devel-
op himself by brushing up against the other, represented in both the external world 
and human beings. But the other in Proust’s work always flees, thus creating a con-
flict that possesses and defines the subject. This existential predicament is figured 
in the near-obsessive ponderings of the difficulty of vision. Sometimes shade is a 
better guarantee of visibility; sometimes volume cannot be grasped, while a flat, 
even banal, surface has more substance and thus offers a more solid base for the 
narrator’s sensualist epistemology. Philippe Hamon’s fundamental work on the 
notion of exhibition (1989), conceived as a sort of textual architecture, traces this 
epistemology to the 19th century. He writes notably: 
The world of Michelet’s ‘brilliant trinkets’, of paper, signs, advertisement 
was also a place where objects were beginning to lose volume and depth. In 
such a world the great projects of historical and philosophical synthesis 
and of the collation of the document and the monument no longer seem ca-
pable of deploying their principle of all-embracing legibility. Before Marx 
and Benjamin, Baudelaire... equated this incapacity with the loss of memo-
ry’s or culture’s ‘halo’ or ‘aura’. (125) 
Proust, as Antoine Compagnon has felicitously phrased it, is situated ‘between 
two centuries’ (1989). At both ends of the dialectical movement, which is itself 
fleeting, lies the two-dimensional image, the flatness of which appears as a perma-
nent temptation to the subject who desires the total ‘possession’ of his prisoner, a 
representation of the subject-desiring-knowledge. But at the same time, in figuring 
the bond between figuration as writing and the tenuousness of the subject, he can 
also be read as (proto-)postmodernist.
Thus, Proustian flatness and its figuration in descriptions of signatures has a 
‘deep’ philosophical meaning. More can be made of this; let me spell it out. The 
two-dimensional image is also, simply, flat; it is also a platitude. I call this charac-
teristic of the image its ‘flatness’, but constantly keeping in mind the conjunction 
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between visuality and banality, which Proust will reveal in all its sublimity. As 
such, ‘flatness’ is an image of writing. And it is, at the same time, a model for writ-
ing, not as an aesthetics of visual art, but as a literary aesthetics based on ‘flatness’. 
It is also the major issue at stake in writing, its principal difficulty and an inextrica-
ble interweaving of affectivity and epistemology. The central desire in this novel, 
which tells of a coming-to-writing, is to ground the subject. The question is, then, 
how to resolve the insoluble conflict that makes ‘I’ other, while all the time rooting, 
as if in a transplantation, the other in the ‘I’. Lastly, ‘flatness’ is also the metaphor 
for writing as a graphic art.
Armed with this insight, I return to the detail, since that is what first triggered 
reflection on the signature. The type of detail that emanates from Proustian flat-
ness, and of which the illegible and detached signature is an emblem, can quite sim-
ply be called a dis-figure. It is disfiguring as a result of an excess of form, and as 
such it is related to denial that is absolutely not necessary and is, therefore, exces-
sive: effective negative surplus, the effect of which is proven by the theorist’s insist-
ence upon non-sense. A dis-figure is the visual equivalent of a Freudian denial in 
that it is a figure of negativity produced by excess. The dis-figure is diametrically 
opposed to what Georges Didi-Huberman has termed pan or patch (1990). With 
this term, the French art historian refers to blots in painting that elude form, such 
as the confused patch of red spilling out of a cushion on the bottom left in Ver-
meer’s Lacemaker. 
For Didi-Huberman, the pan is a self-reflexive detail. But, as I have proposed 
elsewhere, self-reflexivity is not the unified phenomenon Didi-Huberman seems to 
make it out to be (1991). Lest it remains handicapped by the generalization of that 
term, my analysis cannot endorse this term without proposing its opposite as well. 
Hence, I propose to reserve the term patch for more restrictive use on the occasions 
when self-reflexivity effectively takes on a formless form, as opposed to an excess 
form. Both of these possibilities are deforming, both are no doubt self-reflexive, 
but the hypothesis creeping in here is that Proust’s text, which is after all an irre-
ducibly literary text, even though it is charged with visuality, needs dis-figures 
more than it needs patches. Moreover, these needs are over-determined in visual 
terms. 
Hence, now is the moment to reconsider the notion of ‘literary visuality’. Figu-
ration is clearly distinguished from figurativeness, which is the usage of tropes and 
which has been so well analyzed by others. I am attempting, quite differently, to ig-
nore as much as possible the distinction between ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’. Some-
times it is in metaphors or comparisons that figuration begins, and this is the case 
when a visual image is invested with the figuring function or the power to give 
form, that is, visual form, to that which follows. But it is not because it is a trope 
that a word, an evocation or the representation of a thing, will serve as a blueprint 
for the writing. So where is the visual situated in a literary text, an allographic 
work that is supposedly independent from its material shape as either handwrit-
ten, typed, or printed? How can we read ‘visually’? Proust’s description of the sig-
nature and all the misunderstandings caused by its lack of readability, together 
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with its excess of ‘beauty’ and erratic temporality, entails the need to take this 
question seriously on the level of literature itself, handwriting’s seeming opposite.
I am considering Proust’s text in this respect under the sign of the Wittgensteinian 
idea of ‘language games’. The concept of image – which implies generally, but not 
always, an idea of likeness, of resemblance, or of similitude – has in the past been 
analyzed according to its use in five domains (Mitchell 1985, 9-31). The graphic 
domain is that of painting, most frequently alleged when Proust’s novel is consid-
ered in relation to visuality, and photography, which I contend is much more cru-
cial for an understanding of Proustian (dis-)figuration. The optical domain is that 
of mirrors, projections, lenses, and glasses, the recurrence of which in Proust is ut-
terly significant. A third domain is that of sense data or appearances, which are re-
lated to perception. Then there are mental images that are encountered in dreams, 
memories, ideas and fantasies. Finally, at the other end of the spectrum, is the ver-
bal domain, related to which is the domain of metaphors and descriptions. These 
domains could be broken down even further. It is a ‘family’ of concepts.
These five domains are not only strongly represented in Proust, they are also 
thematized in his work, both as part of the theoretical reflection, the essayistic di-
mension of the novel, and in the collection of fictional representations that consti-
tute the novelistic dimension of the novel, which I contend to be essentially figura-
tion-based. Their presence is at once strong, constant, and confused. The graphic 
domain alone ‘fills’ the work: it causes it to ‘swell up’ with all the descriptions, evo-
cations, references and allusions related to visual art. But this domain is not only 
relevant in terms of this semantic or thematic network. Its importance is trans-
formed from being semantic to being syntactic, so to speak, when the images, 
which are visual objects in this domain, figure the text, informing and forming it by 
imposing upon it certain developments that, without this link to the visual, would 
lose much, if not all, of their meaning and their richness. These are the images on 
which the dis-figure superimposes a self-reflexive dimension.
Gilberte’s signature is a mise en abyme of the poetics of flatness. As a condensa-
tion of the notion of handwriting, this dis-figure is over-determined by the over-
whelming bond with another figuration of handwriting, another instance of Ginz-
burgian trace as narrative. This emblem is ‘inflated with meaning’ through the me-
diation of a category of detail that circulates throughout the whole work, namely 
allusions to the biblical text, recycled through Racine’s play about Esther. The 
presence of the Book of Esther in La recherche is almost obsessive, and with good 
reason. It can be explained principally by the insistence upon writing in this par-
ticular biblical text. As we know from the Bible, Esther manages to prevent the ca-
tastrophe that threatens her people by first concealing her identity, then by reveal-
ing it at the right moment, and finally by making the most of the delay implied by 
writing in order to ‘countersign’ the death sentence with a decree that nullifies the 
effectiveness of the time bomb that was Aman’s first decree.
In her first appearance in Proust’s text, Esther is the figure of yellow, which is 
the color of her dress in the stained glass in the church at Combray (‘the yellow of 
her dress was spread so unctuously, so thickly...’ 1.63/I 60). We know the signifi-
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cance of yellow, especially in this buttery incarnation, since it is the painterly sub-
stance that kills the writer Bergotte. But in addition to being a life-saving writer, 
this mythical figure derives her primacy from the bond between writing and the 
tenuousness of the subject. For Esther is also the figure who keeps secret the fact of 
belonging to a particular group, and Proust will develop this in his notion of ‘being 
of them’ (en être) which serves as a principle of selection for the elite of the ‘accurs-
ed race’, be it of Jews, artists, or homosexuals. Esther is the figure in the closet that 
signifies a combination of secrecy and choice (Sedgwick 1990). The third dimen-
sion of ‘Esther’, text and character, but also character-text, is the less well-known 
but equally relevant dimension introduced by her being the incarnation of the sig-
nature as speech act that ‘does things with words’. Writing, in this case, is words 
with a power to initiate action, but the action is delayed. The signature is the word 
of a specific person ‘put down in writing’.
It is because of this aspect of Esther that Proust is able to use this character-au-
thor-text in order to integrate aspects of his own literary enterprise with the visual 
mechanism that underpins it. The poetics of his work must be understood and ap-
preciated in the effects produced by the integration of epistemology with affectiv-
ity, sexuality with aesthetics, sensuality with poetics. Writing integrates these ele-
ments, and it can do so because of the belatedness that it entails. Significantly, visu-
ality is again key to this insight. In the episode of the ‘dance breast to breast’, where 
the narrator is confronted with Albertine’s potential lesbianism, the poison, the de-
layed action of which is related specifically to writing in the Book of Esther, is gen-
erated by a problematic of vision that is embodied in failing eyesight. 
Proust is, here, a preposterous student of Ginzburg. The almost artificially 
drawn-out slowness requires that the medical knowledge of the focalizer – the doc-
tor Cottard, both an expert and stupid – from whom the narrator is to learn, is also 
shortsighted, in all senses of the term. Having forgotten his pince-nez, and being 
less of an expert on feminine beauty than Marcel, he asks ‘Are they pretty, at least? 
I can’t make out their features’. He is, however, the professional of medical clichés 
that enable him to know, rather than see, that ‘they are certainly at the climax of 
their pleasure’. He underlines that his conclusion is based upon prior knowledge 
and not upon perception when he adds: ‘It is not sufficiently known that women 
derive most excitement from their breasts.’ In the gap between perception, for 
which the necessary optical instrument is missing, and knowledge, which allows a 
certain deduction, lies the hesitancy upon which the epistemology of jealousy de-
pends, like a parasite. The details of Odette’s account of her activities also play 
within this gap.
One of the narrator’s role models, Charles Swann, who does not believe him-
self to be duped by the poison administered by his mistress, also does not see the 
semiotic implications of Odette’s speech. Neither true nor false – and is that not the 
essential characteristic of aesthetic discourse? – Swann accepts it nonetheless in his 
heart of hearts, and hence becomes more and more worried, uttering the vague 
statement that grounds truth in coherence when he says: ‘that doesn’t fit with the 
fact that she didn’t let me in’. But this acceptance fails to acknowledge the force of 
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the ‘surplus matter and the unfilled gaps’, words that echo back in poetic terms to 
the glass jars in the Vivonne when the surplus itself filled in the gaps (1.183/I 166). 
These glass jars are very clearly presented as poetic: they are a mise en abyme of the 
poetics of to-ing and fro-ing associated with what I termed in my book on the sub-
ject, the poetics of ‘mottling’. They oscillate between being container/signifier/
point-of-comparison and content/signified/thing-compared, which already reveals 
the distinctions between epistemology, semiotics and poetics, all of which are im-
plied in the scene with the glass jars, as they are in that with Swann and Odette. 
The text only mentions the first aspect verbatim – the aspect of container/content 
– and makes allusion to the third aspect with the use of the word ‘image’. But the 
poetic aspect of the glass jars is definitely the one that projects its trace in what fol-
lows. As the text continues, the subject, like Rousseau in the Reveries, is substitut-
ed for the glass jars. He puts to the test the poetic potential of drifting: ‘How often 
have I watched and longed to imitate... a rower who had shipped his oars and lay 
flat on his back in the bottom of his boat, letting it drift with the current, seeing 
nothing but the sky gliding slowly by above him, his face aglow with a foretaste of 
happiness and peace’ (1.186/ I 168). This is the poetic potential of the detail that 
neither Odette nor Swann can see. Having neither the choice, nor the imagination 
to do otherwise, the latter can only play the same game as his mistress, pitting the 
same weapons against her:
and making opportune use of some detail – insignificant but true – which 
he had accidentally learned, as though it were the sole fragment which he 
had involuntarily let slip of a complete reconstruction of her daily life 
which he carried secretly in his mind, he led her to suppose that he was per-
fectly informed upon matters which in reality he neither knew nor suspect-
ed... (1.391/I 353).
‘Accidentally learned’ is here equal to the unfilled gaps elsewhere. Swann thinks he 
can do battle with Odette’s surplus matter using the complete life that she suppos-
es him to know. Brilliantly playing out their interchangeable and disconcerting 
roles of author and reader, Swann and Odette reveal the impossibility of finding a 
resolution by means of details. 
The semiotic battle between Swann and Odette will later provide a model for 
Marcel’s jealousy concerning Albertine. The difference is, however, that the latter 
is a much less substantial character than Odette. From the beginning, long before 
her escape and her death, this ‘fleeting being’ is truly in flight. Consequently, the 
search for details becomes a caricature of Swann’s actions. Marcel, who depends 
upon others’ help as he hardly ever leaves his house, embarks upon an intermina-
ble to and fro between a suspected detail and a confirmed certitude, only to lose 
that certitude, and thus have to set off on another expedition. The source of the 
Nile remains always beyond reach. 
And that is all for the better. For, as Doubrovsky puts it, this is how the narra-
tor writes: the writing does not ‘reflect’ nor does it ‘wed’ jealousy’s movements; it 
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is jealous (1974, 90). It follows, then, that in order to understand the poetics of the 
detail in this novel, it is necessary to see which detail determines this jealous quest, 
this voyage of discovery in search of female pleasure that is always hidden and re-
sistant. The gap that must be filled during this quest is, in fact, that gaping hole, 
those ‘huge blanks’ (3.93/III 605) that leave a truth without any leftover frag-
ments, without any kernels hidden deep down, from which the narrator could re-
construct something. The huge blanks are like those on a map that designate un-
charted land. Archeology is not a helpful model because the fragment cannot come 
to the rescue of the detail.
The signature thus traced contains the secret of the hidden identity of the self 
that is projected onto all the others in whom this ‘I’ discovers himself. Hence, also, 
the taboo placed on the firstname of the ‘I’. The navel of dreams points towards the 
outside, towards the future of writing, as opposed to the inside of the maternal 
body and the time passed by the child in this inside. To write, by drops – of ink, 
milk, sperm, oysters, sweat, and blood – is an act that introduces ‘flatness’, an act 
of ‘pressing together’, of applying the essence of the self onto a flat leaf base.
The trace of writing is, thus, constantly associated with vital forces, the essence 
of the self, the spurting outwards that make this male, individuated subject; one 
who writes the reversible surface onto which he applies himself in successive lay-
ers. It leads to the infinite spreading-out of this immense work, the base of which is 
provided by the book. This book is flat, but it is inflated with meaning by means of 
these residues of observation.
Thinking back to the illegible writing, the unformed form, the figure-figuration 
that resembles the idea of the dis-figure most closely, despite radical differences, we 
keep being reminded of Gilberte’s signature, that dis-figurer of all figurations. As a 
name ‘put down in writing’, with its delayed impact and its capacity to visualize 
text, this dis-figured signature forms the trace of the visual conflict posed by the de-
tail. Seen from close-up, it is broken into letters, which are in turn fragmented into 
different strokes. Seen from afar, scattered throughout the work and contained 
within the illegible name of Marcel’s two great loves, now both dead, this signa-
ture remains irreducibly broken. It is a tenacious dis-figure, and, as such, like a 
mise en abyme it inscribes the needs of the novel. 
In order that the detail function in a way other than by detailing; in order that 
it help enlarge or insert – rather than detach – the infinitely small into general laws, 
there must also be a certain delicacy of form and quivering of flatness and mobility, 
of light and fragility. It is visual, it is an image, but it is also something else. This 
something else we find in the realm of photography, an art that is both flat and ba-
nal, that is able to enlarge the detail, to capture the past, and to figure movement. 
In the scene from the Duchess of Guermantes’s salon in ‘La fugitive/Albertine 
disparue’, at the moment when the narrator, suffering from amnesia, is to be intro-
duced to the very person who was the great love of his youth, he reflects on the de-
ceptive and disappointing nature of both writing and photography. In the 1954 
Pléiade edition of La recherche, the sentence is as follows:
Sign Here! / Faithfully Submitted
161
Our mistake is to present things as they are, names as they are written, peo-
ple as photography and psychology give an unalterable notion of them. 
(III 573)
Or according to the Tadié edition:
Our mistake lies in supposing that things present themselves habitually as 
they really are, names as they are written, people as photography and psy-
chology give an unalterable notion of them. (3.585/IV 153; translation 
adapted)3
This reflection is offered as an explanation for the bizarre fact that the narrator 
had ‘mis-corrected’ the name that the concierge had already misheard and written 
incorrectly. The fact that Gilberte had stared at him, and that he had brushed up 
against her, taking her to be a tart without recognizing her, appears in no way 
strange to him. For this reflection to take place, it is forgetfulness, rather than the 
contrary, that is necessary. 
Unexpectedly, the deciphering efforts of the successive generations of editors 
of Proust’s challenging handwriting received profound philosophical relevance. In 
the first Pléiade edition, the verb ‘présenter’ was not reflexive, making it a question 
of presentation, that is, of photography as a means, as a medium of communica-
tion. In the Tadié edition it becomes a question of the belief that the frequent use of 
the medium has been established as a routine element of culture. Between these 
two versions we can see the difference between a behavioral pattern and a convic-
tion, between a culture and a religion. 
The patch that in-forms is superimposed in this work with the dis-figure that 
de-forms. The way in which invisibility also becomes a mise en abyme in Gilberte’s 
signature, which is illegible because it is too detailed, is explained by the fact that 
this signature signifies too much at one time. It provides too many forms and there-
by shields the sign from the desperate search for meaning. In this, the signature, far 
from authenticating a subject who has no substance and lives only off the rubbing 
against alterity, dis-figures subjectivity through excess as denial – through a post-
modern dis-belief in authenticity that pre-posterously confirms Derrida’s critique 
of the signature. Rather than inscription of uniqueness, then, the signature signals 
a flatness that, in turn, gives shape to the fabric of the culture in which it occurs. 
If, then, Ginzburg ends his article on the conceptual metaphor of inquiry as 
fabric, he inevitably arrives at a critique of the politics of that kind of tracing that 
handwriting stands for. He describes the protection of civil society by means of se-
curing individual uniqueness and its recognizability, that, I may add, is today re-in-
vigorated by the us’s fingerprinting practice that polices all foreigners. On the final 
page, he mentions Proust as ‘a rigorous example of the application of this conjec-
tural paradigm’ (109). What he does not seem aware of is how Proust applies the 
paradigm without illusions of individuation. Instead, the signature, and the enter-
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prise of jealousy for whose failure it stands, is firmly illegible – in all senses: as 
name, as authenticity, and as depth. Flatness, instead, lays out a sociality beyond 
these traps of humanism. 




1. I am quoting from the four-volume 
French edition of A la recherche du temps 
perdu. edited under the direction of Jean-
Yves Tadié. Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade, 1987-89. (Trans. by C.K. 
Scott-Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin as 
Remembrance of Things Past. London: 
Penguin Books, 1981).
Mieke Bal
2. See Bal (1997) for this term, which 
refers to the perceptual or interpretive 
relation between subject-seeing and what 
is seen.
3. The Tadié edition, which has incorporat-
ed new manuscripts, appeared after the 
English translation.
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(Hand)writing Film 
History: Saul Bass 
Draws Martin 
Scorsese in a Title 
Sequence 
Something starts to hatch in the upper right-hand part of the screen. White lines 
on black. No pen, no hand. Just a movement and a sound. The movement is 
controlled, it is up to something. A curve, it is now drawing an ear. Figurative 
drawing. A forehead (the hatched elements are the hair), again hatching: an 
eyebrow, nose (dot, dot, comma, dash), stop – handwriting, we follow the words: 
‘A personal journey’, underlined (this is a headline), music starts, new paragraph, 
‘with Martin Scorsese’, new paragraph, ‘through American Movies’.
Martin Scorsese’s contribution to the series of national cinema documentaries 
‘celebrating the moving image’ for the cinema centenary, begins with a title se-
quence that reflects on the status of his signature. Even before the first quote, be-
fore the first clip from Minelli’s The Bad and the Beautiful, in which the producer 
(played by Kirk Douglas) states ‘To be a director, you must have imagination’, and 
the director (played by Ivan Triesault) answers ‘Whose imagination, Mr. Shields?’, 
Scorsese has been introduced to the viewer by someone else’s imagination. Some-
body else has provided Scorsese’s signature for his film. The personal statement 
that is about to follow, made of materials from other films, takes off with the dis-
play of hybridity as the very core of filmic authorship.
In the 1994 tv production on cinema history, that somebody-else-who-signs is 
Saul Bass, the most famous designer and director of film title sequences in film his-
tory: 
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I’ve had the honor and the opportunity to work with Saul and Elaine Bass on 
three of my pictures – GoodFellas, Cape Fear, and The Age of Innocence. 
We’re now working on a fourth, Casino. It has been a dream of mine to work 
with Saul Bass ever since I tried to capture his style in my own ‘imaginary’ mov-
ie titles which I drew at ages 12 and 15 in a composition book I kept hidden at 
home. I feel very fortunate to have had that dream realized. (Scorsese 1996, 3)
Scorsese’s dream of his own self-designed signature in the style of another, which he 
has kept hidden at home since puberty, really comes true in the latest of his series of 
collaborations with Saul Bass, the fifth one, which, in a film taking stock of the past, 
is, not without irony, also Bass’s last title design in general. That the truth differs 
slightly from the dream – it is Saul Bass’s style that tries to capture Scorsese’s signa-
ture in an on-screen composition sketch – does not matter that much. Getting per-
sonal in this film is a triumph in itself. The very project of the film commissioned by 
the British Film Institute (bfi), the largest film archive in the world, places Scorsese 
at the center of the center, the number one filmmaker in the world’s leading film in-
dustry: the one who comes to mind first, both as Hollywood’s main representative 
and its best informant. Film and its reading coincide: 
[T]he British Film Institute commissioned The Century of Cinema, an ambi-
tious series of documentaries in which the world’s leading filmmakers were 
asked to interpret their native country’s cinema. From day one there was no 
question that the American segment belonged to Martin Scorsese. (Wilson, 8) 
The film we are about to see is a film about belonging. We will see the writing of film 
history, and the making of its writing. To get the job done, the handpicked director 
handpicks three close collaborators: an established film historian and documentary 
filmmaker, a famous composer and a famous title designer.1 
Why does a television production attach that much importance to the title se-
quence?2 That Saul Bass designs a television title sequence (which happens to be his 
only work for television aside from the title design for the television series Alcoa 
Premiere in 1961) for a documentary about the history of Hollywood appears at 
first sight to be one of the ironies of film history, taking into account that the phe-
nomenon of independent designers such as Saul Bass came into being in the late fif-
ties, above all as the result of the media rivalry between cinema and television. At 
that time, film studios tried to compete with television by raising the production val-
ues of their productions, inter alia, by increasingly favoring the more expensive in-
dependent graphic designers for the title design of their films over designers from the 
studio-owned title houses that had provided most of the title sequences for the film 
industry up to then. Now, years later, it is television that keeps the memory of cine-
ma alive. Hollywood itself had already discovered the structural importance of title 
sequence design at a very early stage. The first company specializing in film title de-




Classical narration usually begins before the action does. True, the credits 
sequence can be seen as a realm of graphic play, an opening which is rela-
tively ‘open’ to non-narrational elements.... Yet the classical Hollywood 
film typically uses the credits sequence to initiate the film’s narration. Even 
these forty to ninety seconds cannot be wasted. Furthermore, in these mo-
ments the narration is self-conscious to a high degree. (Bordwell, Staiger, 
and Thompson 1985, 25) 
Saul Bass’s film-within-a-film of 1994 capitalizes on this second moment, which 
has become more self-evident for today’s movie-going audiences. His introduction 
to Scorsese’s documentary flashback of US cinema history is made in a way that re-
flects on the very linchpin of auteur criticism, which is the concept of the ‘signa-
ture’ of a film that was adopted by film critics such as Andrew Sarris in the United 
States at the same time that Scorsese was just beginning his film career. In the early 
1960s, the talk of the ‘signature’ of a film had both an emancipatory and a classifi-
catory function. On the one hand, it endeavored to put film on a level with the tra-
ditional arts. It distributed value and it did so by making use of the traditional pa-
rameters of the literary system. The various forms of decision making in a filmic 
structure, which is fundamentally based on the division of labor, are to be traced 
back to one origin: the director: 
The second premise of the auteur theory is the distinguishable personality 
of the director as a criterion of value. Over a group of films, a director must 
exhibit certain recurring characteristics of style which serve as his signa-
ture. (Sarris, 662) 
With this move, working for an industry ceases to be an obstacle to creating art. 
Hollywood is capable of generating masterpieces and genius as well: 
His [Andrew Sarris’s] writings led me to see the genius in American movies 
at a time when the cinema was considered a mindless form of entertain-
ment, worthy of serious attention only if it came from Europe or Asia. Sar-
ris’s... wonderful ability to articulate for me and many others as well what 
we unconsciously felt about the styles of various directors played a truly 
pivotal role in my life. (Scorsese 2001, vii) 
It is not by chance that it is Scorsese who provides the foreword to a collection of 
essays in honor of Andrew Sarris, a short message of greeting with the title ‘The 
Fundamental Film Teacher’, as it is Scorsese who provides the foreword to the 
‘Master Series’ catalogue of works by Saul Bass: 
Saul Bass’s reputation as a designer of film is legendary. He has left his in-
delible signature on a number of pictures by Preminger, Hitchcock, Ku-
brick, Wyler – among others. It was exciting growing up on movies during 
the 50s and 60s. That ‘growing’ entailed a great deal of learning, too. Part 
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1. Saul Bass, title sequence, A Personal Journey with Martin Scorsese
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of that excitement and learning was due to the remarkable contribution of 
Saul Bass in some of the greatest films of those periods. (Scorsese 1996)
The indelible signature of the signature specialist behind each on-screen signature 
marks the fundamentally schizoid structure of the filmic title sequence. In order to 
put one’s own signature on display one has to hire somebody else whose rendering 
of your signature also serves as his own: ‘Up until his recent death, Saul Bass con-
tinued to carve his artistic signature on the movies’ (Haskin, 11). Of course, this 
has major consequences for the notion of authorship. In the movies we are con-
fronted with an author, who cannot even write his own name. The title sequence 
introduces the name and celebrates it but it never stops at this point. Because there 
is no single act of signing, the parade of signatures designed to establish authorship 
contradicts the importance of the single name. With respect to author criticism, the 
notion of the ‘signature’ can become a pun: ‘It was the only time I ever met him, 
but I came away from the session with... the auteur’s autograph (“Sincerely yours, 
Andrew Sarris”)’ (Bordwell 2001, 165).
In what follows, I will attempt to decipher the handwritten signature of that 
exclusive part of the title sequence that actually names the film A Personal Jour-
ney, leaving the other credits, which are just white printed characters on black, out 
of the picture. I will try to follow instead some of the windings of the writing of the 
name, its various contexts, detours, and allusions because the title sequence of a 
film is where the metaphorical talk of its ‘signature’ can be read literally.
Of course, to avoid any misunderstanding, ‘handwriting’ in film is handwrit-
ing in name only. First of all, the single letters are based on contemporary letter-
forms and ‘[s]econd, any handwriting that can be transposed into reusable type-
face functions fundamentally as a mechanized script’ (Kittler, 259).
In the beginning there was the boy’s dream of fathering a film, of devising an 
unambiguous signature of his own for everyone to read. To have his dream of 
making the dream factory. What do we make of this dream? How does one make 
films out of dreams?
Screen memories
One day, in the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud goes to the movies to get some 
ideas on the right way to bury his father. He sees himself confronted with the para-
text: 
During the night before my father’s funeral I had a dream of a printed no-
tice, placard or poster – rather like the notices forbidding one to smoke in 
railway waiting-rooms – on which appeared either
‘You are requested to close the eyes’
or, ‘You are requested to close an eye’.
Sign Here! / (Hand)writing Film History
169
I usually write this in the form:
                                                   the
‘You are requested to close         eye(s)’.
                                                   an
… In a few instances the difficulty of representing an alternative is got over 
by dividing the dream into two pieces of equal length. (Freud, 352-353)
Some time before the start of the home movie, before his father’s burial, Freud 
passes the time by staring at a framed space upon the wall on which an inscription 
of the law unfolds. It is night time, the setting is the auditorium where one can see 
L’Arrivée d’un train – the fantasized primal scene of cinema, in which the object 
leaves the screen and enters the space of the spectator.3 Freud is familiar with these 
kinds of accidents. They triggered his Studies on Hysteria a few years previously.4 
Now he is waiting in the darkness and sees the projection of an alternative version 
of the story in the parade of letters before the story unfolds. For the burial of his 
father, Freud has asked cinema for help. What he is dreaming of are different 
modes of representation. What he finds is the simultaneity of two conflicting ver-
sions represented by the closing of (an) eye(s). Dreaming, imagining, focusing, al-
lowing, Freud dreams of the funeral in alternate versions before the actual funeral. 
He dreams up a new editing process. Closing father’s eyes, overlooking general de-
mands, opening alternate points of view. The printed letter as dream content? The 
letter is a rebus?
One day in the 1940s in A Personal Journey Through American Movies, Mar-
tin Scorsese goes to the movies for the first time without his father. He sees himself 
confronted with the paratext: 
I remember quite clearly – it was 1946 and I was four years old – when my 
mother took me to see King Vidor’s Duel in the Sun. I was fanatical about 
Westerns. My father usually took me to see them, but this time my mother 
did. The movie had been condemned by the Church. ‘Lust in the Dust’, 
they dubbed it. I guess she used me as an excuse to see it herself. From the 
opening titles I was mesmerized. The bright blasts of deliriously vibrant 
color, the gunshots, the savage intensity of the music, the burning sun, the 
overt sexuality. A flawed film, maybe. Yet the hallucinatory quality of the 
imagery has never weakened for me over the years…. It was all quite over-
powering. Frightening too..... I covered my eyes through most of it..... 
I didn’t know by then, but in 1946, Hollywood had reached its zenith. 
(Scorsese 1997, 14)
In the film that reveals his authorship at its zenith, Martin Scorsese gets personal 
by telling the story of how he was taken by the hand for the first time. The con-
struction of both the national film canon and his signature begins with a series of 
images that reflects on the relationship between writing, reading and the cinema. 
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The opening titles had already given us the name, handwriting, and an author por-
trait as a first hint. This is followed by the first filmic quote of the compilation film 
from Minelli’s The Bad and the Beautiful, which furnishes a motto concerning the 
ethics of production. Then we see the narrator (Scorsese) sitting in a chair, the au-
thor portrait from the beginning is translated into a frame narrative, a point of 
view. This is a documentary. We are listening to that person’s story now. In the be-
ginning there is a lack. Nothing is written: 
there was nothing really available that I could find written about film.... 
[A]ll I had at my disposal to experience then were these black-and-white 
stills. I would fantasize about them, they would play into my dreams. And 
I was so tempted to steal some of these pictures. (Scorsese 1997, 14) 
Nothing is really moving yet (this is still the story being told.) Flicking through the 
stills of a film book from the public library, zooming in on one, Scorsese arrives at 
his primal scene. It is another title sequence, this time in color. We’re almost back 
again to where we have already been. It is at the place of the filmic imprint (outside 
of the diegesis) that the film gets personal.
2. Duel in the Sun 1946
What four-year-old Little Martin sees within this scene of oedipal nostalgia is not 
so much horses, but something that is too much for him. It is not the first time he 
has been to the movies (‘I was fanatical about Westerns’ (Scorsese 1997, 14) but 
this time he literally does not know where he is. Is he on screen or is he in the audi-
ence?5 Little Martin is overpowered even before the diegesis unfolds. He is already 
paralyzed by the title sequence, by the force of its various elements. How is this 
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possible? The title sequence merely consists of letters on a background, scrolling 
upwards. It looks quite simple. It works because it anticipates and doubles the in-
stability of the agencies of identification. On the one hand, the opening credits that 
disrupt the dark space of the movie theater address Martin as a spectator in the 
usual way: ‘Get ready. Time to identify’. On the other hand, this credit sequence 
stages projection itself by generating a metaphor for it: the screen seems to reflect 
the projection backwards. What Little Martin is staring at, sitting in the cinema: 
shiny spot in the background of the image, the source of light, the ‘burning sun’, 
blurry as if behind glass, the bulb of the projector. Seeing the projection and keep-
ing the name in mind become one: 
[T]he first film I remember seeing by name: Duel in the Sun. The safety of 
the darkness of the theater was suddenly shattered by a bright blast of de-
liriously vibrant color followed by gunshots – the opening credits of Duel 
in the Sun. (Scorsese 1995, 141) 
The first 32 seconds about this film that one could see in movie theaters – the teas-
er – had already introduced a form of violence that is specific to the beam of light: 
Coming Soon! bang! The shiny spot, which looked safe while sitting in the back-
ground, is now suddenly animated and projected into the foreground like a projec-
tile, only to present the encapsulated letters of the titles of the film. The underlying 
gunshots reinforce one’s sudden subjection to the moving image. This metaphor is 
more about a technical than a narrative device but with the projectionist’s beam of 
light metaphorically reversed, it is Martin who is on the screen.6 He is seen. And 
the parading of the letters and the law plays out across his face, shrouded in or-
ange. The mirroring screen has itself become an indicator, a litmus paper turning 
‘orange’.7 big orange: Hollywood! (At its zenith).8 
 What the opening credits of Duel in the Sun accentuate is not so much the 
film’s indebtedness to Gone with the Wind or the ‘heat’ of the scene, the famous 
‘shooting directly into the sun... which had spotlights shining right into the cam-
era’ (Higham, 262), but the ‘heat’ of projection (which might even destroy the 
film.) The Dimitri Tiomkin’s soundtrack climaxes exactly at that moment when 
the credit ‘Color Director: Natalie Kalmus’ appears, thus emphasizing the coloring 
of the film. ‘Technicolor’ has already had a dramatic entry before: ‘david o. 
selznick presents his production in technicolor of king vidor’s.’
The title-sequence of Duel in the Sun becomes delirious, vibrant, savage, in-
tense, burning, sexual, hallucinatory by means of the mirror-effect that is dramati-
cally dyed. What it says is that everything that follows is the effect of projection 
and of Technicolor. And this is not just part of a story. In every film the first duel in 
the sun of the projector bulb is the duel between the title sequence and the film. 
Freud’s ‘either-or’ way of representing, characteristic of dream work, can be found 
here. A relation that is filled with tension. Each film is divided into at least two 
parts and has a ‘making-of’ film in its beginning. Each film has its own story al-
ready told and read, before the story unfolds. Each film provides us with a version 
of itself as something to start with: 
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While the film systematically speaks of something other than itself (of an 
anecdote for instance), the title sequence speaks of nothing else but the 
film, thus exposing what the film has carefully kept hidden. A scandalous 
competition. (Gardies, 86) 
The names of the main cast members in the Duel in the Sun-title are neither printed 
nor handwritten. They are painted. While the frayed typeface dramatizes the plot, 
illustrating the inner conflicts – ‘Duel’ and ‘Sun’ compete in size, with ‘Duel’ in red, 
one hears the sound of shooting beneath – it also directs attention to the variations 
and hierarchies in the parade of credits, which is led by the producer and finished 
off by the director. That which brings ‘Duel’ and ‘Sun’ together is written in script 
(‘in the’), locating the projection, making it personal. This is not by chance.
Hollywood has always specialized in reflections of the signature. How does 
this work? How does film visualize signatures? Let us not harbor any illusions 
about it. In Hollywood’s classical cinema, the person who signs the film first, quite 
unambiguously, is the producer. His name is the one that starts the film. The devel-
opment of more flexible production units in Hollywood in 1931 had triggered cer-
tain stylizations of the figure of the producer in title sequences such as, among oth-
ers, variations in the typeface of the producer credit.9 (The Samuel Goldwyn signa-
ture is just one example of this). But there have also been title sequences that chal-
lenged the prominent position of the producer credit. King Vidor was one of the 
first Hollywood directors who entered into a creative rivalry with the producer, by 
individualizing his own credit also via handwriting, in contrast to the printed char-
acters of the other credits (i.e., The Texas Rangers, in 1936). In 1946, there was no 
opportunity for a stylized signature yet: ‘ [t]here was Directors Guild arbitration 
before Vidor emerged with sole credit’ (Durgnat, 239). 
What about A Personal Journey, which displays this title sequence shortly after 
its own title sequence? Who is actually signing this film? After all, it is the hand-
writing that is supposed to reveal the film as personal. The handwriting transcribes 
the ‘personal’ of the title. The signature on the main title itself simply reads ‘Martin 
Scorsese’. But is this a signature? A name emerges from the handwriting that we 
follow with our eyes. It is part of the title. The writing of the name, however, takes 
place in a specially allocated space, right underneath a line that sets it apart from 
the personal journey. That a name is introduced by ‘with’ does not irritate us. We 
know this from actors’ credits (diary titles may also look like this). The combina-
tion of an identifiable author image and witnessed handwriting suggests both that 
it is and is not a signature. Who is writing here? The handwriting resembles that of 
Saul Bass. We remember his handwriting from Why Man Creates, the Academy 
Award-winning short film from 1968. We can identify it, yet we see neither hands 
nor writing implements. Perhaps somebody else is imitating Bass’s handwriting. 
Scorsese? Is this the director’s credit at all? A Personal Journey with Martin Scors-
ese through American Movies is made by two directors.10 And there is still the di-
rector’s credit to follow. The personal journey through American movies begins 
with a signature that writes itself. In place of the little pictograms between the seg-
ments of the Duel in the Sun title that make explicit the genre or the field of spe-
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cialization – a guitar, a pair of pistols, a pistol – this film presents a face. Physiog-
nomy substitutes the ironic bull skull above King Vidor’s name (which is both a 
genre and a property sign – ‘you are entering the property of King Vidor’). The 
main title card of the bfi film is organized like an emblem. The pictura is an author 
portrait, a sketch, a caricature – (it takes only one-half of the face to recognize it) 
– the subscriptio is the title of the film.11 The upper part of the frame with the up-
per part of the face supplies an ironic commentary on the author’s function in the 
film. This is where the brain is, this is where the eyes are (taken literally, it is also a 
pun on the notion of the ‘frontispiece’). The fact that the main title card and the di-
rector’s (possessory?) credit coincide is rare in film history. The practice goes back 
to the main title design of early cinema that provided all of the information on a 
single card. The characterization of the star by his or her physiognomy is also typ-
ical of that time:  
Before 1917, films commonly introduced characters in ways that called at-
tention to the act of narration. An expository title would name and describe 
the character and attach the actor’s name; then a shot might show the char-
acter striking a pose in a non-diegetic setting (e.g., a theatre stage). After 
several characters were introduced this way, the fictional action would be-
gin. After 1917, such signs of narration diminished. Characters would be 
introduced upon their first appearance in the action. Overt commentary in 
the titles (‘Max, a Bully’) would be replaced by images of the character en-
acting typical behavior (e.g., Max kicking a dog). (Bordwell, 27)
In 1994, in the personal journey through American movies, one comes across a 
myriad of famous actors, but only one star: Martin having his name written. Not 
many directors could make it as stars (and in so personal a manner) in a title se-
quence. Only very few are immediately recognizable by a larger audience.12 By 
presenting the director as the star and main attraction, Bass’s title builds up a line-
age. In the context of television history, it quotes (and inverts) the famous stylized 
profile that opened the Alfred Hitchcock Presents television series of the 1950s 
and 1960s. The quotation is ambivalent, however because it does not start only 
one family. Instead, it introduces Hitchcock not only as the director, and Scorses’s 
predecessor, and other seminal Hollywood figures that come to mind, it also intro-
duces Hitchcock as title designer (the position he began his film career with) as 
both the predecessor of Saul Bass13 and his most famous employer.14 The sketch 
that opened Hitchcock’s television show was actually from a Christmas card that 
Hitchcock designed himself while he was still living in England. As an ironic means 
of authorization, its eight lines adopted more and more the gesture of a signature, 
like a grapheme in its own right. The 32-cent Hitchcock postage stamp that ap-
peared as part of the us Postal Service’s ‘Legends of Hollywood’ makes this per-
fectly clear by repeating the black-and-white photograph of Hitchcock with the 
stylized profile in the upper-left-hand corner. Hitchcock is able to sign his product 
with the wavy contours of his own profile. 
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3. Alfred Hitchcock 
commemorative stamp, 
32-cent,
 US Postal Service 1998
Hitchcock, the big rival in who-comes-to-mind-first-with-respect-to-Hollywood, 
was not particularly on Scorsese’s mind during his journey through American 
film: 
At first, we planned to include almost every director that had inspired Marty 
before he had embraced filmmaking. But there was no room to do justice to 
them all.... [E]ven today Marty laments the sites we never visited or geniuses 
we didn’t discuss, from Ernst Lubitsch to Alfred Hitchcock. (Wilson, 8) 
Unlike Alfred Hitchcock Presents, where each episode would begin with Hitch-
cock’s silhouette profile filling in with black, the lines in the making of ‘Scorsese’ 
are white on black. The profile remains transparent. Nothing is filled in. Leaving 
the Scorsese profile transparent, Bass makes the hidden presence of Hitchcock 
even more felt: it is a pun that marks an absence. The cursoriness of the sketch that 
is not allowed to become substance gives the portrait a ghostlike quality. 
To celebrate the century of cinema, we have been sent back to school again 
with a black background, white lines, the scratching sound of the invisible chalk as 
we learn to read and write all over again. The blackboard on the screen identifies 
the series of images that is about to follow as readable text. The screen is a slate is 
a mystic writing pad. All these various writing materials have in common their ba-
sic relationship to the concept of the trace. Each sign that shows up on them plays 
with the relationship between absence and presence, each emerging sign is almost 
already wiped away at the very moment it shows up.15
What does it mean to return to hand-drawn images and handwritten letters on 
a blackboard in the age of digital composition? On the one hand, it is without a 
doubt a nostalgic gesture in itself: 
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4. What’s on a man’s mind
There are many threads running between the films, with... Saul and Elaine 
Bass doing the titles.... [T]he style of their work was extraordinary and we 
wanted the audience to be very aware of the lineage of this type of film. The 
sadness for me is that I can’t make films in the old style, the studio system 
style, because I’m a product of a different world and society. (Scorsese, in: 
Thompson, 174) 
On the other hand, the title design of A Personal Journey can also be seen as a 
pointed move away from the camera and the photographed image as the basis of 
the filmic image, which is characteristic of digital cinema:
[T]he manual construction of images in digital cinema represents a return 
to the pro-cinematic practices of the nineteenth century, when images were 
hand-painted and hand-animated. At the turn of the twentieth century, cin-
ema was to delegate these manual techniques to animation and define itself 
as a recording medium. As cinema enters the digital age, these techniques 
are again becoming commonplace in the filmmaking process. Consequent-
ly, cinema can no longer be clearly distinguished from animation. It is no 
longer an indexical media technology but, rather, a subgenre of painting. 
(Manovich, 295)
The animation both of writing and drawing in this sequence pays tribute to a clas-
sic in the history of animation film: the Inklings series by Dave Fleischer. Inklings, 
issue 12 from 1925 reminds one most of Bass’s particular approach to the main ti-
tle design of a film on film history: Here we see the painted sketch of a bearded man 
in white brush strokes on a black surface turning into Rin Tin Tin once it is turned 
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upside down (which is again reminiscent of another famous picture puzzle: the 
portrait of Sigmund Freud ‘What’s on a man’s mind?’). 
The hand-drawn face and name of Martin Scorsese are the focal points of A Per-
sonal Journey with Martin Scorsese through American Movies. Due to its emblem-
atic character, Bass’s personification of the filmic force as a head looking to the 
side, with the signature underneath, alludes to the history of the studio logo, in 
particular, the mgm lion. ‘Scorsese’ is an American, is a lion, is a myth. Turning the 
studio ‘look’ into a personal style, he manages to become a trademark of ‘Holly-
wood’.16




1. ‘A poet or a painter can be a loner, but 
the film director has to be, first and fore-
most, a team player. Particularly in Holly-
wood’ (Scorsese 1997, 20).
2. That it’s a work for a television produc-
tion is probably the reason why this title 
sequence is not as well known as most of 
the other Saul Bass title sequences. ‘Mar-
tin Scorsese’s most recent film, Casino, 
features... the last title sequence that Bass 
would make before his death’ (Haskin 
1996, 11).
3. Perhaps the oldest cliché of film history 
is the reputed reaction of the first audien-
ces to the Lumières’ L’Arrivée d’un train en 
gare de La Ciotat. Spectators were said to 
have jumped from their seats in terror at 
the sight of the train coming toward the 
camera and running beyond its purview 
(in three-quarters’ view) logically ‘into’ 
the space of the spectator. Descriptions of 
such a response in France and elsewhere 
survive in film history as rhetorical indices 
of film’s initial novelty and the naïveté of 
the spectator confronted by a two-dimen-
sional, dynamic representation. Gunning 
sums this up: ‘Thus conceived, the myth 
of initial terror defines film’s power as its 
unprecedented realism, its ability to con-
vince spectators that the moving image 
was, in fact, palpable and dangerous, 
bearing towards them with physical im-
pact.’ He goes on to refer to this myth as 
a ‘primal scene’ informing film theory’s 
view of early film history’ (Kirby, 62).
4. ‘The railway accident as an agent of 
traumatic experience occupies an impor-
tant place in the history of mid- and late-
19th-century medical and medico-legal 
discourses over trauma and traumatic 
disorder. In fact, it can be argued that sys-
tematic medical theorization about psy-
chological trauma in the modern West 
commenced with the responses of mid-
Victorian medical practitioners to the so-
called railway spine condition, which was 
characterized by the manifestation of a 
variety of physical disorders in otherwise 
healthy and apparently uninjured railway 
accident victims. The investigation of this 
condition led many 19th century surgeons 
to examine the role of psychological fac-
tors – variously referred to as “fright”, “ter-
ror”, or “emotional shock”  
– in provoking physical disorders some 
thirty years before Freud and Breuer con-
sidered the matter in Studies on Hysteria’ 
(note: ‘Freud’s own earliest writings on 
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hysteria and trauma were prompted by the 
debates over railway accident cases to 
which he had been exposed in Paris and 
Berlin in the 1880s’ Harrington, 31-32). See 
also: ‘Essentially, the idea that the train 
image inspires a threatened response – 
terror – and does so as a film image, returns 
us to the whole history of train travel as a 
paradigm for cinematic spectatorship 
based on shock’ (Kirby, 62).
5. Little Martin, who is viewing the forbid-
den movie with his mother, in the first ten 
minutes sees the mother who is cheating 
on the father getting shot by the father 
along with her lover. The father is then 
hanged for the crime. For Little Martin, 
who has left his father home alone, there 
are still 128 minutes of sitting beside his 
mother left.
6. The trailer, which adds both the produc-
er’s logo and little silhouettes in front of a 
sun that has become bright red, concen-
trates on the brand name. ‘A shot of the 
Selznick Studios logo (a shingle with the 
‘Tara’ building that served as the studio 
headquarters in the background) is first 
seen, accompanied by an epic trombone 
fanfare. Then a narrator announces, “The 
studio that made Gone with the Wind brings 
you...”, after which there is a cut to a graph-
ic of the sun with jagged brown lettering 
inside it that zooms slowly into the fore-
ground until “Duel in the Sun” can be read. 
Visually, the graphic (on the heels of a pic-
ture of Tara) echoes the famous “Gone with 
the Wind” title silhouette of Scarlett O’Hara 
on the hill at Tara with the sun behind her 
(which was also a key image in the GWTW 
trailer)’ (Kernan, 108-109). The title se-
quence of the film still echoes ‘Gone with 
the Wind’, but is stripped of all direct the-
matic allusions besides the ‘sun’. More 
abstract, it stands by itself.
7. It is Duel in the Sun that inspires Laura 
Mulvey to ‘afterthoughts’ on her concept of 
female spectatorship: ‘The fantasy of “ac-
tion” finds expression through a metaphor 
of masculinity. Both in the language used 
by Freud and in the male personifications of 
desire flanking the female protagonist in 
the melodrama, this metaphor acts as a 
strait-jacket, becoming itself an indicator, a 
litmus paper, of the problems inevitably 
activated by any attempt to represent the 
feminine in patriarchal society’ (Mulvey, 
37). In this film, the metaphor of masculinity 
no longer works for male spectatorship 
either.
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8. ‘The postwar era ... 1946 closed with 
three even bigger hits, The Jolson Story, 
Duel in the Sun, and The Best Years of Our 
Lives. These hits capped off what was by 
far Hollywood’s biggest year ever in terms 
of box-office revenues and studio profits’ 
(Schatz, 289-290).
9. ‘In 1931 the film industry moved away 
from the central producer management 
system to a management organization in 
which a group of men supervised six to 
eight films per year, usually each producer 
concentrating on a particular type of film. 
Like other changes in the mode, this intro-
duced greater specialization, in this case 
in the upper-management levels. In fact, 
over the period of the central producer 
system, specialization in the producer 
function was already occurring’ (Bordwell, 
320).
10. ‘When Marty and I embarked upon this 
project, we never expected it to be so emo-
tional. Originally, the format agreed upon 
was two 52-minute programs. However, as 
soon as we started charting our vast sub-
ject, conventional standards fell away. We 
had to create our own parameters, without 
fear of being selective or subjective’  
(Wilson, 8).
11. ‘This trailer [for the animation film 
Shark Tale] showcases... a very entertain-
ing exchange between De Niro and Martin 
Scorsese as Sykes, a puffer fish with the 
instantly recognizable Scorsese bushy 
eyebrows’ (The Codfather).
12. See Rotten Tomatoes’ General Discus-
sion: ‘Scorsese’s eyebrows vs. Tarantino’s 
forehead’.
13. ‘Hitchcock’s first job in the film indus-
try was as a title illustrator for the British 
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production branch of the most powerful 
of American companies – Paramount Pic-
tures’ (Ryall, 85).
14. ‘[I]t was for Alfred Hitchcock in the 
early Sixties – in Vertigo, North by North-
west and Psycho – that Bass evolved his 
most exalted, sophisticated and altogether 
disturbing form of abstraction’ (Romney).
15. Something that relates to another as-
pect of The Interpretation of Dreams: 
‘Titles and credits thus consolidate an 
a priori impression in which the final se-
quence prevails over the first: the story will 
advance in a rectilinear fashion. They es-
tablish what Freud would call a “purposive 
idea”, working beneath the development 
of the fiction as a structuring absence’ 
(Vernet, 5).
16. ‘[D]uring the thirties each studio... 
typically developed a distinctive house 
style when it produced the most important 
films on its roster at the level where differ-
entiation would normally be most effec-
tive.... The famous MGM look was created 
mainly by one individual, Cedric Gibbons. 
“The nearest thing to a movie star that 
Hollywood art direction ever had”, Gib-
bons was “one of the most powerful per-
sonalities in America’s most powerful stu-
dio for thirty years”’ (Balio, 87). His ap-
pearance in MGM title sequences of that 
time was guaranteed: ‘Joining the studio 
as head of the art department in 1924, he 
had a clause inserted in his contract stipu-
lating that his credit would appear on 
every picture the studio produced, a 
stipulation that the studio respected with 
few exceptions until his retirement in 1956’ 
(Balio, 87).
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1. Freud’s Notiz über den 
‘Wunderblock’, 1924
A paper on archiving machines has to start with a Freudian impression – the subti-
tle of Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever.1 Derrida distinguishes three forms of im-
pression. The first Freudian impression is an inscription (Niederschrift), such as 
Freud’s own Notiz über den ‘Wunderblock’, handwritten in 1924, printed in 1925, 
and translated in 1940 as ‘A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”’, reactivated in 
2000 by artist Arnold Dreyblatt in his installation ‘The Wunderblock’ (Freud 
quoted in Draaisma, 7-9; Dreyblatt). 
This first Freudian impression evokes a second one. With his Note, Freud made 
an impression – he continues to make an impression – ‘on anyone, after him, who 
speaks of him or speaks to him’, among them Derrida who carried Freud’s discus-
sion on the mystic pad further. Arnold Dreyblatt, too, showed with his Wunder-
block and other installations how he is impressed by Freud, while at the same time 
making new Freudian impressions.
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A third meaning of impression is the undetermined notion. ‘Archive’ is such an im-
pression: ‘only a notion, an impression associated with a word and for which to-
gether with Freud, we do not have a concept. We only have an impression…’ (Der-
rida 1996, 29). It is this third form of impression, in conjunction with the first one, 
the scriptural impression, that is the subject of my paper. 
According to Freud, memory traces (Erinnerungsspuren) of perceptions are not 
stored permanently in the perceptual system, but in memory systems underneath. 
He demonstrated this with the mystic writing pad. This is a child’s toy, consisting 
of a pad covered with wax, protected by two sheets, one of wax paper and another 
of celluloid. Writing with a stylus on the celluloid sheet leaves traces on the wax 
paper, visible through the celluloid. The text can be erased by pulling the paper 
loose from the wax layer. The celluloid sheet corresponds with our perception of 
consciousness that observes the stimulus, but does not preserve it. The permanent 
traces (Dauerspuren) of the stimulus/stylus are apprehended in the wax layer of 
the mystic pad, analogous to the unconscious mnemic system behind the percep-
tion-consciousness. Writing on the mystic pad, as described by Freud, does not de-
pend on material being deposited durably upon the receptive surface: the writing 
leaves permanent traces in/on a mnemic system which is invisible to the observer. 
From the human mnemic system, pulses are sent to the porous perceptive layer 
– to and fro. But it is precisely this capacity – reproducing the once-faded writing 
from within – that the mystic pad is lacking. Consequently, the mystic pad is not a 
true archiving machine which both stores and retrieves and (re)produces memory-
traces. 
2. Keyboardless PDA
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The modern mystic writing pad – and a true archiving machine – is a keyboardless 
tablet pc or pda. We write with a stylus on its surface (the screen). The writing 
leaves no mark on the substrate; it looks – to use the poetic expression that the 
Flemish philosopher Ann van Sevenant adopted from Plato – like writing with wa-
ter (Van Sevenant). The stylus does not penetrate ‘the virginity of the receiving sub-
stance’ (Derrida 1978, 251). 
Can we still call such writing on a pda handwriting? Was it our hand? To what 
extent is the hand that held the stylus identifiable? Writing with a stylus on a tablet 
pc or pda produces, in some applications, handwriting just as if the screen were a 
piece of paper marked by a pen or a pencil. Such handwriting can subsequently be 
reproduced from the machine’s memory, but only because the impressions on the 
screen have been translated by software into bits, which the machine can ‘read’, 
store, retrieve and re-translate into handwriting. The immediacy of writing on a 
screen is an illusion, as is its corporeality. Does this render the tablet PC and the 
pda useless as a modern mystic writing pad, as prosthesis of live memory? 
The issue here is not so much that digital writing and storage are metaphors for hu-
man memory, but that (hand)writing can be seen as a means of archiving. Derrida’s 
main question with regard to memory is how the psychic apparatus is: 
affected differently by all the technical mechanisms for archivization and 
for reproduction, for prostheses of so-called live memory, for simulacrums 
of living things which already are, and will increasingly be more refined, 
complicated, powerful than the ‘mystic pad’ (microcomputing, electroni-
zation, computerization, etc.)? (Derrida 1996, 15) 
 
The metaphor of writing haunts European discourse (Derrida 1978, 197). Writ-
ing, Schreiben, schrijven are ambiguous words, referring to both the process and 
the product. The process is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as marking 
‘paper or some other surface by means of a pen, pencil, etc. with symbols, letters, 
or words.’ The product of such writing is ‘that which is in a written state or form’, 
‘a group or sequence of letters or symbols’.2
In German and Dutch the double meaning is even stronger: man schreibt ein 
Schreiben, men schrijft een schrijven: one writes a writ (a written formal docu-
ment). The German and Dutch verb and noun schreiben, schrijven come from the 
Latin scribere (as do the English scribe and scrivener).3 
The distinction between writing as a process and writing as a product has an 
interesting parallel in the distinction between archive as a process and archive as a 
product. The archive-product, as we will see, is reconstructible by means of the ar-
chive process. Before we can assess the extent to which handwriting is equivalent 
to writing on, in, or with archiving machines, we have to understand the recover-




What is the archive? Is it ‘only a notion, an impression’? Whereas most English and 
French archivists always use the plural ‘archives’, scholars outside the archival 
profession have started to use the singular: the archive. For most anthropologists, 
sociologists, philosophers, cultural and literary theorists the archive is the 
Foucauldian archive: ‘the general system of the formation and transformation of 
statements’ (Foucault, 145-146).
In archivists’ terminology, in German and Dutch, het archief/das Archiv (sin-
gular) is used both for the institution and the building that houses the archives 
(plural). This corresponds with the origin of the word archive, coming from the 
Greek archeion: ‘the residence of the magistrates, the archons, the place where of-
ficial documents are filed’ (Derrida 1996, 2).
Today’s archeion is an archive(s) like the National Archives, an institution that 
manages and preserves archives. Archives, the totality of documents, are defined in 
archival terminology as recorded information, regardless of form or medium, cre-
ated, received, and maintained as evidence by an agency, institution, organization 
or individual in pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business 
(Walne). The qualification is important ‘regardless of form or medium’, indicating 
that neither the mode of inscription (handwritten or typewritten, painted or print-
ed) nor the carrier (clay tablet, parchment, paper) are essential. The archival bond 
is essential, which binds the documents to the context of their creation. 
Dynamic Archiving
Archivists and historians use archives as sources, yielding documentary evidence 
about the past. Moreover, good archivists and historians 
have always studied not just what is said, but how the message is expressed: 
the language, the medium, the technology of production, the genre of the 
document, the historical circumstances and the context of writing (who the 
author is, who the intended audience is). (Heald, 93)
Disciplines other than history have also discovered the archives. Anthropologist 
Ann Stoler explains that the ‘archival turn’ in anthropology is leading her and her 
colleagues to critically reflect on the making of documents and how we choose to 
use them, on archives not as sites of knowledge retrieval but knowledge produc-
tion, as monuments of states as well as sites of state ethnography. This is not a re-
jection of colonial archives as sources of the past. Rather, it signals a more sus-
tained engagement with those archives as cultural artifacts of fact production, of 
taxonomies in the making, and of disparate notions of what made up colonial au-
thority. (Stoler ‘Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance’, 90-91; Stoler ‘On 
the Content in the Form’, 85)4 
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Scholars in other disciplines too, are looking up from the archival document and 
through the archive, looking beyond – and questioning – its boundaries (Blouin 
and Rosenberg). In doing so, the focus shifts from the actual archival document to 
its functional process or context of creation (Yakel); from the archive as a product 
to archive as a process; from the physical artifact to the ‘very act and deed’ which 
first caused that artifact to be created (Taylor); shifting the emphasis from the anal-
ysis of the properties and characteristics of individual documents to an analysis of 
the functions, processes, and transactions which cause documents to be created 
(Cook, 47). 
In this new approach, an archive and archiving are much more than the storage of 
a document (Webster’s: ‘to file or collect as records or documents in or as if in ar-
chive’). Archiving encompasses all the activities from the capture of documents 
into the system, to their management, use, and disposal. Archiving implies interac-
tions, interventions, interrogations, and interpretations by creator, user, and archi-
vist; these are activations that co-determine the archive’s meaning (Ketelaar 
2001). 
This implies that the archive is not static, but a dynamic process (Ernst 2002, 
138-139). Quite appropriately, a recent German collection of essays is entitled Ar-
chivprozesse. Die Kommunikation der Aufbewahrung [Archival processes. The 
communication of storage]. Jürgen Fohrmann, in the collection introduction, ex-
plains that the archive should be seen as a dynamic process: 
If everything that originates from the archive, is modeled by the work of 
the user, then again put into the archive, to be activated over again etc. – 
then the archive is not only to be understood as thesaurus, as place, as 
Wunderkammer, but as process. (Fohrmann, 22) 
The archive product is also formed by the archive process because any use of the 
archive retrospectively affects all earlier instances of use, or, to put it differently: 
we can no longer read a text as our predecessors have read it (Ketelaar 2001). Let 
me give an example. The records created and used by German and Dutch agencies 
during World War II to account for the looting of Jewish assets, continued to be 
used, after the war, by German and Dutch agencies in the processes of restitution 
and reparation. The same record was activated again and again by different soci-
etal powers, for different purposes and for different audiences, as it continues to be 
activated today in the search for looted and lost works of art and other Holocaust 
assets. The looting and the registration of the looted property were, of course, an 
appalling event, but it was through the subsequent reemployment of the record 
that the primary registration really became a record of a traumatic experience. 
This is an application of Freud’s Nachträglichkeit (retrospective causality): events 
that occur later may not only change the significance, but the nature of prior events 
as well (Van Zyl, 53-55). Archives do not have ‘a single past, but an unbroken se-
quence of past times leading backward from the present moment.’5 
Eric Ketelaar
188
Archives, however, are not only leading backward: they secure the present for the 
future, transmitting authentic evidence of human activity and experience through 
time (Ernst 2002, 120-122). Archives, libraries, museums are all in the ‘memory 
business’, ensuring ‘time future contained in time past’ (Ketelaar 2004). But what 
distinguishes archives from all other memory institutions is that the individual, or-
ganizational, and collective memories they preserve are not defined primarily in 
terms of a cultural heritage because they have been created as ‘process-bound in-
formation’: ‘[I]nformation generated by coherent work processes and structured 
and recorded by these work processes in such a way that it can be retrieved from 
the context of those work processes’ (Thomassen, 374).
Archives are memory because they are evidence. They are not only evidence of 
a transaction, but also evidence of some historic fact that is either part of the trans-
action itself, or that may be traced via the transaction, or that which is otherwise 
embodied in the record, or in the context of the archiving process. 
Archivalization
Archiving is mostly understood to be the activity that follows upon the creation of 
a document. Archival theory, however, carries archiving one step forward because 
at the front end of a record-keeping system, documents are captured, that is, ac-
cepted by the system. Derrida has introduced the notion of archivation (archiviza-
tion in the English translation).6 Archivization extends beyond capture, it includes 
the creative phase before capture, it is consigning, inscribing a trace in some exter-
nal location, some space outside. Paul Ricoeur uses the term archivation too, refer-
ring to writing down the oral testimony and then setting aside, assembling, and 
collecting these traces (Ricoeur, 166-168).
Before archivization, however, before the impression of a document, there is a 
‘moment of truth’ (Stuckey, 270) which I propose to call archivalization, a neolo-
gism, meaning the conscious or unconscious choice (determined by social and cul-
tural factors) to consider something worth archiving (Ketelaar 1999; 2000, 328-
329). Archivalization precedes Derridean archivization and archiving. The search-
light of archivalization has to sweep the world for something to illuminate in the 
archival sense, before we proceed to register, to record, to inscribe it, in short, be-
fore we start archivization and archiving. 
We are looking at the Pompeii fresco of a girl writing (Illustration 3). Is she 
writing? Is she thinking? About what? I would suggest that we are looking at 
someone in the process of archivalization, pondering her choices of whether to in-
scribe her thoughts or not, whether to take the next step or not, toward archiviza-
tion – handwriting the trace and then to archive it. 
By differentiating archivalization from subsequent inscription or archivization, 
which is then followed by archiving, we gain a better understanding of the tacit 
narratives of the archives (Ketelaar 2001). These tacit narratives, the meanings of 
archives, must be inferred from the content, structure, and form of the archival 
documents. 
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3. The process of archivalization 
Digital Records
In paper records, content, structure, and form are physically present in the docu-
ment and its physical arrangement. Digital records, however, do not present their 
content, structure, and form in or on a physical medium, but rather in a digital rep-
resentation that serves as a generator for various ways in which the document can 
be made visible (Simons, 57). Digital documents are potential documents, that 
emerge only by virtue of software that understands how to access and display them 
(Rothenberg). Moreover, the circumscription of a digital document is different 
from a physical document because it often includes links to other documents, and 
it is variable and changeable, fluid and unstable.7 An original no longer exists be-
cause, intrinsically, each recording or representation (on a medium, a screen or as 
a printout) is a representation or rather a reconstruction made by the operating 
system and the application software.8 As David Levy notes, digital materials are 
made up of both the digital representation and the perceptible forms produced 
from it. The digital archive can only be communicated through space and time by 
being continuously ‘manufactured just-in-time, on the spot’ (Levy, 152). ‘Ensuring 
the technical and intellectual survival of authentic records through time’, as ISO 
standard 15489 requires, means reconstructing the content, form, and structure of 
a record through time, every time making an ‘authentic copy’ of an original that 
never existed in reality but only as a virtual construction. 
The original in the digital age has disappeared, it has to be reconstructed time 
and again by means of copies: the original is inscribed in its copy (Ernst 1988, 
515). The copy permits a (re)construction of the original. Retrieving the original 
by reconstruction is like the reconstruction of information stored in human mem-
ory. As neurologist Antonio Damasio explains, the memory you have of someone 
you met is not stored as a lifelike copy, not like a Polaroid picture, but rather as 
‘dispositions’, a set of codings for reactivation or reconstruction:
And once you apply the reconstruction mechanism, you have a chance of 
bringing to your mind some kind of image that approximates the image 
that you actually had in perception. (Damasio and Mulder 2003)
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The ‘disappearance of the original’ in the digital age has led to a major paradigm 
shift in archival science, as Hugh Taylor foresaw in as early as 1988 (Taylor). Ar-
chival science can no longer utilize many of the concepts that were applicable in 
the world of paper and parchment.9 Its object is no longer a tangible document or 
file in a logical and partly physical context that can be arranged and described, 
used and preserved, as in the paper world: the object is the archive process rather 
than the archive product. 
Duplex Writing/Reading
A digital document is not a thing in and of itself. It is ‘no more than an interpretive 
moment in a never-ending conversation with the texts’.10 The digital document 
speaks in a dialogue with the reader/viewer, who may be outside the visible text, 
but never outside its invisible narrative.11 In our digital world, as Mark Poster af-
firms ‘Texts become “hypertexts” which are reconstructed in the act of reading, 
rendering the reader an author’ (Poster, 188). The text becomes an interactive dia-
logue between ‘the writer and her readers, and the reader could be asked to share 
the responsibility for the outcome’ (Bolter, 112). Writing becomes part of a dual 
process of writing/reading. The writer and the reader sit at their keyboardless com-
puter screens and connect with their archiving machines via a stylus or their voices 
or the heat of their fingers as they touch the screen. The hand of handwriting has 
been transformed into a part of the machine, entailing not only ‘a profound trans-
formation of the body and of our relationship to our own body’ (Derrida and Stie-
gler, 96), but also embodying handwriting with a new functionality. 
Digital Handwriting
The hand that is writing on a keyboardless tablet pc or pda connects the human 
body with a machine body, leaving no permanent mark on the substrate, but trans-
ferring from one body to another the potentiality of reconstruction. Contingent to 
that reconstructibility are the features of conventional handwriting: immediacy, 
singularity, iterability and corporeality – or rather the digital equivalents of these 
features. Immediacy and corporeality of digital handwriting are an illusion. The 
archiving machine stores a simulacrum of what has been ‘written’ (i.e., construct-
ed by the hand interfacing with the machine), it may even be able to ‘remember’ 
(i.e., reconstruct) the writing hand. Moreover, even the writing mind can be recon-
structed by means of an archaeology of the mise-en-abîme of continuous archival-
ization and archivization. From the archival machine behind the screen we can re-
call a ‘copy’ of what we wrote. The copy permits a (re)construction of the original. 
To quote Aleida and Jan Assmann refuting Walter Benjamin, the original ‘is not 
displaced by its copies, but is constructed by them and can thrive with them’ (Ass-
mann and Assmann, 156). Similarly, handwriting as a product may be displaced 
by writing on archiving machines, but handwriting as a process can be constructed 
through the archiving process and can thrive. 
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Archival Constructs
This ‘new’ writing (hands-on or hands-off) on archiving machines constitutes one 
of what Derrida calls archival technologies that determine ‘not merely the moment 
of the conservational recording, but rather the very institution of the archivable 
event’ (Derrida 1996, 18). Archives do not merely serve to preserve for the future 
an archivable content of the present. Rather, that present and its relation to the fu-
ture are constructed through archiving: in Derrida’s words ‘The archivization pro-
duces as much as it records the event’ (Derrida Archive Fever, 17; ‘Archive Fever. A 
Seminar’, 35). The Amsterdam Achterhuis (the Secret Annex) – I do not mean the 
brick and mortar one, but the Achterhuis as a lieu de mémoire – exists only be-
cause of its archivization in Anne Frank’s Diary. Another example: according to 
Dutch law, the fact of a child’s birth only exists by virtue of its registration. There-
fore, when a baby dies before its birth has been registered, a birth certificate is not 
issued, only a certificate stating that the child was not alive at the moment of dec-
laration. In other words, the birth has never happened, because it was never regis-
tered (Ketelaar 1999, 57). A photograph or a video is not just a recording: it con-
stitutes the event. Think of home movies: the happy moments in the movie are 
staged, they are produced by their archivization in the movie (Roepke). Even what 
is transmitted on television ‘live’ is ‘produced before being transmitted’ (Derrida 
and Stiegler, 40).
Archivization systems are active creators of categories because people in these 
systems, through archivalization, ‘classify away traces that they know to be rele-
vant but which should not be officially recorded’ (Bowker and Star, 279, 321). It is 
impossible to die of old age, because the International Classification of Diseases 
does not recognize ‘being worn out’ as a cause of death (Bowker and Star, 90, 276). 
Bowker and Star give many other examples of the way in which life is constructed 
and ordered by classification, labeling and categorization. Their study affirms Der-
rida’s assumption that ‘the mutation in technology changes not simply the archiv-
ing process, but what is archivable – that is, the content of what has to be archived 
is changed by the technology’ (Derrida Archive Fever 6, 17; ‘Archive Fever: A Sem-
inar’, 46; Ketelaar 1999, 2000). Technology conditions not only the form or the 
structure, but also the content of the writing. Of course, technology is not the only 
factor that determines form and content, because cognitive and cultural agencies 
also play an important role, as demonstrated by the following examples.
Until quite recently, Dutch people were instructed to deal with only one subject 
when writing a letter to the government – the governmental filing system, with one 
file for each subject, could not cope with a citizen’s letter that included more than 
one subject (Ketelaar 1997, 214-215).12 The technology of archivization condi-
tions the archivalization (the choice of a citizen to deal with a particular topic in 
her letter), which in turn, conditions archivization and archiving because when in-
coming letters deal with only one subject, they can be dealt with in a relatively sim-
ple work process, sustained by a relatively simple document management system. 
When one uses sms (Short Message Service) on a mobile telephone, the form 
and content of the message will be different from a message sent by e-mail or a 
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message conveyed in a handwritten letter. This difference is due to the technology 
in terms of a complex interplay with social and cultural norms governing what to 
sms and how to sms.13 
Likewise, the technology of handwriting on a tablet pc or pda conditions the 
content of the writing, which to a large extent will be different from the content of 
a handwritten text on paper. 
In the preceding sections I have argued that the archive-as-a-process works in two 
ways. Looking backward – before the impression or archivization – we encounter 
archivalization. And looking the other way, we see that the archive is never closed, 
it is shaped by the anticipation of the future – the future anterior (Derrida Archive 
Fever, 18, 68; ‘Archive Fever: A Seminar’, 40). But this power of the archive is lim-
ited by the paradox of anticipation: the archive fever which, by anticipating death, 
is already ‘deadening death [à amortir la mort] to the point where it can’t even hap-
pen anymore’ (Derrida and Stiegler, 106). Here and now, the ‘impression’ produc-
es as much as it records the event, embodying the event with meaning, while stay-
ing receptive to future activations of the archive which will add to and change its 
former meanings: ‘a perpetual endgame of inscriptions’ (Brothman, 192). 
The handwriting on, in or with an archiving machine that is kept in the ma-
chine’s archive memory is only decipherable and understandable in terms of the 
processes of archivalization, archivization and archiving through which the ar-
chive product was constituted and subsequently activated and re-activated by ever 
new impressions. 
It does not matter by what technology these impressions are inscribed, as long 
as the archiving machine keeps a trace of what has been traced on the surface. 




1. Derrida’s translator Eric Prenowitz 
writes: ‘Archival machines. I prefer 
archiving machines as a translation of 
machines à archiver. Reversely, the 
machines à archives in Derrida’s L’Écriture 
et la différence (translated in Derrida’s 
Writing and Difference as ‘machines for 
storing archives’) might be called archival 
machines (Archivmaschinen).
2. According to the Oxford English Diction-
ary: ‘The action of one who writes, in vari-
ous senses; the penning or forming of 
letters or words; the using of written char-
acters for purposes of record, transmis-
sion of ideas, etc.’ ‘That which is in a writ-
ten (now also typewritten) state or form; 
something penned or recorded; written 
information, composition, or production; 
literary work or compilation.’
3. The word was adapted at a time when 
the Germans adopted the Roman way of 
writing, replacing the scratching of runes 
(krassen, German: reissen, old Dutch 
rijten, compare writing). See N. van Wijk, 
Franck’s Etymologisch woordenboek der 
Nederlandsche taal, 2nd ed. ’s-Graven-
hage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1912.
4. See also Betty Joseph, Reading the East 
India Company, 1720-1840: Colonial Cur-
rencies of Gender, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004.
5. See Kenneth L. Ames, ‘Introduction’, in: 
Alan Axelrod (ed.), The Colonial Revival in 
America, Henry Francis du Pont Winterthur 
Museum, Wilmington, DE, 1975, 6, quoted 
by Spencer R. Crews and James E. Smis in 
‘Locating Authenticity: Fragments of a 
Dialogue’, in: Ivan Karp and Steven D. 
Lavine (eds.), The Poetics and Politics of 
Museum Display, 160, Washington and 
London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 
1991.
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6. The term archivation was first used in 
the nineties by the French philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler, see Chabin, 66. French 
archivists, however, used the term before 
as the equivalent of archivéconomie or 
archivage, Delmas 2001, 28.
7. See John Mackenzie Owen, ‘Authenticity 
and Objectivity in Scientific Communica-
tion: Implications of Digital Media’ in this 
volume, p.60.
8. In modern diplomatics, an original is 
‘the first complete and effective record’, 
see Duranti; MacNeil; and Duranti, East-
wood and MacNeil. Following Delmas 
1996, I contend that every (digitally cre-
ated) view (or instantation) of a (digitally 
created) ‘original’ is a reconstruction.
9. In other disciplines, the concept of an 
‘original’ is also challenged: ‘Most medi-
eval scholars would be hard pressed to 
correlate the term “original” with any given 
manuscript… Text-editors would reject out-
of-hand the notion of “original” applied to 
a specific manuscript…’ (Nichols, 264). 
10. See Dodge, 19. Also see Cook 2001 
and Ketelaar 2001, 10.
11. See Harris 1997, 136; Harris 2000, 20; 
Harris 2002, 65. 
12. ‘The limits inherent in writing and typ-
ing on paper to some extent dictate the 
kind of policy which can be effectively 
pursued… the early indexed filing systems 
allowed for the solution of limited, reactive 
problems but did not facilitate long-term 
planning based on coordinated informa-
tion’ (Taylor).
13. Young people tend to use ‘SMS lan-
guage’ not only in writing an SMS but in  
e-mail and letters as well – an interesting 
form of remediation of a cultural practice.
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Blood Samples and 
Blood as Artificial 
Matter, Artistic 
Material, and Means 
of the Signature
All handwriting leaves a trace, even if it is only the trace of an absent body that 
produced this trace. This trace can be anything from a drawn line or a scribble to a 
short note, a sketch or a signature, and it can mean anything, ranging from mere 
‘non-sense’ produced in the process of a bodily automatism while thinking of 
something else, to a meaningful act of leaving a message or even of authenticating 
oneself through the act of signing. 
Therefore, writing, handwriting, and drawing may always commence with a 
playful act without definite purpose: a face drawn in the sand with one finger by a 
child and then signed by the first letters it is able to write – or able to imagine as her 
or his own name. From there on, the technique is ever improved, as are the tools 
extended where the hand learns to control its movements, and where one finger 
that left a trace in the sand is extended and replaced by the tool of a pencil or pen. 
The index (or thumb) which so often left an immediate stain on a piece of paper or 
textile, or a temporary impression on the skin of another person, begins to lose di-
rect contact with the bearer of traces – be it paper, parchment or skin. 
The connection that my text reflects on is the seemingly obvious one of (hand-) 
writing-signature and trace-impression/print, which also implies the dialectics of 
presence/absence of a body. That presence/absence may be less manifest when we 
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regard the liquid normally used within the writing process but which immediately 
gains another (symbolic) quality when it undergoes a substitution of, for example, 
ink for blood.
My approach is based on Mieke Bal’s and Norman Bryson’s article ‘Semiotics 
and Art History’ and their reference to Jacques Derrida. According to Bal and Bry-
son the signature:
is the most typical case of the Derridian ‘trace’, the indexical sign that re-
fers by contiguity, not simply to the past (the maker of the image) but, more 
importantly, to the future, the reading of it. The act of writing, which for 
Derrida is much more than graphic writing alone, is precisely the produc-
tion of traces, and painting, drawing, and, most emphatically, etching are 
also acts of writing in this sense. (Bal and Bryson, 190)
When, therefore, considering the relation between the trace and the impression, or 
print, one also has to keep in mind the footstep, the fingerprint, the mark, the cast 
and – last but not least – the copy. Georges Didi-Huberman, in his essay on the im-
pression (‘L’empreinte’), uses the example of the footstep to clarify their related-
ness: in order to produce a footstep, the foot has to sink into the sand, but one has 
to remove the foot in order to render the footstep, or its impression, visible.1 In 
other words, the impression (empreinte) is dependent upon a dialectics of presence 
and absence. A main condition, or requirement, is, of course, a form of contact, a 
touch. The remains of such a touch – the trace or print – is characterized by its ‘in-
dexicality’. But, as we will see, this indexicality turns into iconicity when the liquid 
used for handwriting is consciously changed or even intentionally supplemented.
Therefore, I will make a few theoretical remarks on the index and the icon be-
fore I start with a short overview of the use of blood in contemporary arts and then 
look a bit more closely at a work by Jenny Holzer.
Charles Sanders Peirce, in his typology, defined the sign as tripartite, comprised of 
icon, index, and symbol. I shall confine myself to icon and index in this context. 
According to Peirce’s definition: 
an icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it signifi-
cant, even though its object had no existence; such as lead-pencil streak as 
representing a geometric line. An index is a sign which would, at once, lose 
the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but would 
not lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for example, is a 
piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; for without the 
shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether any-
body has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. [A symbol is a sign which 
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would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpre-
tant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies what it does only by 
virtue of its being understood to have that signification.] (Peirce, quoted in 
Bal and Bryson, 189)
Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, in their article ‘Semiotics and Art History’, do not 
only warn against identifying the icon with the entire domain of the visual (al-
though I ignore this warning since I shall, as you will see, concentrate on the visu-
al!). On the contrary, Bal and Bryson emphasize that the icon can be:
best seen as a sign capable of evoking nonexistent objects because it pro-
poses to imagine an object similar to the sign itself. Iconicity is in the first 
place a mode of reading, based on a hypothetical similarity between sign 
and object. (Bal and Bryson, 189)
Bal and Bryson stress Peirce’s emphasis on a symmetrical opposition of icon and 
index insofar as:
while the icon does not need the object to exist, the index functions precise-
ly on the ground of that existence. His [Peirce’s] example suggests that real, 
existential contiguity between indexical sign and object (or meaning) is in-
dispensable. (Bal and Bryson, 190)
To put my conclusion in terms of a question: Can (or shall) we regard this symmet-
rical opposition between icon and index to be in any way analogous to the opposi-
tion that Walter Benjamin establishes in the notions of aura and trace (‘Spur’) in 
his ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’? If the aura repre-
sents an absent presence and the trace a present absence, can this be said vice versa 
of the index and the icon?
The fingerprint (as pen) and the human skin (as writing-surface) will, in the fol-
lowing, serve as ‘media’ to further develop these questions.
When Iraqi citizens, during the presidential elections in Iraq in the Summer of 
2002, wanted to express their absolute loyalty to Saddam Hussein, they did so in a 
peculiar way. The voters pressed their (right) thumb, impregnated with their own 
blood, on their ballots. The gesture was certainly meant to emphasize the uncondi-
tional faithfulness of the voter: the fingerprint stood for, or replaced, the signature 
(or the voting ‘X’) and the sentiment was confirmed by the substitution of the vot-
er’s own blood for normal ink. Because that ‘very particular juice’ (‘ein ganz beson-
derer Saft’, according to Mephistopheles in Faust) that is blood serves here as a 
means of reinforcing authenticity by placing emphasis on the fingerprint as abso-
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lutely authentic: both the blood and the fingerprint belong to a particular person 
and, moreover, are part of his body or at least an immediate body effect. Moreo-
ver, in direct relation to this reinforcement, the gesture made with the blood-
soaked finger expresses a certain readiness, namely the readiness to die as a mar-
tyr.
For the last 120 years or so, we have, mainly within legal discourse, come to 
regard the fingerprint as an unmistakable – and ‘unfakeable’ – characteristic of 
the individual. In order to develop a typology of the criminal subject, men of sci-
ence like Alphonse Bertillon and Francis Galton developed several procedures to 
examine the face and the fingerprint. The latter in particular gained a prominent 
position in the detection of crimes and the question of identity. As Georges Didi-
Huberman notes with the fingerprint in mind, it is remarkable, how a singularity 
with all its improbability became the valid symbol for identity (Didi-Huberman, 
1999, 194). And yet, any identification is deeply dependent on the copy, in other 
words, authenticity is dependent on reproduction because identity can be con-
firmed by comparing it with several copies, for example from an archive.
The fingerprint is also closely related to the signature, and not just because in 
both cases ink leaves a trace or stain. As Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s cousin 
and one of the fathers of the scientific version of racism called eugenics, pointed 
out in his book on the fingerprint published in 1892, this personal characteristic 
was an esteemed way of signing letters in China and Bengal. Carlo Ginzburg, in 
his wide-ranging essay on traces, makes a connection with prophecy and fortune 
telling. He assumes that a culture that deciphers the drawings on a tortoise shell or 
the traces of birds must have also been able to decipher a fingerprint as a kind of 
writing (Ginzburg, 89). It was, however, the British colonial administration that 
took advantage of this practice in order to identify those subordinates of the Com-
monwealth who all seemed to look the same to them. As we all know today, this 
was the beginning of the fingerprint file – and, in connection with the archived 
photographic images of delinquents and suspects, of modern criminology (Ginz-
burg, 90).
The fingerprint, the face, and the signature are all still considered as the major 
characteristics used for identification (if we ignore extraordinary characteristics 
like scars). All three acquire their authentication, that is to say, their authoriza-
tion, from a kind of ‘mother copy’. Every signature and every fingerprint has to be 
more or less an identical copy of another one. But is there any original? Our faces 
change over the years, our signature always varies a bit. Authenticity, therefore, 
seems to be established in a process of constant repetition and constant compari-
son. During that process, identity is proven by similarity, which is proven by re-
peated visual examination. The substance used in order to obtain all these copies 
(including the printing of photographs of faces) – ink – is regarded more or less as 
neutral. In other words, the main quality of the substance that allows traces like 




In the following sections, I would like to slightly skew the picture a little bit by 
bringing in a different substance that is not at all neutral: blood. Compared to ink, 
blood seems much more auratic, even frightening, because blood is directly related 
to the body, either to the body of someone who voluntarily gives blood or has a 
blood test, or someone who has been wounded.
Blood has almost vanished from our everyday life. This has not always been 
the case, as the Italian social anthropologist Piero Camporesi has shown in his 
study on the ‘Juice of Life’. In the Middle Ages and in early modern times, blood 
was much more a part of the public sphere. Today, in a society almost obsessed 
with privacy, and especially in times of hiv, blood seems too close to death and is 
therefore hidden behind the walls of hospitals and medical practices. This is con-
firmed by the pervasiveness of blood in action movies and crime or splatter movies. 
Blood evokes what in German is so aptly called ‘Berührungsangst’ – a fear of 
touching, a fear of contact.
In contemporary art, the use of blood, of real blood – be it human blood or 
‘merely’ animal blood – has almost always been regarded as a taboo-breaking act. 
It will thus come as no surprise that blood in art has often provoked a scandal. And 
I should add that I am referring to the Western Judeo-Christian art tradition. How-
ever, I cannot account for traditions such as Afro-Cuban syncretist rituals, for ex-
ample. As ‘material’ – and one might even hesitate to call it a material in the usual 
sense – blood has been used mainly in performances, sparingly in Ana Mendieta’s 
bodywork, while extremely lavishly, even wastefully, in Herman Nitsch’s ‘Orgy-
Mystery-Theatre’. Not accidentally, most of these performances are interpreted as, 
or associated with, cult-like practices, and the inherent symbolism ranges from 
wounds and healing rituals to sacrifice and collective profligacy.
But there is more to the combination of blood and art than mere mimicry of re-
ligious undercurrents. What is at stake here is a revitalization of the aura, a re-au-
ratization of the arts in the age of mechanical reproduction, namely in a way that 
relates art to Benjamin’s notion of the ‘Kultwert’ (cult value) of the work of art. 
The definition of the aura as ‘einmalige Erscheinung einer Ferne, so nah sie sein 
mag’ (Benjamin, 1936, 142) [as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however 
close it may be (Benjamin, 1969, 222)] reconnects the cult value of the work of art 
to categories of apperception of time and space, and thus to the experience of an 
observer.
When Benjamin speaks of the ‘Kultwert’ of the art work, he seems to do so 
with the implicit intention of establishing it as a third term, in opposition or at 
least in calculated distinction to Marx’s notions of Gebrauchswert (value in use) 
and Tauschwert (exchangeable value). This is made clear when Benjamin opens up 
his Work of Art essay, with reference to Marx’s analysis of capitalist production. 
Production, as an economic practice, thus becomes the starting point for any re-
production or copy. Whereas, of course, the cult value is rooted in the ritual: ‘Der 
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einzigartige Wert des “echten” Kunstwerks hat seine Fundierung im Ritual, in dem 
es seinen originären und ersten Gebrauchswert hatte’ (Benjamin, 143-144).
Given the fact that rituals are, by definition, acts of repetition, it is the object 
used in the ritual that gains its aura both through its singularity and its presence. In 
other words, the work of art derives much of its aura from its singularity or, at 
least, its rarity, and presence – which might sound somewhat banal. Let me first 
give an example. During the 1950s, the artist Yves Klein performed his so-called 
‘Anthropometries’, a series of body prints on paper, carried out by naked female 
models ‘dressed’ only in colors.2
It is reported that Klein also used ox blood in this manner during one private 
performance. When he signed the paper rolls of bloody imprints of the models’ 
bodies, he purportedly pricked his index finger with a needle and stamped the 
work of art with a fingerprint dipped in his own blood.
None of those pieces survive, however. According to his friend, the art critic 
Pierre Restany, Yves Klein destroyed them all shortly after the performance. He 
commented on this self-destructive act of iconoclasm by saying that he had the 
feeling that he had come too close to the devil (Wagner, 228-229). I mention this 
because of the somewhat strange echo of Benjamin’s definition of the aura as ‘a dis-
tance so near’. All the more so because Yves Klein once admitted, not surprisingly, 
that his ‘Anthropometries’ were inspired by a film on Hiroshima (showing, among 
others, the shadows of victims left on a wall) and the (lost) image of the Vera Icon, 
also known as the legendary sudarium of Veronica. This refers to the myth of the 
supposed actual image of Christ’s face, called the Mandylion or the sudarium of 
Veronica, appearing as a ‘print’ on a piece of cloth. The original was said to have 
been preserved as a relic in Constantinople until 1204, and was then lost during 
the plundering of the city.
One tale regarding the origin of the Vera Icon relates the portrait to a woman 
by the name of Veronica (of course, an anagrammatic name) who is said to have 
been among the mourning women under the cross who, during Christ’s journey to 
the Cross, gave him a piece of cloth to dry his face. According to this legend, the 
combination of sweat and blood from the suffering Christ created the first and 
only true portrait of Christ. And thus, the use of blood in combination with the im-
print of body parts, in this case the face of Christ, can be traced back to this Vera 
Icon. 
The relationship between the following example and the Vera Icon is predicat-
ed on the notion of blood-ink and the inherent symbolism of victim and sacrifice.
Jenny Holzer’s ‘Lustmord’ (rape and murder) was a work commissioned by the 
German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung for their weekly supplement Süddeut-
sche Zeitung Magazin. Conceived in 1993-94 during the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia, it is a reaction at that time to the constant news of the violation and 
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rape of women. The result, however, is in no way a simple reaction, in terms of tak-
ing a position. ‘Lustmord’ presents three different viewpoints of a rape, namely the 
perpetrator’s, the victim’s, and the observer’s.3 It is important to note that it is im-
possible to distinguish which position the artist herself has assumed.
Holzer uses cropped photographs of naked skin upon which she wrote various 
texts. We are not told whether these skin surfaces belong to a victim, or a perpetra-
tor, or to some uninvolved bystander. I will not go into the details of the texts’ con-
tent nor discuss the issue of violence and language, which is one of the topics of this 
piece. Instead, I would like to concentrate on the question of handwriting, print, 
and reproduction. Although written in neutral capital letters, it is clearly recogniz-
able that Holzer’s words are written by hand. The handwriting was carried out by 
means of a pen or a felt-tip marker. Some of the texts look like a tattoo, some ap-
pear blurred by sweat. The colors used are mostly red, blue, and black. It remains 
unclear, however, if the different colors represent, or are in any other way connect-
ed to, the aforementioned perspectives of victim, perpetrator, and observer. Nor is 
it possible to ascertain which part of the body has been used as a writing surface. 
These handwriting samples have been reproduced twice: first, during the pho-
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tographic session with the artist, and second, during preparations for the printing 
process of the insert. This is of some importance, as I will point out in a moment. 
The cover of the magazine with the inserted photographs again shows a text in 
scarlet red, but this time it is not written on skin. A white sheet of paper positioned 
over the black background of the magazine contains the following text: ‘Da wo 
Frauen sterben bin ich hellwach’ [‘I am wide-awake where women die’]. This sheet 
of paper with the red handwriting was printed separately and glued to the cover. 
Then human blood donated by women volunteers from Yugoslavia was added by 
the artist to the red ink – not the pen ink, but the printing process ink. The behold-
er is not informed whether these donors were victims or not. Of course, this mix-
ture of blood and ink was made public and of course it did cause a scandal, and, of 
course, the scandal was a calculated one.
Nevertheless, by reproducing handwriting, at least partly, and by using blood, 
the artist manages to rephrase the question of physical authenticity in a new way 
that reformulates the question of copy/reproduction and difference. While the 
original handwriting ‘contains’ only ink, the reproduction contains both ink and 
blood. Although we are unable to distinguish this difference, the implication, nev-
ertheless made public knowledge here, is also meant to produce an auratic effect. 
2. Jenny Holzer, ‘Lustmord’, 1993-94
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The distant echo of the Vera Icon returns as a trace – the trace of handwriting, and 
of a hand writing. It is the trace of a ‘blood toll’ which has not been demanded in 
terms of heroic sacrifice, i.e., the martyrdom (of men), but is the result of perma-
nent victimization (of women).4 
I conclude by recalling Bal and Bryson’s presentation of the index-icon symmetry:
the iconic is a quality of the sign in relation to its object; it is best seen as a 
sign capable of evoking nonexistent objects because it proposes to imagine 
an object similar to the sign itself. Iconicity is in the first place a mode of 
reading, based on a hypothetical similarity between sign and object. (Bal 
and Bryson, 189)
The iconicity in Holzer’s piece is therefore evoked via its association with blood 
stains, although there is no equivalent in terms of a real object that exists or has ex-
isted. There is no real blood in the game either. But, nevertheless, there is also an 
indexical procedure at work here insofar as the ‘handmade’ copies point to an ab-
sent ‘original’ that has left an impression. 
In conclusion I would like to formulate a possible hypothesis: in all of my ex-
amples blood, this highly symbolic liquid, establishes an irritating oscillation be-
tween indexicality and iconicity. In terms of an artistic strategy, this serves as a 
kind of reinsertion of ‘authenticity’ into the realm of the copy. I conclude with the 
observation, formulated after Hal Foster, that the observer always witnesses some 
kind of uncanny return of the real. 




1. See Georges Didi-Huberman, Ähnlich-
keit und Berührung, 190.
2. For Klein’s Anthropometries, see Stich, 
171-186.
3. This tripartite ‘structure’ seems crucial 
to me to properly understand violence and 
its images in a media society. As far as 
I know, there exists no systematic analysis 
of this constellation. See Susan Sontag’s 
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essay Regarding the Pain of Others. For 
the case of the Holocaust, see, for exam-
ple, Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, 
Bystanders. The Jewish Catastrophe 1933-
1945.
4. The German term Opfer leaves it open to 
context and interpretation if a deed, a per-
son, etc. must be regarded as sacrifice or 
victim.
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Writing Over                
         , Writing With       
                     On Shirin 
Neshat’s Women of 
Allah Series
A close-up in black and white. A larger than life-size portrait of a woman covered 
in black, with a black veil. The veil only leaves her eyes and nose visible whereas 
her lips and neck are hidden beneath the black folds that frame her face and ex-
pands across the image’s surface. The woman, with her heavily ‘Oriental’ made-up 
eyes, looks at the viewer directly; yet it is a fleeting glance. It is as if the camera’s 
shutter was clicked just as the woman was passing by, capturing the very instant 
she glimpsed at the camera; this moment is further emphasized by her aslant pos-
ture. In her frozen stillness she does not challenge the viewer’s gaze; her look does 
not force the viewer to avert her eyes. It is perhaps because she is facing the viewer 
through the Arabic letters written across the visible parts of her face, leaving only 
her eyes exempt from the scribbled lettering. Written in black-and-red ink, the text 
flows in circles in a loop left bare by the veil and ends (or begins?) just amidst her 
eyebrows, becoming as hypnotic as the eyes looking at the viewer (Illustration 1). 
Another monochromatic portrait of a veiled woman: Here the veil renders her 
face visible but covers her from head to shoulders. Like the first woman, she stares 
at the viewer directly, yet hers is a confrontational gaze. It is a straight look that 
will not be interrupted; she is not going to blink. She holds a gun right in front of 
her face in her invisible hands (outside the image frame, presumably under her 
veil). The gun splits her face in two, as well as the Arabic text inscribed on it. Un-
like the first one, the text in this image is written in black ink in a linear horizontal 
manner, again leaving her eyes untouched (Illustration 2). 
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1. Shirin Neshat, I Am Its Secret, 1993 
These two images, I Am Its Secret and the latter Rebellious Silence, are part of Shi-
rin Neshat’s photographic series Women of Allah. Neshat is an Iranian-born artist 
living and working in New York. According to Hamid Naficy, Neshat is among a 
group of ‘intercultural artists and filmmakers in the West whose lives and works 
intersect artistic domains (in her case, photography and film) and cross boundaries 
of style, genre, gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, language and culture’ (2000, 
43). Neshat left Iran well before the Islamic revolution in 1979, and returned for 
the first time in 1990. Three years after that visit, she started the monochromatic 
photo series Women of Allah and kept the project going until 1997. In Neshat’s 
words, the series focuses on ‘the Islamic revolution in Iran and particularly on the 
subject of women in relation to violence and politics’ (Desai 2003). The photo-
graphic series is composed of images of women, mostly of Neshat herself, wearing 
veils and carrying guns with Farsi calligraphy written all over them. Most of the 
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2. Shirin Neshat, Rebellious Silence, 1994 
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time, the texts are written across the visible body parts, especially on the face, the 
hands, and the feet – the only parts of a woman that are allowed to be visible ac-
cording to the mandatory dress code. Yet, contrary to the potential first impression 
that might place the handwriting immediately on the body, the text in the series is 
written over the images, not on the bodies of the photographed women. As such, 
the handwritten inscriptions open up a medial space between the body and the 
writing that provides the images with multi-layeredness. Within the Women of Al-
lah series, it is among these layers that handwriting as a cultural practice reclaims 
its aesthetic, cultural, and political reminiscence and constructs the core of this ar-
ticle. 
Given that Neshat is an artist working and producing in the heart of the contem-
porary art scene, it is plausible to argue that her works are on display primarily for 
the Western viewer.1 Veils, guns, and Farsi inscriptions are highly loaded signs that 
invoke in the viewer a historically constructed, multi-layered image of Muslim cul-
tures. Viewed from the present – especially in the aftermath of 9/11 in the us and 
its global reflection – the veil does not refer to the ‘exotic’ unknown body of the 
Oriental women anymore; instead it refers to the hotly disputed issues of Muslim 
women’s emancipation and to the dangerous female ‘terrorist’ carrying a hidden 
bomb on her body. Guns are not only a reminder of local conflicts in the Middle 
East but are also an echo of Islamic upheaval, global terrorism, and jihad and thus 
a ‘war on terror’.2 Such echoing is further re-enforced by the Arabic inscriptions 
which may carry different significations such as references to the Quran, sharia, or 
to the ‘repressive’ Islamic states, or to the captions accompanying images on the 
famous television network Al-Jazeera and daily news images from Iraq on the glo-
bal or national media. 
 The Women of Allah series does not only refer to Iran and Iranian women but 
are also generic images for the ‘Muslim Other’, materialized in the female body as 
the site of visual symbols made to represent geographically and historically diverse 
Muslim societies. On the surface, the images do nothing but reproduce the histori-
cally constructed fantasy and fear of the Orient by employing the overused signs of 
the Orient. However, I interpret these images as a series that problematizes this ge-
neric and immediate reading and challenges the Orientalist gaze by appropriating 
these very Islamic symbols in a deconstructive manner. By masking/ornamenting 
her culturally hybrid body with the veil and the Arabic script of the Muslim Other, 
Neshat questions the Western viewer’s already constructed viewing position and 
attempts to turn the gaze upon itself to reflect on the ‘cultural screen’ upon which 
these images are encouraged to be seen.3 Yet, the images remain stereotypically 
Oriental for the viewer regardless of the artist’s intentions. The viewer can only see 
what she already knows in accordance with the frames made available for inter-
pretation. In their stillness, these images do not invoke such critical self-reflective 
readings. Yet, images do not stand still; they metaphorically move and along their 
movement they encourage the viewer to move with them. Thus, I argue that the 
Farsi calligraphy written across each image in a rhythmic fashion has the capacity 
to tickle the eye of the viewer and in that capacity encourages an engaged reading 
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of the image of the Muslim Other, albeit in a problematic manner that I will discuss 
below.
The handwritten text on the Women of Allah images comments on the possi-
bility of cross-cultural viewing positions at the intersections of the visual and the 
verbal, of looking and reading, of translation and unreadability, all of which con-
vene on the body of the artist that is inscribed with calligraphy. At the crossroads, 
the super-imposed writing opens up multi-layered interpretations by creating pro-
ductive tensions first by appropriating and remediating the Islamic calligraphy tra-
dition on the visual plane, and second, by reclaiming the body both as a text that is 
culturally overwritten and as a medium that self-reflectively overwrites itself. 
What is, perhaps, most immediately striking about the series are the texts in Farsi 
calligraphy super-imposed over the images. Delicately written in circular forms 
opening out or perhaps closing in, almost hypnotizing in its effect, like a swirling 
black-and-white wheel, the text on I am Its Secret (Illustration 1) pulls the viewer 
into the depth opened up on the surface of the image. Similarly, the floating letters 
on the face of the woman in Rebellious Silence (Illustration 2) tease the viewer to 
tackle the text, just behind the rifle, on the inside of the veil, in front of the white 
background. 
What catches the eye is the additional visual dimension, a supplementary space at-
tached to the flat surface of the photographic image. This new space expands from 
the tactile materiality of the ink, by means of its thickness striking out of the image, 
beyond its textual character breaking up the interaction of the visual signs that dis-
turb the continuity of a comfortable viewing. In this mixed space, the viewer is 
tempted to look, to read, and to touch the calligraphic texts. By appropriating the 
Islamic practice of calligraphy and by attaching an ‘othered’ cultural medium of 
writing onto the surface of the photographic image, Neshat also reappropriates 
the synaesthetic experience of the calligraphic tradition. What I find intriguing in 
such an invitation of viewing is the juxtaposition of two modes of seeing, that of 
looking and reading, both on the level of the image as a whole and over the written 
space alone. 
The confusion between modalities of looking and reading expands outwards 
from the calligraphic text, in front of which the non-Farsi reader/viewer finds her-
self unable to read, towards the image, and thus merges visual signs into verbal 
ones and vice versa. This intermingling of modalities is one of the recurring traits 
of an encounter with the Islamic calligraphy tradition. Calligraphy has been the 
most important practice of the visual arts within Muslim cultures, and is one that 
populates the visual field in forms ranging from manuscript writing to architectur-
al facades and building interiors carved onto stone, almost like an ornamental 
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graffiti, or framed and hung like a painting. Regardless of the surface it ornaments, 
the main objective of calligraphy within Muslim cultures is to convey a message of 
a strictly linguistic order. As a practice of manuscript reproduction, calligraphic 
writing definitely communicates the written in a legible form. Even practiced as 
‘pure’ architectural decoration, calligraphic texts may still be ‘informative inscrip-
tions’ (Grabar 1978, 116-117) that completely fulfill their linguistic function of 
transmitting a message, often a religious one. Nevertheless, as Valerie Gonzales 
states, calligraphic inscriptions can also go beyond ‘this universal function of writ-
ing and completely lose their function of objective linguistic signaling by trans-
forming themselves into illegible forms, sometimes even into meaningless epi-
graphic type called “pseudo-Arabic”’ (Gonzales 2001, 99) where beauty, com-
plexity and sophistication gain prominence. In this sense, most of the decorative 
Islamic calligraphic works, whether on an architectural space or on the surface of 
a simple object, tend to subordinate the linguistic and semantic functioning to a 
visual function that invokes the aesthetics of writing and also that of the pleasure 
of looking. 
In such works, the exaggerated rhythm, the excessive decoration and the over-
stated figural manifestation of the lettering overrides the intentional content of the 
text. This transformation from verbal to visual, then, interrupts the interplay be-
tween the signifier and the signified on the scriptural level and encourages an icon-
ographic reading brought on by the highlighted visuality of the inscription that 
makes the text illegible, yet visually stimulating. When calligraphy is so elaborated 
or distorted and manipulated that it can hardly be read, it suggests to the pious 
Muslim a well-known Quranic text or literary work, or a religious phrase, and it 
lets the viewer’s memory and imagination supply the rest. In this respect, the expe-
rience of the viewer of the calligraphic works is beyond a simple act of reading; it 
is an aesthetic experience that is collectively shared on the basis of a performance 
of cultural memory and as an enactment of individual revelation.4
In her Women of Allah series, Neshat complicates the visual tradition of callig-
raphy in a very similar manner. Neshat here imposes the aesthetics of calligraphic 
writing onto the photographic image and the very corporeality of the letters opens 
up an aesthetic scriptural space on the visual surface. As such, the images suggest a 
viewing position that oscillates between reading and looking at the image. As stat-
ed before, this intermingling of modalities of seeing is one of the main traits of Is-
lamic calligraphic practice. Yet, in Neshat’s series, the juxtaposition of the modali-
ties gains cross-cultural significance. If the photograph represents the triumph of 
the Western eye by confirming the perspectival laws which so long constituted the 
Western norm of vision, as argued by Comolli and others (quoted in Silverman 
1996, 127), Neshat reclaims this primacy in Islamic cultures of the visual over the 
written word in which the divine ‘invisible’ truth reveals itself by means of the spa-
tio-temporal materiality of speech and scripture. In the series, then, two different 
signifying systems carrying their respective cultural connotations conflate, or, are 
translated into each other’s language, by highlighting the visual character of the 
written and infecting the visual with the stain of the verbal. 
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However, it is less the act of reading than that of looking that overrules the image 
as the non-Farsi viewer/reader of these images is left helpless in front of them, pri-
marily because, in her exhibitions, Neshat usually does not provide translations of 
the texts.5 Although the script is written in clear and legible Farsi script, it remains 
completely unreadable to the non-Farsi reader. The scripted letters ask to be read, 
as it were; the viewer is invited to be the reader of the text while the reader’s inabil-
ity to read them is already presumed. The act of reading is both promised and pre-
vented, which creates a desire to read that will not be fulfilled. From such a para-
doxical viewing position, the calligraphic inscriptions function in a manner similar 
to that of the highly manipulated and distorted traditional decorative Islamic cal-
ligraphy that becomes illegible. Through Neshat’s remediation of the calligraphic 
tradition, where unreadability is emphasized in the absence of a readable text, the 
inscriptions on the photographic images encourage a diverse mode of signification 
rather than referring strictly to the linguistic signifiers. For the viewer of these im-
ages, confronted by their unreadability, the calligraphic text becomes a generic vis-
ual sign, much like the veil and the gun now do in a homogenous manner. Resem-
bling the experience of the Muslim in front of the illegible calligraphic texts in 
which the illegible signifies a well-known religious text or familiar phrase, Ne-
shat’s handwriting encourages the viewer to interpret the images in a similar way. 
The immediate ‘reading’ of the unreadable Farsi text relates to the Quran in a way 
similar to a Muslim standing in front of an illegible text. In an interview, Neshat 
stated that she has often been asked if the inscriptions were taken from the Quran 
and, according to curator Igor Zabel, this seems to be a natural question, ‘given the 
prevalence of stereotypes about Islamic fundamentalism, in which the Quran is 
compulsory – the only possible – text’ (Zabel 2001, 22). For the Western viewer 
any reference to Quran, as the ‘only text’ governing the Muslim world, would in-
voke the notion of oppression, backwardness, and eventually religious terrorism 
in relation to contemporary Muslim societies. Especially since the texts are written 
over the female body, the viewer may assume that the texts were quotations per-
taining to the status of women and the association would invoke that of the sup-
pression of and the violence against women, as well as evoking issues of freedom 
and equality within Muslim societies.6 
However, Neshat plays with the potential signification that is at work here. 
The texts that Neshat quotes – visually and literally – are taken from famous Ira-
nian feminist poets’ works and most of the time they are critical of the masculine 
ideology of contemporary Iranian society.7 Certainly, most viewers are excluded 
from the meaning of the text because they are unable to read the Arabic script and 
understand the Farsi language. Yet, I believe that this potential viewer disability is 
exactly what Neshat is hinting at, supported by the unavailability of the translated 
texts in the exhibitions. The viewer who fails to read the image in the absence of a 
translation interprets it through an Orientalist discourse that defines the Muslim 
Other by means of historically constructed culturally mediated stereotypes. In 
fact, this encouraged ‘misreading’ implicitly whispers to the viewer that rather 
than the veil concealing the body, it is the Western discourse about the Muslim 
Sign Here! / Writing Over the Body, Writing With the Body
213
world that obscures the viewers’ eyes. From the unreadable text of the so-called 
Orient written on the female body, the silence turns into a rebellious scream that 
expands towards the veil, to the gun, to the non-white female body and questions 
the dynamics of the cross-cultural viewing positions and the possibility of visual 
translation. 
In fact, the female body, mostly that of the artist herself, demands interpreta-
tion as much as the calligraphic texts do. The body in these images is an effect of 
translation and transformation from the ‘natural’ feminine body to a bearer of cul-
ture; from the site of submission to a surface overwritten by resistance; from the 
generic anonymous Oriental body to the culturally marked female body. And all 
these translations take place at the convergence of the handwritten texts that con-
tour and fill the images with the bits and pieces of a fragmented female body. 
The body, as Foucault argues in Discipline and Punishment, has been historically 
and discursively constructed as a site of contesting power structures. Throughout 
his analyses, Foucault shows how the body, in its very materiality, does not stand 
in external relation to power, but is ‘marked, stamped, invested, acted upon, in-
scribed, and cultivated by a historically contingent nexus of power/discourse’ 
(Yeǧenoǧlu 1998, 113). Accordingly, in the history of Islamic societies, the body, 
particularly the female body, has constantly emerged as a controversial symbolic 
site of these contestations of power structures, primarily by attempting to regulate 
its activities by prescribing clothing practices. In Iranian society, while the unveiled 
female body was turned into the carrier of the ‘modern’ Pahlavi regime, the re-veil-
ing of this body in the context of the Iranian Islamic revolution served as a compul-
sory statement of its ideology. However, it is almost impossible to understand the 
‘internal’ politics of the veil in isolation from its colonialist and neo-colonialist 
construction and politics, as in the cases of Algeria and Afghanistan, for example, 
where stripping women bare from the veil is seen as a form of emancipation. In 
both cases, the veil becomes a visual sign of difference that demarcates the ‘Mus-
lim’ women from the ‘Western’ other in a similar manner that it severs inside from 
outside, private from public. From the Western perspective, the difference of the 
veiled body is constructed by means of the formulation of a lack, the lack of agen-
cy, as well as the passivity of a silenced and oppressed invisible body contrasted 
with the presumable truth and naturalness of the unveiled Western body.8 
However, in the Women of Allah series, the veiled feminine body as the object 
and target of power gains a different signifying power through the calligraphic in-
scriptions, which translate the body into a culturally engraved site of resistance. 
The quoted inscriptions, in a subtle way, suggest that the feminine body has multi-
ple cultural skins with multiple significations: the material veil, which both ‘erases 
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and enforces embodiment’ (Moore 2002, 3) and the textual skin that overwrites 
the body that both suppresses and enables the subject with creative agency and cul-
tural identity. It is between these skins – including the skin of the image – that the 
body is transformed and translated at the very moment when the non-Farsi reader/
viewer fails to give a voice, and hence meaning, to the text that repels the unde-
manding cross-cultural viewing position. As I suggested before, the handwritten 
inscriptions that the viewer fails to interpret or ‘read’ as verses from the Quran, 
are, in fact, excerpts from the works of contemporary Iranian writers, such as 
Forugh Farrokhzad, Tahereh Saffarzadeh, and Monirou Ravanipur, whose works 
have feminist overtones and are mostly in stark opposition to the ideology of the 
Islamic Revolution. The handwritten quotes from these ‘militant’ writers, then, 
imply that the culturally inscribed feminine body is not only a site for subordina-
tion and coercion but is also a space for creative and subversive processes. In this 
capacity, the images suggest that the viewer read the female body as a cultural text 
that is entirely overwritten, yet it is not the body of the victim anymore; it is a cul-
turally inscribed body that is also a site of memory that remembers the repressed 
stories and does not shy away from showing it. However, the visible part of the text 
that is exposed by the frame of the veil does not communicate with the viewer, 
who, in turn, questions the universality of the body as text that can be read cross-
culturally. 
Aside from problematizing the cross-cultural reading of the generic anony-
mous body of Muslim women, Neshat also challenges her culturally hybrid multi-
ple skins by writing over the image of her own body. It is less by means of (dis)guising 
her body as the veiled cultural other than by transcribing texts in her mother tongue 
over and over onto the image of her body that Neshat negotiates and appropriates 
her diasporic, or exiled, Iranian cultural identity. Writing is what carries culture in 
much the same way that handwriting identifies individuals. Nehsat’s work deals 
with both the personal and the cultural. By writing in Farsi she reclaims herself in 
terms of a culture that pays homage to the written word. Like the humble calligra-
pher who writes the 99 beautiful names of Allah, or basmalah over and over again, 
Neshat fills in her blank face, the face without cultural remarks, with the round-
ness and loops of the Arabic letters. In this respect, I read the artist’s deployment of 
the practice of writing over the body, and especially on the face, as an implicit ap-
propriation of the repressed tradition of Hurufism (harf, pl. huruf: letter) that sub-
limates the divine character of the Arabic alphabet and the practice of its inscrip-
tion.9 The Hurufi sect reworks the Islamic belief of the Divine Pen (al-Qalam) by 
writing the realities of all things (al-haqa’iq) upon the Guarded Tablet (al-Lawh al 
Mahfuz) and upon the pages of that archetypal book that is none other than the 
Quran, and further believes that the human body, and especially the face, is a text 
that is already written by the divine. According to Hurufi belief, the main elements 
of the face contain the mystical and the divine letters of the Arabic alphabet. By 
‘reading’ the divine text on the face, the Hurufi unravels the divine truth, Allah. As 
important as unraveling the divine truth, the Hurufi practice of reading and inter-
preting the face is a practice of knowing the self. In line with this understanding, 
the Hurufi calligraphic tradition asserts itself as the ultimate figuration of writing, 
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or vice-versa, where the human face is twice written: first with the divine letters, and 
then using calligraphy, in the search for the self and the divine creator.10
Reinterpreting the Hurufi tradition, I read Neshat’s works as a search for the self 
through the cultural practice of writing with the body over the body. By writing the 
letters of the alphabet of her mother tongue, the artist negotiates Iranian cultural 
identity and traces her hybrid body with the cultural text of Iranian heritage. This is 
to say that, instead of searching for unification with the divine by means of individ-
ual revelation, Neshat’s practice of writing is directed more towards appreciating 
her diasporic difference through the performance of writing as an established cul-
tural practice. As a result, handwriting becomes both the artist’s individual signa-
ture and a sign of her cultural hybridity. 
However, Neshat does not apply the text directly over her body; she does some-
thing quite different. Neshat first photographs herself and then writes over the im-
ages of bits and pieces of her body. By doing so, she manages to keep the handwrit-
ing authentic and directs attention towards the materiality of writing, and hence to-
wards the body at work, the ‘hand’ of writing. As such, the lost body of the artist as 
the photographed or the photographer is brought back by the handwriting that car-
ries the trace of the writing subject on the mechanically reproduced images. The 
subjectless gaze of the camera that turns the female body into an object of looking is 
countered by the writing subject and by its corporeal energy, stimulated by the 
rhythmic inscription of Arabic letters. The formality of calligraphic writing, that is, 
the flow of letters from right-to-left, the consistency of linear movements, which are 
always horizontal, directional, and dynamic, becomes an indexical sign of the art-
ist’s body executing the text. The manual gestures of the author that oscillate be-
tween visibility and invisibility while connecting one letter to the other or separating 
them from each other, expose the kinetic impulses underlying the act of inscription. 
From the hand that holds the pen, the movement of writing expands outwards to-
ward the wrist, the elbow, and to the shoulder of the inscriber, and embodies the art-
ist while her hand mimics the shape of Arabic letters. The rhythmic pulses of the let-
ters, their morphing over time, the pressure of the pen, and the thickness of the ink 
that it leaves on the surface of the photographic image, refer to the artist’s body in 
labor in durée of its practical activity. The writing body of the artist that fills the im-
age with temporality also reclaims the generic disembodied image of the Muslim 
body with an embodied one that is culturally submitted to a regime of gestural/
scriptural training. 
As Foucault writes in Discipline and Punish, good handwriting ‘presupposes a 
gymnastics – a whole routine whose rigorous code invests the body in its entirety, 
from the points of the feet to the tip of the index finger’ (1979, 152). In the Women 
of Allah series, Neshat’s hand, endowed with proper orthography, almost struggles 
with the practice of writing that has disciplined her body. The viewer is left to ob-
serve countless lines flowing in every direction in each image, in which the meticu-
lous process of writing almost appears as a bodily torment where the artist negoti-
ates the Iranian cultural heritage at pains. Within such negotiation, the calligraphic 
texts mediate between the artist, as a unique individual, and her relationship with 
the cultural community to which she belongs. In this sense, the script as a cultural 
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indicator that ornaments the visible parts of the fragmented bodies in the images 
generates a productive space in which the artist deconstructs and reconstructs her 
cultural identity so as to appropriate her hybrid body text. 
Moreover, the artist’s writing body is further emphasized by the direct inscrip-
tion of the texts over the images. Authentic handwriting, in contrast with the end-
less reproducibility of the photographic image, confirms the writer’s individual 
uniqueness, distinguishing her as a signature and signing her presence at the unique 
moment of writing. The handwritten text represents the willingness of the artist to 
communicate with the viewer/reader on a very personal level; the act of writing is 
almost a confession of the artist as a way of revealing her identity by means of the 
inclusion of the autographic marks on the images of herself. By doing so, the artist 
unifies the mechanical image of herself with her bodily self through the act of writ-
ing, exchanging blood for ink, fingerprint for pen.
 The authentic handwriting not only signifies the uniqueness of the writer but 
also provides the images with a uniqueness of their own, which otherwise they 
would not have had. Of the many possible copies, the overwritten ones become the 
original that distinguish the images from any other photographic work. The pho-
tographic negative as the original source of infinite copies hence loses its primacy 
and is replaced by the authenticity of the written images. In this respect, each and 
every image in the series becomes unique and repudiates its reproducibility and re-
claims the authority that is lost with the prospect of reproduction. As is well 
known, in his essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Wal-
ter Benjamin asserts that, by means of the process of mechanical reproduction, the 
work of art loses its aura, that is, its historical uniqueness, as well as the unique 
viewing experience of such works. Benjamin does not mention handwriting or cal-
ligraphy as an aesthetic experience that would re-invoke the concept of an aura 
that is lost because of its reproducibility. Although he hints at lithography and 
print technologies with regard to writing, it is obvious that he does not consider 
handwriting as having aesthetic qualities and hence capable of inducing aura. As 
Sonja Neef and José van Dijck state in the introduction of this collection, this lapse 
in Benjamin’s article is revealing, since it neglects the unique visual aspect of hand-
writing on the one hand and fails to notice the effectiveness of the mechanical re-
producibility of handwriting on the other. However, once I have invoked the im-
ageness of calligraphy at work, I find the discussion of the concept of aura produc-
tive with regard to Neshat’s calligraphic inscriptions. 
As I mentioned earlier, the materiality and the plasticity of the unreadable cal-
ligraphic text attract the viewer’s eye almost in a hypnotic manner towards the 
scriptural plane it opens up. However, in contradiction to other familiar cultural 
signs, such as the veil, handwriting presents itself as intimate while keeping its dis-
tance. This intimacy, or closeness, is brought on by the images provided by the me-
dia from different parts of the Middle East while the letters enjoy the distance of an 
‘unheard-of symbolic system’ as Roland Barthes (1982, 2) would say. Yet the dis-
tance does not stem from viewers’ failing to read the text but from the sudden em-
bodiment of the artist potentially inscribing verses from the Quran like a talisman, 
evoking the ritualistic and mystical dimensions of writing, which subordinates the 
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‘emancipated’ photographic image to the cult-like value of the written. In this ca-
pacity, the handwriting re-enchants the demystified photographic image that pro-
vides the image with inapproachability, in line with Benjamin’s definition of aura 
as a ‘unique phenomenon of a distance however close it may be’ (222). Moreover, 
handwriting pulls the photographic image towards the domain of tradition both 
by emphasizing handwriting’s historical function and by invoking the tradition of 
calligraphic practice. Taken together, the images in the series are covered with an 
auratic shield that puts them at a distance from the viewer, making the images dif-
ficult to consume all at once. The physical distance one has to maintain in front of 
the larger than life-size images is, then, accompanied by a psychological and cul-
tural distance enforced by the handwritten texts. The imposed distance alters the 
experience of the contemporary viewer for whom the Muslim women, brought 
close by the relentlessly repeated media images, are seen through the Oriental/co-
lonial camera that shoots them as powerless veiled victims. Instead of conjuring up 
the closeness of the already known that would only make the veil transparent in 
order to expose the submitted female body, the auratic distance encourages the 
viewer to see beneath the opaque veil in order to read the unheard feminine voice 
that resists. It is along these lines that I interpret the titles such as Speechless (1996) 
or Rebellious Silence; even if Muslim women speak and write in their own lan-
guage, their words remain mute, not because they are unreadable but because they 
are unheard. In the way that the right-to-left lines of text written across the Rebel-
lious Silence speaks out: ‘stories of your martyrdom  /  like martyrdom of the peo-
ple / remain unheard. / They have no voice, no image, no date, / they are unan-
nounced’.11
In the Women of Allah series, Shirin Neshat tries to give a voice, an image, and 
a date to the Oriental woman by writing over the cross-cultural tensions. Yet, this 






1. Shirin Neshat has exhibited widely in 
major European and North American cit-
ies. Among her most recent solo exhibi-
tions are those held at the Miami Art 
Museum (2003), Houston Museum of Con-
temporary Art (2003), Museum of Modern 
Art, Mexico City (2003), Castello di Rivoli 
in Turin, Italy (2002), and the Walker Art 
Center, Minneapolis (2002). She has been 
included in numerous international exhibi-
tions and film festivals, including Docu-
menta 11 in Kassel, Germany (2002), Sun-
dance Film Festival (2003), Tribeca Film 
Festival (2003), Locarno Film Festival 
(2002), 48th Venice Biennale (1999), 2nd 
Johannesburg Biennale (1997), and the 
5th Istanbul Biennale (1995). Conversely, 
although her works deal with Muslim soci-
eties in general, and with Iranian society in 
particular, they have never been displayed 
in Iran or in most of the other Muslim soci-
eties. With such an audience profile, I find 
it plausible to argue that Neshat not only 
produces in the West but also for the West-
ern viewer. Therefore, throughout the arti-
cle, I use the term ‘the viewer’ to refer to 
the Western viewer, the main consumer of 
Neshat’s art.
2. As Jaqueline Larson (1997) points out, 
in some of the photographs, like Stories of 
Martyrdom (1994), the brand Remington, 
an American firearms company, is clearly 
visible on the rifle. For Larson, the visibility 
of the label in the image refers to the US 
production of the images such as that of 
the US-produced rifle, and she interprets 
the image in relation to the persistence of 
the American gaze and to what America 
expects to see. Aside from this possible 
interpretation, I think that the visibility of 
the label also comments on the global 
arms trade and on the US’s role as the 
exporter of arms and the source of conflict 
in certain parts of the world, in particular 
the Middle East.
3. I use the term ‘cultural screen’ in the 
way Kaja Silverman interprets the Lacani-
an visual field. The cultural screen, as un-
derstood by Silverman, is ‘the culturally 
generated image or repertoire of images 
through which subjects are not only con-
stituted, but differentiated in relation to 
class, race, sexuality, age and nationality’ 
(1992, 135). In the Lacanian model of the 
field of vision, the screen stands between 
the subject (of the look) and the infamous 
gaze. Therefore, wherever the subject 
looks, she sees through the framework of 
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the cultural screen including herself and 
the cultural other.
4. Since the written, as a transmission of 
the divine words of Allah, has been given 
primacy in Muslim culture, calligraphic 
writing, as well as its experience by the 
viewer/reader, is usually explained in 
terms of individual revelation. See, for 
example, Annemarie Schimmel, Calligra-
phy and Islamic Culture, London: Tauris, 
1990 and Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1975; where she discusses the mys-
tical dimension of Arabic letters at length. 
See also Sayyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Art 
and Spirituality, New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1987. 
5. To my knowledge, the translations of the 
texts were not included in most of the exhi-
bitions, although there have been excep-
tions like The Serpentine Gallery, London 
(July 28 – September 3, 2000) where the 
translations were provided in the exhibi-
tion hall, or the Women of Allah exhibition 
in Artspeak Gallery, Vancouver, Canada 
(April 25 – June 7, 1997) that included the 
translations, not in the exhibition itself, but 
in the catalogue. Neshat also does not 
provide the subtitled translations of later 
video works that followed the Women of 
Allah series.
6. As I was writing this article, Theo van 
Gogh, a Dutch film director, was assassi-
nated, by a ‘fundamentalist’ Dutch-Moroc-
can Muslim. The media claimed that he 
was killed because of the film Submission 
(2004) that Van Gogh made in collabora-
tion with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a member of the 
Dutch Parliament and the conservative-
liberal party VVD. The ten-minute film 
deals with the oppression of and violence 
against women in the Muslim world and 
narrates stories of women beaten and 
raped by their family members. It includes 
shots of women with their faces half-
veiled, wearing a transparent black 
chador-like clothes that makes the over-
written Quranic verses – dealing with the 
situation of woman on their bodies, visible. 
Moreover, one hears invisible whip lash-
ings while the camera wanders through the 
naked bodies overwritten and freshly 
wounded by lash strokes. Judged as high-
ly controversial at the time of its broadcast 
on Dutch television, I believe the film is 
very superficial in how it discusses wom-
en’s rights in Muslim societies. Resem-
bling the Women of Allah series in the way 
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it deals with signs of Islam, Submission 
offers a rather simplified stereotypical view 
that is far from complicating and discuss-
ing the issues at stake. As such, contrary 
to Neshat’s work, the film remains mere 
provocation that does not lead to a pro-
ductive dialogue. For a discussion of the 
phenomenon of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and the 
film Submission in Dutch socio-political 
context see, ‘ “Word alsjeblieft wakker”: 
Submission, het fenomeen “Ayaan” en de 
nieuwe ideologische confrontatie’ by Marc 
de Leeuw and Sonja van Wichelen and ‘De 
obsessie met Hirsi Ali en de broodnodige 
kritiek op het neo-liberalisme’ by Ingrid 
Hoofd in Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies 
2005 (4).
7. The text that overwrites Rebellious 
Silence is a poem by Tahereh Saffarzadeh 
(1936) entitled ‘Allegiance with Wakeful-
ness’ (1980). The quote over the surface of 
I Am Its Secret is an excerpt from Forugh 
Farrokhzad’s (1933-1967) poem titled 
‘I Will Greet the Sun Again’. Farrokhzad’s 
poetry had an immediate impact in pre-
Revolutionary Iran because of its seduc-
tive tone and subject matter. In contrast to 
the emotional and sexual characteristics of 
Farrokhzad’s writings, Saffarzadeh’s po-
etry celebrates the martyrs in the Iran-Iraq 
war and is emphatically prorevolutionary 
Iran. She was also one of the few women in 
the Iranian parliament to represent wom-
en’s issues after the revolution.
8. For a theoretical discussion of the rela-
tion of the veil and embodiment see, Mey-
da Yeǧenoǧlu, Colonial Fantasies, 
112-120. For an analysis of how the veil is 
articulated in nationalist projects in Algeria 
and Turkey, elaborated through Partha 
Chatterjee’s framework provided in Nation-
alist Thought and The Colonial World, see, 
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again, Yeǧenoǧlu, Colonial Fantasies, es-
pecially the chapter entitled, ‘The Battle of 
the Veil: Woman Between Orientalism and 
Nationalism’.
9. Hurufism or Hurufiyya is an unorthodox 
Muslim sect of gnostic-cabalistic tenden-
cies founded by the Iranian mystic Fadl 
Allah of Astarabad, who was flayed to 
death for his heretical beliefs in circa 1401. 
According to The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 
one of the tenets of the Hurufi doctrine is 
the idea that God reveals himself in the 
Word and that words that are made up of 
sounds are always associated with letters. 
The total number of letters (and their nu-
merical value according to the abdjad) is 
the total of all emanating and creative pos-
sibilities of God and is God himself made 
manifest. For the relation between calli-
graphic tradition and the Hurufi influence, 
see Annemarie Schimmel, Calligraphy and 
Islamic Culture.
10. Annemarie Schimmel notes that the 
lasting influence of the Hurufis, ‘who had 
systematized the equations between let-
ters of Arabic alphabet and features of the 
human face or the human body’ on the 
scriptural pictures of the Bektashi order, 
has strong Shi’i influences. Schimmel 
gives examples of scriptural pictures that 
show human faces comprised of a mir-
rored Ali and the names of Panjtan (Mu-
hammad, Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn) 
and Allah. See, Annemarie Schimmel, 
‘Calligraphy and Sufism in Ottoman 
Turkey’, 247-248.
11. The translation of Tahereh Saffaraz-
deh’s poem ‘Allegiance with Wakefulness’ 
is taken from Artspeak Gallery’s exhibition 
catalogue Shirin Neshat ‘Women of Allah’ 
on page 28.
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                        Writing: 
Tattoo, Mark, 
Signature 
His masterpiece: an extraordinary tattoo with which he is covering 
the back of his wife while making love to her, from behind, having 
understood that such was the condition of his ‘ductus’. He is seen 
pushing in his pin while his wife, who is lying flat on her belly, turns 
a suppliant and pained face towards him...
She cannot see the masterpiece she is wearing, not directly, and not 
without a mirror, but it subsists directly on her, at least for some 
time – lodged [á demeure] for a limited time, of course.
(Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other, 78)
When Jacques Derrida in the early 1970s sent the written text of his lecture ‘Signa-
ture Event Context’ to the Association des sociétés de philosophie de langue 
française, he signed his text and accompanied his signature by remarking: ‘That 
dispatch should thus have been signed. Which I do, and counterfeit, here. Where? 
There. J.D.’ His signature is printed in facsimile in the book on the right side of this 
comment. 
1. Jacques Derrida’s signature in ‘Signature Event Context’
Sonja Neef
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This enactment of the signature as copy gets to the heart of Derrida’s critique of an 
all too positivist view on a metaphysics of presence. Derrida resists the idea of writ-
ing as retracing the origin, that is, the presence of the sender. For Derrida, writing 
has, rather, to do with absence, especially the absence of the addressee, to whom the 
signature is directed, but also the absence of the sender, ‘from the mark that he 
abandons, and which cuts itself off from him and continues to produce effects inde-
pendently of his presence…, indeed even after his death, his absence, which more-
over belongs to the structure of all writing…’ (1988, 5).
All writing? 
The implications of this statement are already challenging for the handwritten 
signature because it postpones the presence of its writer’s authentic and un-ex-
changeable physical body from a historical here and now on which the logic of the 
signature relies so much, towards a future in which corporeality is dissolved in the 
trace of writing. However, if not only the moment of performing a signature is based 
on corporeal presence, but if also the material to be written on is a physical body, 
like in the signature piece in illustration 2, how can we then understand Derrida’s 
theory of the signature without falling back upon a philosophy of immediacy?
2. Margo DeMello’s signature
Margo DeMello, like Derrida, is an author who signs her book; a monograph on 
tattooing entitled Bodies of Inscription. A Cultural History of the Modern Tattoo 
Community (Illustration 2). The back cover includes a photograph of the author’s 
name, Margo D., which is said to have been tattooed by Joe Vegas onto the author’s 
back and photographed by Vida Pavesich. The ‘author’s back’, here, is equivalent to 
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‘the book’s back’, and yet, unlike the author’s book, her body – her flesh, her skin 
– cannot be ‘cut off from’ her writing. Skin as a writing surface unfolds a semiotic 
process that cannot be reduced to the concept of an individual body remaining 
outside of the process of signification, nor can it be qualified as the material aspect 
of the signifier only. For the practice of tattooing, it is unavoidable that the body 
will intervene in the concept of writing, above all handwriting, as it seems to chal-
lenge the Derridean idea of writing as a sign that continues to produce effects inde-
pendently of the author’s presence, ‘indeed even after his death’.
DeMello’s tattooed signature piece raises yet another problem. For handwrit-
ing, and especially for the signature, ductus, pressure, and movement of the hand 
are culturally understood as signs reflecting individual identity.1 In the case of 
DeMello’s signature, however, the writing on her back with its ornamental loops 
and curls refers to the work of a calligrapher rather than to an impulsive act of 
signing. It is indeed ‘handmade’, but executed by means of a writing machine 
which standardizes writing ductus and pressure into a repetitive, consistent perfo-
ration of the skin and injection of ink – a writing tool somewhere between type-
writer and sewing machine. Since Kittler’s Gramophone Film Typewriter, it is well 
known that both typewriters and sewing machines were built with great success by 
Remington, a company that initially specialized in weapons production. For tat-
tooing, all three mechanisms seem vital: the violating dimension of weapons, the 
repetitive penetration by the needle of the sewing machine which simultaneously 
riddles the fabric and joins it to itself, and the mechanical act of writing performed 
by the typewriter. The electric tattoo machine was invented circa 1890 by Samuel 
F. O’Reilly to keep up with the demand of customers in his tattoo shop in Chatham 
Square in New York’s Bowery (Govenar, 214-215).2 
Moreover, the person named by the signature is not identical to the person per-
forming the signature. Who is the ‘I, the undersigned’? Who is signing whose prop-
er name? In other words, this writing raises the question of the status of tattooer 
and tattooed. From its very beginning, the professional status of the Western tat-
tooer ranges from an ordinary hairdresser or barber – when the tattooer mainly 
works from ‘flash’, pre-designed motifs displayed in catalogues or on the walls of 
the tattooshop – to a tattoo artist who is known for a personal style. Tattoo shops, 
thus seen, may resemble either a Carolingian chancellery where the scribe func-
tions as a manus ministra, authorized to perform a pre-designed signature on be-
half of the king, or a postmodern atelier where an artist creates an artwork in her 
unparalleled style.3 Such art tattooers are considered ‘first-person’ performers. 
The tattooed ‘artwork’, as an object to be written on, comes to stand in a ‘third-
person’ position where she or he is named by the subject executing the tattoo. This 
tattooed person is not a silent object, however. She or he actively participates in the 
process of choosing the design to be tattooed, and influences the effects produced 
by the tattoo by framing it within a personal narrative which is performed when-
ever the tattoo is displayed: the story of why, where and when the tattoo was made, 
and about the pain suffered.4 As a consequence, artistic subjectivity is displayed 




This blurring of subjectivity challenges the foundations of the logic of the signa-
ture and of handwriting as such. A tattoo is, even more than a handwritten signa-
ture, a marking of individuality and identity. A tattoo makes the subject identifia-
ble, incomparable and authentic.5 A tattoo is ultimately based on physical materi-
ality, and, as such, it functions as a somatic sign referring to the irreducible pres-
ence of the tattooed body. But as a tattoo riddles the skin, it is also a ‘perforation’, 
a gap into the unitary corporeality driven by the intervention of another body with 
the hand of the tattooer making the inscriptions. Within this split of corporeality, 
not only the concept of authorship becomes problematic, but it challenges the 
whole idea of handwriting as a ‘live’ practice whereby the physical, human hand is 
pivotal to the production of letters. The aim of this paper is to address some key 
characteristics of handwriting – its emphasis on the here and now of the act of 
writing as well as its claim to constitute authenticity and identity – in relation to 
tattooing as a contemporary Western practice.
 
5. Tim Whitmore, photograph: Graham Brandon
6. Maori hand design
3. Patience Agbabi, photograph: Graham Brandon
4. Ian Day, photograph: Gordon Rainsford 
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The Derridean sentence ‘even after his death’, when adopted for the tattoo, evokes 
a taste of decomposition. In what follows, I will explore the corporeal dimensions 
of this phrase by analyzing some examples which are mostly selected from a digital 
online art exhibition collecting photographs of tattooed people, photographed by 
Graham Brandon and posted on the web by the Victoria and Albert Museum in 
London. Illustration 3 shows Patience Agbabi whose back is covered with a tattoo 
depicting the Egyptian sun god Ra, a symbol of creation and life represented as an 
eagle carrying the sun on his head through the sky. For this symbolic dimension, 
Ra is a favorite motif for tattoo design and is found on many bodies. When tat-
tooed onto Ian Day’s body (Illustration 4), however, this notion of creation and life 
gets a slightly bitter aftertaste. The condition of this tired and worn-out writing 
surface makes it a sign for transitoriness and death. Such dedication to death, is 
this not a rule inscribed in all tattoos?
Illustration 5 shows a photograph of Tim Whitmore. In the online database of 
the V&A Archive, he describes the tattoo on his left hand as a version of a Maori-
inspired triangular design that is part of a design from Borneo. Tim’s partner wears 
the other half of the design and together they form one complete design. The tattoo 
was done by Mike from Athens as a gift to the two of them upon the anniversary 
of their first meeting. Thus, the tattoo on the finger, in a way, functions as a wed-
ding ring. However, unlike a wedding ring, a tattoo cannot be removed without 
leaving a scar. In this context, the Derridean sentence ‘even after his death’ sounds 
like the opposite of this other phrase ‘until death do us part’, a dictum which is un-
bound from its legitimacy at the moment of death. Before death, however, this tat-
too claims to establish unity – between Tim and his partner, but also between writ-
ing and the material presence of the body. Yet, and this is precisely what the Derri-
dean critique of presence refers to, the de-‘sign’ on Whitmore’s hand cannot be un-
derstood other than as a ‘sign’, as a speech act uttering ‘I hereby marry’, and by 
saying this, celebrating – or ‘performing’ – the marriage.
Like a wedding ring, a tattooed name is a lifetime promise and is therefore a fa-
vorite motive in tattoo art. This promise cannot be revoked, under any circum-
stances; it says: ‘I love you forever’. In illustration 7, the list of three names ‘Mat-
thew/Adam/Lucy’ is enigmatic. Does it stand for a menage a trois – be it a polyga-
mous partnership or parents and child, though the latter would seem a bit odd be-
cause these names all have the same visual status, which would not correspond to 
the hierarchical relation between parents and child. Alternatively, the arrangement 
of these names can be read as a list of partners in order of time with two open slots 
at the end. When the list is full, the game is over. Whatever reading one chooses, 
the time vector of this tattoo is undeniable: ‘I love you forever’. 
This promise of ‘forever’ becomes even more problematic when taking into ac-
count a detail of this image that can easily be overlooked. This detail concerns less 
the tattoo itself than the materiality of the skin with its little spots, some of them 
looking like pigments, others like pustules, pimples, little bloody injuries display-
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ing the skin’s vulnerability. They resemble Barthes’ punctum, an element in a pho-
tograph ‘which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me’ 
(26). Barthes literally describes the punctum as ‘this wound, this prick, this mark 
made by a pointed instrument… it also refers to the notion of punctuation’ (26). 
The punctum is also a ‘sting, speck, cut, little hole – and also a cast of the dice’ (27). 
The punctum is the element which comes by surprise and which breaks with the 
committed, culturally trained mode of looking, which Barthes refers to as the stu-
dium. The punctum has the potential to interrupt the studium and to redirect, sud-
denly and unexpectedly, the process of meaning production. The tattoo’s punctum 
concerns less the recognizable depiction, which would rather invite the interpreta-
tive examination of the studium, than the secondary markers of the almost invisi-
ble stabs, little punctures and injuries underlying the tattoo. This blessed skin fi-
nally mirrors the basic idea of what a tattoo is: a perforation of the skin, an inflic-
tion of pain, an injection of ink, a wound that heals and thus becomes writing. 
7. Richard Botheras, photograph Michaela Wyatt 
8. Natalie, photograph Othello Hartley
The tattoo in illustration 8 is composed of fine black lines representing a Chinese 
scene. This image’s punctum makes us aware of another figure that is overwritten 
like in a palimpsest. This secondary figure is, like the tattooed scene itself, formed 
by lines that do not actually belong to the tattoo and yet interfere with it. These 
lines are imprints from the clothes which had to be taken off to expose the tattoo 
to the photographer, the Internet user, you, the addressee for whom this writing 
continues to produce effects independent of the author’s presence, ‘indeed even af-
ter his death’. These imprints redirect our gaze from the tattoo, as writing, towards 
the skin. Likewise, the skin covered with goose bumps in illustration 9 is not just 
an invisible writing surface. As opposed to canvas or paper, the skin cannot deny 
its material mode as physical, susceptible to time, diseases, heat, and cold. A tat-
too, after all, cannot be read but on a naked body. It signals that we can only feel 
or touch when we are naked. All these tiny little details – these pustules and pim-
ples, these fat-folds and goose bumps – as a punctum striking us by surprise, stress 
our understanding of the tattooed body as a signifier by itself, emphasizing the vul-
nerability and nakedness of our existence.
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9. Beautiful strange, 
photograph Jan Dunning
Unlike writing on paper or on a computer screen, the signifier of tattooed writing 
cannot be conceived as an almost invisible medium that ‘immediately’ links us to a 
signified meaning. Rather, it arrests the gaze and makes us aware that a tattoo, like 
ballet or theatre, takes the living body as its medium. Tattooing therefore qualifies 
as performance culture. ‘Performance’ is epistemologically studied in cultural 
practices such as theatres, side shows, festivities, rites, musical or dance perform-
ances – all practices that require the presence of physical bodies and thus function 
as singular events which, like a handwritten signature, claim to be authentic, unex-
changeable and unrepeatable. The cultural role of the tattoo in Europe, from its 
early beginnings until the present, always resided in this display of a present body. 
Since the 17th century, tattooed natives from the Pacific Islands were displayed in 
the Western world’s freak shows, dime museums and circuses. In the early 20th 
century, such attraction slaves were sometimes displaced by tattooed Westerners, 
who sold pamphlets at their performances that described them as victims of canni-
bal natives or other savages who had kidnapped and tattooed them. 
This racist idea of tattoo as a ‘naked’, ‘pure’ and ‘savage’ cultural practice was 
soon used by Westerners to mark themselves as wild or exotic. In the 18th century, 
mariners and sailors tattooed themselves as an articulation of exoticism and ad-
venture; in the 19th century, soldiers used it as an expression of courage and com-
bativeness; and in the 20th century convicts, motorcyclists and other working-
class populations discovered it as a mode to mark themselves as marginalized out-
laws. In postmodern culture the practice of tattooing still functions as an import 
from an exotic, wild, natural, ‘original’ culture. In most of these cases, the tattooed 
subject is inscribed into a system of classifications, into a set of norms formulated 
by a community marked by difference. This logic of classifying, I will argue, is not 
only based on a semiotics of ‘skin’ as a racial, sexual, and social signifier, but it is 
also the basic operation of the tattoo. 
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Etymologically, the word ‘tattoo’ is derived from the Tahitian ta tau, which means 
‘to mark’. When Captain Cook discovered Tahiti in the 18th century while sailing 
for the British Navy, he described Polynesian tattooing as a sign system expressing 
genealogical relations (Kaeppler). Like the practice of naming in Western society, 
the Tahitian tattoo is a marking that comes from the outside, serving the aim of in-
scribing the subject into a social system. Tattooing embodies a socio-political pow-
er of locating the one marked within a context. ‘I hereby baptize’ is such a phrase 
that – as Austin argues in How to do Things With Words – by saying it, performs 
what it says. The name given in this rite identifies the subject.6 Naming the subject 
is a discursive practice that generates what it names, that does what it says. From 
this magic moment on, the subject is ‘spelled’ by the proper name – in the double 
sense of the word ‘spelling’ because identity is conjured from that very act of writ-
ing understood as treading one letter upon the other.7
Like baptizing and marrying – Austin’s favorite examples – marking, tattoo-
ing, and signing are equally based on the logic of performativity. Signing is the ex-
ample Derrida uses in ‘Signature Event Context’ in response to Austin by arguing 
that performativity is not reduced to a certain mode of speech act, but that any cul-
tural utterance is performative. The signature is performative because it is a singu-
lar act, a ‘life’ practice grounded in repetition, since any signature cites the system 
of signing it derives from. ‘Performativity’, says Judith Butler in Bodies that Mat-
ter, echoing Derrida’s discussion of performativity, ‘is thus not a “singular” act, for 
it is always a reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires 
an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of 
which it is a repetition’ (1993, 12). Unlike Derrida, who relates the signature to the 
future, to future readers, as the subscriber is ‘always already’ deferred in the ges-
ture of signing, Butler, in Excitable Speech, emphasizes the historical dimension of 
performativity by arguing that a performative iterates (or ‘cites’) cultural norms 
and conventions of the past. When framed within Butler’s theory, tattooing can be 
considered such a repetition of norms – social and racial norms marking familiar-
ity and difference between self and other. It thus functions as a performative. The 
practice of tattooing can be regarded as a singular event that is grounded in the 
repetition of cultural norms. If the tattooed body is a marked body, it is not only 
marked by the difference between vulnerability and healing, between life and 
death, presence and absence, but it is also marked in the etymological sense of the 
word ta tau.
One of the greatest modern tattoo spectacles in the Western world in the 1930s 
was the ‘Great Omi’ (Illustration 10). The Great Omi, also called ‘the Zebra Man’ 
(his real name was Horace Ridler), was tattooed with bold black zebra-like stripes 
covering much of his body, including head and face. As the years passed, the Great 
Omi took to wearing lipstick and nail polish to arouse the curiosity of paying 
crowds. He had his earlobes stretched and pierced with ivory spikes; he had his 
teeth filed to sharp points, and wore an ivory tusk in his nose. He signed his pitch 
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cards ‘Barbaric Beauty’. (Cohen, 29; 52). In his correspondence with his tattooer 
George Burchett, the Great Omi complained that the more outrageous his appear-
ance became, the less respectful he was treated by his employers. He described his 
most insulting experience in a small circus in France as follows: ‘When I was too ill 
to work they painted up a nigger with white paint and put him in my place.’ For the 
sideshow, a white man exposing black features appears to be replaceable by a 
black man exposing white features. Black on white, or white on black, what is the 
difference?8 For a conceptualization of the tattoo as writing or signature, it makes 
a difference, or more precisely, a ‘differant’ in the Derridean sense of the word. 
Black ink on white paper, after all, cannot be understood but as the signifier par ex-
cellence of white, literate, male-dominated civilization, which is constituted in op-
position to ‘the other’, the illiterate, primitive, barbarian savage.9
10. The Great Omi
Tim Whitmore describes his tattoos in the online database of the V&A Archive as 
a mixture of Japanese, Maori, Celtic and Thai-inspired designs. The intertextual 
pre-texts quoted here are ornaments and symbols recalling far-away or long-ago 
exotic cultures. The Maori-inspired design on Whitmore’s left hand, for example, 
refers to the New Zealand tradition to mark the Moko Master with a chiseled de-
sign used for hand and face tattooing. Although a tattoo takes the living body for 
its medium, these historical tattoos can still be seen, not only in drawings or pho-
tographs, but actually in the skin, not only as a performative citation in the shape 
of a quote on Tim Whitmore’s body, but as an authentic and original performance. 
The reason for this presence of tattooed bodies – even after their death – resides 
not only in the Maori’s custom of tattooing their chiefs (marking them as such) and 
removing and preserving their heads after death. It is also based on a macabre 
chapter in Western history; when Europeans began to colonize New Zealand, the 
dried heads of the native Maori became part of a commercial enterprise, stocking 
the museums of Europe and the United States with specimens of ‘barbaric face-cul-




The Maori designs tattooed onto Whitmore’s body are equally transferred from 
the South Seas to Europe, this time not in their physical originality, but as a quota-
tion. Yet on Whitmore’s white skin, these tattoos no longer qualify as fixed writ-
ing, as conventional signs functioning as coded and legible markers of political hi-
erarchy – as they did in Moko society. As a quotation, they indeed repeat their con-
text, but they also have the potential to break with that context. According to Der-
rida, this potential to break with a context is constitutive for any semiotic process: 
‘Every sign… can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break 
with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner 
which is absolutely illimitable.’ (Derrida 1988, 12; emphasis in the original). Just 
like a signature, the symbols on Whitmore’s skin affirm their pre-text, but not 
without difference. Whereas in Moko society, these symbolic stripes indicate a vio-
lating act of naming and thus of labeling or fixing a person within a pre-defined po-
litical hierarchy, Whitmore’s tattooed body challenges rather then affirms such so-
cial hierarchical structures. These tattoos claim to provoke a break, both with the 
culture of origin and with the culture of destination. In doing so, they establish a 
new – or, as Michail Bakhtin would say, a ‘third’ – space in between these cul-
tures.
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Even though Whitmore’s tattoos undeniably serve to mark the self as other, they 
do not necessarily qualify as a racist fixation of the other as for example the Great 
Omi’s tattoos do.11 Shortly before his death in 1969, the Great Omi confessed that 
‘underneath it all, I’m just an ordinary man’.12 Ordinary, here, means white and 
civilized, and civilization is what is underneath the skin. Skin, thus defined, be-
comes an opposite of ‘mind’ or ‘soul’, which is invisible since hidden under the sur-
face. Unlike the Great Omi, Tim Whitmore emphasizes that his tattoos bring his 
deepest held beliefs – his religion, his philosophy, his being married – onto the sur-
face and thus performs those for the other.
This idea of skin as a performative articulation that – as Austin would say – ‘does’ 
the self, comes close to Didier Anzieu’s psychoanalytical concept of the ‘skin ego’. 
The ego, for Anzieu, is not only located in the mind. Rather, it is an effect of cuta-
neous experiences and fantasies. Anzieu introduces his theory with the observa-
tion that in embryonic development, the cortex of the brain (the place where hu-
man consciousness is located) grows out of the surface of the early fetus from 
where it re-enters the inside of the body. This paradoxical insight that ‘the centre is 
situated at the periphery’ (9) makes him conceive of the ego as being ectoderm, 
leading him to call it a ‘skin ego’. Hence, for Anzieu, ego and skin are not opposites 
– as they were for the Great Omi. On the contrary, the skin can be seen as a vessel 
or an envelope that contains the ego, a process defined by Anzieu as ‘invagination’. 
He uses the metaphor of the vagina to explain the concept of ‘skin ego’ because the 
vagina is a fold in the skin that is at once on the outside and on the inside, thus ex-
ternalizing the inside and internalizing the outside. 
Because the skin forms the border between the inside and the world outside it 
has for Anzieu the potential to function as interface. The skin both protects the ego 
against intruders, against aggressive penetration by the other, and it is at once the 
(erogenous) zone where contact between self and other takes place. Skin, thus con-
sidered, can no longer be regarded as an essentialist somatic sign establishing ra-
cial, sexual, or social difference. On the contrary, it becomes a permeable velum 
which can be transgressed both from the inside and from the outside, thus allow-
ing for new, hybrid identities. 
The concept of ‘invagination’ in the sense of Anzieu allows for a more detailed 
analysis of tattooing and of handwriting on the whole. Like handwriting, tattoos 
– as the example of Whitmore’s tattooed body shows – for their bearers serve as 
marks of identification; they claim to bring an authentic self hidden in the depths 
of the inside to the surface. Identity is here construed by tattooed marks that qual-
ify the subject as individual and unique, since different from its community. In the 
case of Whitmore, however much these tattoos claim to be definite markers of di-
versity, they remain a repetition or a citation of a pre-text, however distant in time 
or space it may be. Whitmore may emphatically mark himself as ‘non-Western’, 
but in doing so he cannot avoid inscribing himself into another social context, 
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which he quotes via the design of his tattoos. The Western self appears to be ‘oth-
ered’, that means ‘invaginated’ or penetrated by an exotic other.
This intervention is indeed productive for constituting cultural identity. On the 
other hand, though, it is an effect of a painful disturbance of the ego’s borderline, 
a traumatization, or perforation, of the self by the other. For the act of tattooing, 
this violating dimension is physically true, as tattooing indeed involves an injury of 
the skin, an infliction of pain, and a flow of blood. And yet, for Whitmore, this 
penetration by a Moko design does not function as a violating act of naming in the 
sense that it fixes and labels a person in its essence. Rather, being a quote of exotic 
symbols on white skin, it breaks with its original cultural context by carrying it 
from the South Seas to Western culture, where the tattooed body challenges rather 
then affirms social hierarchical structures. The corporeal metaphor of the vagina 
reveals precisely the dialectics of tattooing as both wounding and healing where 
the self is simultaneously identified and challenged by the other. Both a tattoo and 
the vagina are at once wounded and healed like a scar. To echo Luce Irigaray, the 
vagina is both separated and one, both asunder and in unity, as folded genitals 
touching itself, ‘always simultaneously the one and the other’ (224).13
This double logic of being at once ‘the one and the other’ is also the reason why 
I consider tattooing both a ‘perforative’ and a ‘performative’ practice. It is ‘perfo-
rative’ because it physically riddles or perforates the skin. As a ‘perforative’ prac-
tice, the tattooed body is a singular event. Its emphasis is on the here and now, and 
for that reason it claims to be authentic and original. A tattoo can only be done 
‘live’ and is, therefore, not to be repeated. And yet it is grounded in repetition, 
since it is a result, or a citation, of a cultural other that is entered into the self. Tat-
tooing, marking, naming, or signing must have a repeatable, iterable form in order 
to be readable; to quote Derrida, ‘it must be able to be detached from the present 
and singular intention of its production’. This citationality qualifies tattooing as a 
performative practice. 
However much a tattoo’s perforative, live dimension qualifies it as authentic, a 
tattoo must fail in its attempts of fixing a self as unitary, and finally identical, with 
itself. This is because this desired unity will always be riven by difference; it will 
have the shape of a scar, of which the unity is asunder, an effect of healing a wound 
caused by a violating act of penetrating the needle and injecting the ink as the writ-
ing fluid of the symbolic other. This scar, then, becomes a signifier for the rupture 
between life and death, absence and presence, inside and outside, self and other, as 
indicated by the somatic concept of invagination. 
This idea of being at once ‘the one and the other’ does not only apply to the 
practice of tattooing, but it also holds for handwriting. Similar to the cultural role 
of tattooing, handwriting is often seen as a secure sign of identity. For example, the 
logic of the signature relies on its capacity to function as an index pinpointing at 
the subject of writing, and its legitimacy is based on an assumed unity between 
hand and writing. However, one must admit that this unity is not purely self-reflex-
ive but is split by the (traumatizing) intervention of the other who has not only pre-
designed the letters to sign with, but who has also established the system of sign-
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ing. Even the absolutely singular signature is valid only as a repetition of the ritual 
of signing. And even though it is an absolutely un-exchangeable autographical 
drawing of that which claims to be the strongest bulwark of identity, the proper 
name, it is still split by the gap between the one naming and the one named. This 
other comes from the outside and yet is enfolded inside, it is at the same time the 
one who provides the letters to ‘spell’ the name, and the one to whom any hand-





1. The assumption that handwriting can 
trace the writer’s character is as old as the 
practice of handwriting itself. Prominent 
representatives of graphology are Camillo 
Baldo 1622; Cesare Lombroso 1893; and 
Ludwig Klages 1905-1927; see also the 
‘Introduction’ in this volume.
2. Govenar (215) describes this tool as 
follows: ‘The electric tattoo machine (pat-
terned after the rotary mechanism of a 
sewing machine) not only quickened the 
process and decreased the pain involved, 
but facilitated greater detail and subtlety in 
colouration and shading.’
3. For a wonderful rich historical approach 
to the signature see Fraenkel’s La signa-
ture. The practice of performing the royal 
signature is described on pages 29-30.
4. See, for example, DeMello’s monograph 
Bodies of Inscription.
5. The problem of identifying a subject 
became a new issue in the 19th century, 
when biometrical data such as finger-
prints, characteristics of the face, the walk 
and other body movements entered into 
modern criminology. See also Fechner-
Smarsly’s article on ‘Fingerprint Files’ in 
this book. Cesare Lombroso (L’uomo delin-
quente. Turin, 1897) and A. Lacassagne 
(Les tatouages: étude anthropologique et 
medico-légale. Paris, 1881) also included 
the tattoo in their anthropological classifi-
cations of individuals as a secure signifier 
for a criminal subject. See Caplan, ‘Nation-
al Tattooing’, 2000, 156-173 as well as 
Oettermann 1994, 58-74.
6. This idea of a spelling force of the prop-
er name comes close to Derrida’s theoriza-
tion in his chapter ‘The Battle of Proper 
Names’ in: Of Grammatology. There he 
argues against Lévi-Strauss’s classifica-
tion of the Nambikwara Native Americans 
as ‘wild’, by stating that a society that for-
bids the use of the proper name cannot be 
qualified as illiterate because they obvi-
ously know about the ‘spelling’ force of the 
name. See also Derrida’s Otobiographies 
(1984), where he discusses the use of 
Nietzsche’s proper name as a use ‘on 
credit’, an appraisal which also emphasiz-
es the power structure of the proper name.
7. Juliet Fleming in her brilliant article on 
‘The Renaissance Tattoo’ discusses the act 
of naming through a tattoo as highly de-
pendent on the cultural norms that frame 
it. Depending on cultural norms and on 
naming practices, a tattoo may either ap-
pear as ‘a scandalously prosthetic act of 
naming – one that labels, rather than di-
vines, the essence of a person or thing’, or, 
within another cultural order, it may ‘cause 
identity retroactively’ (82). The latter posi-
tion comes close to my own analysis of 
tattooing as a performative act.
8. This enactment of racial difference is 
the central subject of an installation by 
Glen Lygon consisting of a diptych of two 
identical full-body photographs, one enti-
tled Self-portrait exaggerating my black 
features, the other one Self-portrait exag-
gerating my white features. Photographed 
in high-contrast black-and-white, the mise-
en-scène of whiteness and blackness in-
terrogates, as Cylena Simons puts it ‘the 
self as a racialised subject’ (141). The 
rhetorical power of such undecidability 
has been demonstrated masterfully by 
Paul de Man in his Allegories of Reading, 
where he installs his concept of undecid-
ability by making Archie Bunker ask this 
famous and dangerous question: ‘What’s 
the difference?’
9. The tattoos noted by Captain Cook’s 
crew included lines, stars, and other geo-
metric designs, as well as figures of ani-
mals and humans. According to Lévi 
Strauss’s classification of writing, these 
tattooed marks could be considered less 
‘real writing’ than a writing of ‘savage’ or at 
best ‘barbarian’ people: ‘The depicting of 
objects is appropriate to a savage people, 
signs of words and of propositions to a 
barbaric people, and the alphabet to civi-
lized peoples [peoples polices]’ (quoted in 
Derrida 1997, 337, footnote 9). The letters 
of the Roman alphabet, thus considered, 
generate a writing which can hardly be 
understood other than as a tool used to 
establish white dominance by means of 
‘spelling’ white identity.
10. It appears to be a favorite practice of 
19th-century museums, including the fa-
mous Natural History Museum in New York 
– as Donna Haraway points out – to use 
exhibits of foreign cultures as the ‘justifi-
cation for colonial domination and for 
maintaining the so-called natural hierar-
chies of race, class, and gender’ (quoted 
in DeMello, 54).
11. Susan Benson even goes so far to 
ascribe authenticity to such postmodern 
tattoo practices: ‘The identification with 
the primitive and the exotic is… no longer 
abjected, but is reconfigured as identifica-
tion with the authentic, the uncommodi-
fied, the pure, in opposition to the corrup-
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tions of mainstream society; or, in the case 
of Japanese tattoo, with the refined aes-
thetic of an “ancient civilization”’ (242). 
This assessment indeed expresses what 
could be called the ‘tattoo dream’. But I 
think that this simplifies rather than ex-
plains the idea of ‘authentic identity’, 
which is, as is also discussed in the first 
section of this book, haunted by the trou-
bles of the impossibility of originality, 




13. The concept of the fold is a central one 
in poststructuralist epistemology. I refer to 
Deleuze’s A Thousand Plateaus (with Guat-
tari) as well as his The Fold: Leibniz and 
the Baroque. Derrida in his Dissemination 
designs a fold that is entangled in the dis-
semination as dissemination. All these 
folds, rather than coming to a halt in the 
face of Luce Irigaray’s binary, go on into 
infinity.
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